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WORLD POLITICS

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ABSTRACTS

Political Succession in China

By T. W. ROBINSON

There are at least four approaches useful in predicting what will happen in China after Mao. The "environmental approach" stresses that the Chinese setting—physical, cultural, economic, and international—will govern the courses taken by political actors. The "personality approach" is the opposite, stressing that people, not their surroundings, will determine succession politics. The "societal approach" postulates that it is society (defined as the social environment, including influences from Chinese culture, history, and the structure and operation of Chinese social-political-familial-economic institutions) that is the operationally significant variable. Finally, the "politics approach" assumes that politics itself is the central concern of Chinese life, necessitating a search for general "rules" of politics in China to project the future. These approaches and their implications are each examined in detail, with the conclusion that none is adequate of itself to explain post-Mao politics in China. By combining them, however, it is possible to periodize developments after Mao. Four stages are envisaged. An initial stage would last about three months, during which a collective leadership would form. A second, transitional phase, possibly lasting several years, would be marked by the advent of major policy questions not solvable by Maoist precedent. A third phase would see the emergence of a new leadership, probably operating on a factionalist model. Finally, a fourth stage would be defined after China has returned to normal, "gotten over" Mao's death, and when events are no longer viewable in terms of "succession politics."

Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations

By R. O. KEOHANE and J. S. NYE

Students of world politics have tended to assume that states act as units. Yet transgovernmental relations—direct interactions among sub-units not controlled or closely guided by the policies of cabinets or chief executives—are frequently important. Transgovernmental relations are facilitated by extensive personal contacts among officials and by conflicts of interest between departments or agencies within modern governments. International organizations can play important roles in transgovernmental networks by (1) affecting the definition of issues; (2) promoting coalitions among governmental sub-units with similar interests; and (3) serving as points of policy intervention in transnational systems. As policy interdependence among developed-country governments becomes more extensive and complex, these roles of international organizations are likely to become increasingly important. Internationalism of this relatively informal, non-institutionalized type is not a "dead end."

Oil, Other Scarcities, and the Poor Countries

By J. P. LEWIS

Classic, optimistic, post-World War II development strategy (whereunder the new states, catalyzed by temporary, modest injections of foreign aid, were to achieve accelerated growth, improved mass welfare, and national self-reliance) already was in trouble before it was overtaken by growing awareness of natural-resource scarcities. But, at least in their Limits-of-Growth version, the latter seem to challenge the strategy fundamentally. Six hypotheses for reconciling scarcities and development are: (1) world zero population growth needs urgent promotion; but (2) there is no comparable early need for arresting global economic growth; (3) the poor countries, along with more equity, need faster

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

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growth and therefore continuing regularized net transfers from the rich; (4) the rich, while sharing some of their growth dividends with the poor through scarcity-related market adjustments, will keep growing enough also to provide net transfers; (5) the oil crisis is so extreme a case of the problem that it confuses more than it teaches; (6) in a system that is still nation-state dominated, the mixture of cooperative and conflicted scenarios for promoting development in a context of scarcity may veer toward the former as affluent decision makers are "subverted" into planetary perspectives.

The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy

By A. PERLMUTTER

Fundamental to modern politics is the fact that politics of security and diplomacy are central to society. Historically, foreign and security politics have been the main priorities of the political center, conducted primarily on that level. Since 1945, these political centers have gained predominance in the U.S. In the absence of well-integrated political elites, a highly centralized political party or parties, and powerful and permanent bureaucracies and civil service, the presidential political center has become the pivotal political center with almost exclusive control over foreign affairs and national security. The locus and degree of power within the American political and constitutional context, rather than elite orientations and practices, are identified to explain who dominates American foreign policy.

Armies and Politics in Latin America

By A. F. LOWENTHAL

An extensive literature analyzes military participation in Latin American politics. Case studies and a few comparative works undermine the faith of a decade ago—that military involvement in Latin American politics would decline as a result of economic development, social modernization, military professionalization, and American influence. Attention has turned increasingly to the variety of military involvements: direct and indirect; personal, factional, and institutional; intermittent and long-term; reformist and regressive. Analyses stressing the confluence and interaction of macro-social factors with those internal to the military institution seem most persuasive in explaining the diverse political roles played by Latin American officers. One central proposition which deserves further research is that the relation between the levels of military institutionalization and the institutionalization of civilian political procedures importantly affects these varying roles.

Strategic Intelligence and Foreign Policy

By H. H. RANSOM

Strategic intelligence, the evaluated informational product of intelligence bureaucracies, is a potentially important element in foreign policy decision making. But the role and impact of intelligence reports are very difficult to analyze, because of both secrecy and conceptual or definitional problems. Some new light is shed by a number of recent books, in three categories: essentially uncritical works by former insiders, muckraking exposés, and historical case studies. Collectively, these books improve our understanding of the variables that condition the impact of strategic intelligence on policy, or they illuminate the policy and bureaucratic context of intelligence activities. But only one of the recent books has a theoretical thrust. Great need remains, and opportunities exist, to move toward better theoretical understanding of intelligence, or at least toward improved information about when, how, or whether intelligence activities or reports have measurable impact on foreign policy decision making and policy outcomes in world politics.

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POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN CHINA

By THOMAS W. ROBINSON

I. Introduction

SUCCESSION has been a favorite topic of analysts and politicians, in and outside of China, for at least the two decades since Kao Kang attempted to set himself up as Mao's heir.[1] However, several reasons argue against attempts to apply to China the traditional categories of analysis of succession in communist regimes. Mao's arrangements for a peaceful succession have failed twice, and while there is much to learn of the future from the fates of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, it is unlikely that Mao will for a third time attempt to name a successor. Collective leadership is therefore probable in China, at least in the months immediately following Mao's demise, and perhaps for a lengthy period thereafter. Given the present lack of a leader with the necessary charismatic qualifications, given the multiplicity of force and "electorates" at play on the Chinese political landscape, and given the natural reluctance of Mao's posterity to allow any of their number to acquire vast power without good reason, it does not pay to devote a great deal of effort to speculate over exactly who will succeed Mao.

Moreover, the relative political status of the twenty or so men and women who make up the central leadership, and the thousand or so people just below them, is not known to the degree necessary to make useful (i.e., reasonably accurate) predictions of their positions after Mao has left the scene. In some cases, we do not know who occupies the important positions; in others, comparative unknowns are in office; in still others, the chair seems unfilled. Meanwhile, old figures, presumably purged during the Cultural Revolution, constantly turn up, sometimes in their old positions, and new officeholders are sometimes purged without their demotion being announced until much later (or never—a new person merely shows up). It is, therefore, at present impossible to construct a politically accurate chart of who's who in Peking, and it is still difficult to fill in a formal chart of organization. Finally, the

[1] Just to mention a few studies over the years: Harold C. Hinton, "The Succession Problem in Communist China," *Current Scene*, I (July 19, 1962); John W. Lewis, "Chinese Communist Party Leadership and the Succession to Mao Tse-tung: An Appraisal of Tensions," Department of State (Washington, D.C. 1964); William F. Dorrill, "Leadership and Succession in Communist China," *Current History*, II (September 7, 1965), 129-35; A. Doak Barnett, *China After Mao* (Princeton 1967); and Dennis Ray, "China After Mao," *International Affairs* (London), XLVII (January 1971), 45-62.

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power contest in Peking is far from open. This is little different from other communist countries, to be sure, but the problem is especially acute in China, where would-be contenders fear to make moves that might mark them as such, much less express their desires or opinions even to close associates. To appear to have ambition in China is a fatal error, not only because Chinese "political culture" forbids such open display of one's plans, but also because, with a seemingly irrational and crotchety Mao still occupying the Chung Nai Hai, one can become a "walking ghost" (or a real one, as Lin Piao found out) literally overnight.

Thus, when studying succession in China, we must return to fundamentals. This means we must grasp the essential features of Chinese politics as it has been played at least since 1949 if not before, and on that basis consider alternative outcomes of succession. Fortunately, we are now on somewhat surer ground, because many of the details as well as the main outlines of the political process in China were made public during and after the Cultural Revolution. In fact, much of the domestic politics of China since 1953, and perhaps significant elements in its foreign policy, were conducted in terms of differences between the chosen successors, Liu Shao-ch'i or Lin Piao, and their nominator, Mao, or in terms of jugglings for position among the various groups and personages thought to be contending for the right to wear the mantle of leadership in the post-Mao period.[2] Of course, Mao himself confounded the problem by failing to stick with either of his nominees. With the downfall of Lin Piao, therefore, the issue of succession again became a wide-open question. And because the geriatric tables press

[2] The Mao vs. Lin controversy is by now well documented. See, *inter alia*, Richard Baum, "Revolution and Reaction in the Chinese Countryside: The Socialist Education Movement in Cultural Revolutionary Perspective," *China Quarterly*, No. 38 (April-June 1969), 92-119; Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cadres Question," *Asian Survey*, VIII (April 1968), 323-45; Richard Baum and Frederick C. Teiwes, *Ssu-Ch'ing: The Socialist Education Movement of 1962–1966*, Center for Chinese Studies, China Research Monograph No. 2 (Berkeley 1968); Parris H. Chang, "Dispute Over Communes, 1959–1962," unpub.; Peter Cheng, "Liu Shao-ch'i and the Cultural Revolution," *Asian Survey*, XI (October 1971), 943-57; Chin Ssu-k'ai, "The Mao-Lin Struggle from Another Angle," *Tsu-kuo Yüeh-k'an*, No. 68 (November 1, 1969), transl. in *Chinese Law and Government*, III (Summer/Fall 1970), 189-205; Kung Te-liang, "Maoist Attacks on Liu Shao-ch'i," *Issues and Studies*, IV (July 1967), 8-17; Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, 1939–1969," *Asian Survey*, XII (April 1972), 275-93; D. Gordon White, "A Comparison of the Operational Codes of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i," Center for East Asian Studies (Stanford 1970); the Editor, "The Conflict Between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i Over Agricultural Mechanization in Communist China," *Current Scene*, VI (October 1, 1968); and the Editor, "The Mao-Liu Controversy Over Rural Public Health," *Current Scene*, VII (June 15, 1969).

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ever more relentlessly upon the Party Chairman, it is quite doubtful that many more years will pass before he "goes to see God."

In any reasonably complete inquiry into succession in China (or elsewhere for that matter), the following are questions that must be considered. First, what alternative methods exist for analyzing the problem, and what is the comparative usefulness of each? Second, what does the past teach us to expect during the post-Mao period, in the sense of having influenced the nature and development of Chinese politics on this question and of the effect of the two official attempts to designate a successor? Third, what are the probable stages of succession in China, and how long can each be expected to last? Fourth, what issues are likely to influence the process of succession and, once the immediate succession period is past, what policy changes are possible and with what relative probability? Finally, what individuals, groups, institutions, and regions are liable to be involved in the succession; what are their comparative assets and vulnerabilities; and what, therefore, is the likelihood that a given individual or group of individuals will succeed to power? (In this context, we must also ask whether there need be a succession in the narrow sense of finding someone, eventually, to step into the shoes of the Chairman.)

Some cautions are in order. As we have noted, it is impossible to forecast with any degree of accuracy exactly who, or what group, will succeed to Mao's mantle. To be sure, personality is an exceedingly important determinant of policy. But the very indeterminacy of politics, the complexity of Chinese political culture, the relatively large part played by the physical environment, and the influence of past policies, political "style," and institutional arrangements all combine to limit the weight of the role of personality. These are the more important in the Chinese case, for aside from Chou En-lai, whose personal imprint has been important to the question of succession, there is now no political figure whose qualities obviously make him stand out, or who is even known sufficiently well to merit more than ordinary attention.

If excessive concern with the individual is one pitfall to be avoided, so is its opposite, the "statistical fallacy." This is the notion that, since the top leadership in contemporary China is so elderly and the several older political generations so relatively small in number, it is probable that the post-Mao period will see a virtual skipping over of whole classes of eligible leaders and a comparatively rapid transition to a much younger group of governors.[3] The dire consequences foreseen as a re-

[3] On the "generational skip hypothesis," see Robert A. Scalapino, "The Transition in Chinese Party Leadership: A Comparison of the Eighth and Ninth Central Com-

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sult of such a process (violent political infighting, inexperience in politics, severely circumscribed worldview) do not necessarily follow, for three reasons. It takes only one exception to the generational skip hypothesis—one leader of the older generation remaining in power for several years—to render it invalid. The younger generations of Chinese leaders, those who entered the Party in 1936 and after, have at least as good a chance of learning about the world of politics and of international relations as their predecessors, if only because their elders held office for so long and provided such an extensive and intensive example. If present international conditions persist, the probability of their contact with other cultures and viewpoints will increase dramatically. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the transition to a group of rulers whose average age is significantly lower than those now in office will occur suddenly. Not only do old men well know how to keep their younger subordinates from forcing them out of office, but the Chinese respect for age (still valid in the communist era) and the tendency for communist autocracies to stay in power for long periods render the probability of a rapid generational transition relatively low.

Finally, caution must be exercised in forecasting policy changes on the basis of the mere removal of Mao and one or more of his associates from the current balance of factions, issues, institutions, and policies. Despite the revelations of the Cultural Revolution, we still do not know the extent to which current policies represent Mao's own.[4] Policies are subject to more than just personal preference, no matter how powerful and authoritative the rulers. The nature of Chinese politics, especially at the "palace" level, is only imperfectly understood, even now. And the cyclical nature of Chinese politics, together with the tendency toward nonlinearity in future trends, should give us pause in attempting to discuss policy outputs when only one of the inputs—the presence of the Chairman—is presumed to have changed. In politics, many variables can change simultaneously, at varying rates, and with changing degrees of importance.

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mittees," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China* (Seattle 1972), 67-143; and William W. Whitson, "The Concept of Military Generation: The Chinese Communist Case," *Asian Survey*, VIII (November 1968), 921-47.

[4] Most studies of the Cultural Revolution assume all major initiatives to come from Mao. See, for instance, the series by Philip Bridgham, "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution': Origins and Developments," "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," and "Mao's Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Consolidate Power," *China Quarterly*, No. 29 (January–March 1967), 1-35; No. 34 (April–June 1968), 6-37; and No. 41 (January–March 1970), 1-25. Needless to say, this orientation, always open to question because of its exclusivism, has been presented with increasing problems by the trend of events and revelations since the Ninth Party Congress.

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It does not follow that it is impossible to discuss the future with any degree of assurance. We can note general trends. We do observe a certain pattern in past events. We have, for a communist polity, better than average data. We know, in general, what issues will need to be addressed in Peking during the coming years, and we have a good idea of the "style" of the Chinese communists over the past half-century in dealing with all kinds of issues. These give us the right at least to express opinions, in the sense of probabilistic statements, as to what to expect once Mao, and perhaps Chou, leave the scene.[5]

II. Alternative Approaches to Political Succession in China

There are at least four ways of organizing an inquiry into the status of China, domestic and international, after Mao's demise. Each stems from a particular notion as to what the most important factors are in determining the political process in China.

First is the idea that the environment, domestic and international, determines politics.[6] One must therefore concentrate on issues as a set of alternative ways of meeting the challenge of the environment. Hence, the driving force of the political process is not so much the composition of decision-making groups, the role of the personalities of certain leaders, or the strength of certain ideas about the nature of political reality, as the stream of inputs into the political system from the environment. Attention thus focuses on such matters as the stage and direction of the Chinese economy, the population-food balance, the Soviet border threat, and the status of Taiwan, rather than on how political decisions themselves are made. The political process is, in fact, regarded as a constant; politics consists, for the most part, in dealing with issues as they come up, and not in seizing upon or creating issues for the purpose of advancing one's own cause or increasing one's own power. At the extreme, this approach turns politics into administration, or at least regards it as a set of reactions to the environment, upon which the decision-makers have little real impact. Depending on what view of human nature one adopts, politics becomes the science of mud-

[5] There are several recent interesting studies of succession in China. See Parris H. Chang, "China: After Mao, Who and What," unpub., 1973; Michael C. Oksenberg, "The Chinese Political Process and the Succession," unpub., 1973; and Ting Wang, "The Succession Problem," *Problems of Communism*, XXII (May–June 1973), 13-24.

[6] See, for instance, Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Man-Milieu Relationships: Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics*, Center of International Studies Research Monograph (Princeton 1956), and *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton 1956 and 1965); Donella H. Meadows and others, *The Limits to Growth* (New York 1972); and W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960).

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dling through or the study of rationalism in a social setting. In China, where the environment—physical, cultural, economic, and international—severely constrains the freedom of political actors to assert themselves, an approach that concentrates upon issues may not be entirely divorced from reality.

The second approach is the opposite of the first, its thesis being that it is people, not their surroundings, that determine politics.[7] One must therefore discuss particular individuals, personalities, factions, and the generational question. Instead of standing at the center of attention, issues become the framework or a series of catalysts for the working out of the complex of relations between people and the institutions they control. In the Chinese setting, research has concentrated on the person of Mao Tse-tung, or of such other important political actors as Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, or Lin Piao. Their "style" of politics, their *Weltanschauung*, and the relative strength of the organizations which they head or headed are the objects of the scholar's inquiry, and determine how they deal with the issues of the day. Inquiry then is made into the existence of factions centering on the major personalities, and the regional, field army, and generational differences traceable to the historic leadership of one or another of the CCP or PLA leaders. Pekinology, the study of Chinese politics from the viewpoint of the relationship between personages within the leadership group at the top of the Party and the army, is one example of this approach. Another is the thesis that Chinese politics since 1949, if not Party politics before, is merely the workings of the personality of Mao Tse-tung writ large.

The third approach postulates that it is society, in a very general sense, that determines politics, and hence policy.[8] Society is defined as the social environment, and includes the set of influences that stem from Chinese culture, Chinese history, and the structure and operation of Chinese social-political familial-economic institutions. This approach distinguishes itself from the environmental approach by regarding the environment as a physical entity, and therefore outside the direct control of Chinese social institutions, or beyond control simply because the policy or acts of other states are involved. By contrast, social acts relate

[7] Perhaps the writings of Erik Erikson and Alexander George are the best examples. See Erikson's *Young Man Luther* and *Gandhi's Truth* (New York 1956 and 1969), and George's *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House* (New York 1956). The writings on personality and politics are, of course, extremely numerous.

[8] Good examples are: Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston 1965), and James March and Herbert Simon, *Organization* (New York 1958). Most traditional writing on China, exemplified by the work of John Fairbank, is of this school.

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to matters that occur because of the nature and structure of institutions, past or present, which humans in China have set up, or to the thoughts and acts of humans within those institutions. Attempts at understanding Chinese politics, which place emphasis upon the role of ideology—particularly Maoism—in determining domestic and foreign policies, would fall within this category, as would those that stress the role of Chinese political culture, the weight of Chinese history, and the sociological and familial basis of Chinese society. Answers to policy questions are therefore to be found in the social environment rather than in the physical, external, or even psychological environment. This approach to Chinese politics is, therefore, more indirect than the first two, and relegates both issue and personality to the status of variables of secondary importance.

A final approach is more direct but somewhat difficult to describe. Essentially, it holds that it is politics itself that determines policy, that politics is the central concern of Chinese life, and that politics sums up and is the "queen" of the social sciences.[9] A search is therefore instituted for general "rules" of politics in China, or regularities derived from the study of politics elsewhere are applied to the Chinese case. Process models, such as the emphasis upon intra-institutional bureaucratic processes, or inter-institutional conflicts of authority, are examples; so are the many theories stressing the struggle for power among persons and institutions. In this approach, politics is regarded as an atmosphere in which all political actors are immersed and which immutably conditions their every act. Consequently, decision-makers, despite their desire, intention, and assertion to the contrary, lack freedom of action and find themselves, often tragically, constrained to perform acts they would not normally countenance in nonpolitical circumstances. Everything changes, according to this view, when an issue becomes political: standards of conduct usually considered immoral suddenly find a "rational" basis; rules of institutional or legal behavior are superseded by special political rules; and everyone is forced to act to protect himself or to advance his interest (defined as a constant augmentation of his relative power) to the detriment of that of his colleagues. Politics is often a deadly zero-sum game from whose domain it is impossible to escape once one has agreed to play. This is particularly the case in

[9] Two classics of this approach are: Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago 1946), and David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, *A Strategy of Decision* (New York 1963). A convenient *entrée* to the behavioral literature taking this approach is Paul Swingle, ed., *The Structure of Conflict* (New York 1970).

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China, in this view, where there are neither relatively unchanging and universally accepted legal or constitutional norms, nor prescribed institutional, procedural guarantees, nor established time limits to the holding of political office.

A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACH

Each of the four approaches can be applied to the question of succession in China and each, obviously, will produce a different set of emphases and forecasts.[10] The environmental approach, stressing issues, looks to continuity with the period prior to succession, but also stresses the necessity to solve new problems not now on the agenda for decision. Four major problem areas must be faced by any future group of Chinese leaders: (1) how to increase agricultural production and limit population increase to prevent an unfavorable trend in the available number of calories per person per day; (2) what emphasis and form to give to the education of Chinese youth in a period of rapid modernization and, concomitantly, what the content of the ideological (particularly the Maoist) basis of the Party's authority is to be; (3) what relative stress to give to the various sectors of industry (consumer, producer, military); what pace should be set for industrial growth, and what percentage of total annual industrial production should be devoted to the foreign trade sector; in particular, how much emphasis to give to production of nuclear weapons, missiles, and other modern, sophisticated, and high-cost weaponry as opposed to continued emphasis upon conventional weaponry; and (4) what policy to adopt internationally, especially toward the Soviet Union, the United States, and Japan; what set of military strategies to adopt—conventional defense, nuclear deterrence, mixed conventional and nuclear, or trading the nonproduction of large numbers of nuclear delivery vehicles for disarmament commitments by the United States and the Soviet Union; and whether to emphasize Peking's role as a world power, perhaps as the leader of the

[10] It is true, of course, that the situation does not demand that we choose between these four approaches to settle upon the one most likely to predict policy outcomes accurately in the post-Mao period. The most desirable procedure would be to obtain some realistic and generally agreed-upon synthesis and, from that, to generate a series of alternative possible scenarios, each touching upon policy-relevant issues and each carrying some probability of occurrence. But the status of our understanding about, and our agreement upon, the nature of politics in China precludes the production of such a single model, and the lack of the detailed facts necessary for a full exposition of any of the approaches would prevent the use of such a model even if it did exist. Further, the fledgling nature of the field of forecasting renders it quite unlikely that such a synthetic model could find its central utility in a forecasting mode. Finally, there is some intrinsic merit to forbearing, at least for the present, from picking the four approaches apart and welding together, in some eclectic manner, what seem to be the strongest elements of each.

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developing countries, or to stress her ideological autonomy, political independence, and economic autarky. No matter who comes to power in Peking when the actual moment of succession occurs, Chinese leaders will have to deal with these problems. And because the Chinese environment allows little margin of error in their solution, the range of options available to Chinese decision-makers is limited when compared with the possibilities open to American, Russian, or Japanese leaders.

(1) The continuing necessity to augment food production as much as possible, for instance, will require an increasing emphasis in the future upon farm mechanization, chemical fertilizers, and other devices produced by modern industry. It follows that if adversity is to be avoided, a relatively high percentage of industrial production must continue to be devoted to support agriculture; that most of China's population must continue to live in the countryside and not the cities (with all the obvious implications for the medical, educational, and transportation systems); and that private plots will still play a disproportionately large role in production (which means that the ideological, purist solution to the problems of "capitalist remnants" in the countryside will remain beyond the reach of Mao's successors). Any successor government will also feel the necessity to devote increasingly large sums to manufacturing conventional military weaponry. A classic "guns versus butter" debate may shape up in the post-Mao political arena, as the agricultural and strategic environments combine to present China with severe constraints upon available resources and, hence, unpalatable choices. Elementary national security and Peking's desire to be recognized as a world power argue in favor of accelerated acquisition of modern military hardware. Although the question of the exact division of investment between the spheres of conventional and nuclear weapons, and among various weapons systems, will surely be one of the issues forming the context of political infighting among the contenders for leadership in post-Mao China, there seems little doubt that military expenditures will demand an increasing share of the Chinese budget. Since the increasing complexity of contemporary armaments threatens to widen the gap between China and her Russian and American competitors, she must run faster if she wishes to catch up.

(2) In the educational arena, fundamental decisions must be made concerning the content of curriculum, the number of years students will be permitted to remain in school, and policy toward specialization versus broadly based education. Because education is so closely linked to the everyday life of the people and to the very basis of Party policy and ideological doctrine, decisions on educational matters will be taken

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and put into effect only when agreement has been reached on what the "correct" ideological content and direction is to be for the short- and medium-term future. Yet even here, the "environment" presses in upon the Chinese leadership, for if China wishes to modernize herself in the industrial-technological sense, as she must, she must provide herself with a large number of trained scientists, technicians, artists, and teachers whose work is at the level of world standards. The trouble is that educational modernization is corrosive of ideology (i.e., it is "revisionist"). The Cultural Revolution itself was fought partially over the content of the educational curriculum, and definitive new programs have been slow to be promulgated. In the end, compromises will have to be made that will gradually be corrosive of ideology. If Soviet experience is any guide, the Party can control outcroppings of liberal thinking for an indefinite period, but only at the cost of slowly losing ground to the panoply of new ideas constantly emanating from Western countries. If, during the Maoist era, China came to be known as a "revolutionary" country, in the post-Mao period she may risk being looked upon as reactionary. Once again, the "environment" pushes the Chinese leadership into confronting questions it would rather defer to the more distant future. So long as the scientific-technical and the various social revolutions seem to be speeding up, and so long as China feels she must move doubly fast to overcome a century's lack of progress, the educational question will continue to plague any future leadership.

(3) In the industrial sphere, the Chinese leadership must do whatever is necessary to foster a high rate of industrial growth just to make up for the relatively low growth during the first half of the twentieth century, to provide the wherewithal to defend the country, and to underline Peking's assertion of world-power status. Mao's successors must also face the fact that, for some time to come, China's industrial rate of growth will be determined not so much by how efficient industry is, but by such relatively uncontrollable factors as the volume of the harvest, the degree to which foreign trade allows for the importation of foreign technology, and the percentage of production that must be siphoned off to produce weaponry for defense. The latter two factors depend upon the status of China's relations with foreign countries, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States, over which China's direct influence is slight.

It is true, of course, that if Mao's successors were to adopt a policy of modified, Yugoslav-style, market socialism, China's industrial rate of growth would probably rise and certainly be less susceptible to po-

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litically induced ups and downs. But shielding much of the economic sphere from direct political control is exactly what many Chinese politicians fear, for Soviet-style revisionism would quickly appear and, having gained a foothold in industry, threaten to spread to other areas. And yet, as the country's industry becomes more complex, it seems ever more desirable to relax totalistic controls based on derivations from the political experience of the more and more distant past or on the whims of a single individual. The passage of Mao, and the consequent inevitable dilution of his ideological authority, will come at a time when pressures will be mounting to modify such presently sacrosanct ideas as basing incentives at least partially on ideological verve, insisting upon autarky in design and production of important producer goods and means of locomotion, and prohibiting overdependence upon foreign trade or the acceptance of massive loans from foreign states or other external creditors.

(4) Finally, in foreign relations, the "environment," that is, the character of the international system and the policies of other relevant states, is only marginally amenable to Chinese control. Looking at trends in the system as a whole, it would seem, at the least, that a higher degree of international cooperation and institutionalization is likely. The increasing economic interdependence of the industrialized countries, the enhanced importance of raw materials and energy supplies, the rise of regional economic and, possibly, security organizations, and the necessity for cooperative measures against pollution, all argue to that end. This is to say nothing of the possibilities for cooperation that flow from arms control and disarmament agreements among the major powers.

These trends seem, at present, to be inimical to Chinese ways of thinking about and acting in the international sphere. China regards herself as doing battle against the "system," rather than as joining in to improve its working. She regards herself as the champion of the developing countries, who are, in her eyes, increasingly exploited by the industrialized states. She emphasizes the rights of autonomy, independence, and sanctity of her national borders, not mutual cultural penetration, economic cooperation, and voluntary diminution of sovereignty in favor of new international organizations. With regard to the three states most important to her—America, Japan, and Russia—she fears a coalition of all three against her or an agreement, written or unwritten, between the United States and the Soviet Union that could be interpreted as being directed against her. There are many ways of dealing with such an eventuality, but the principal means involve leaning toward one or the other of the two nuclear superpowers, de-

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pending on which one is regarded as the more threatening, or forming a racially based alliance with Japan against the other two. For purposes of the present argument, however, the point is that, barring more than minimal Sino-Soviet rapprochement, the international environment seems to constrict Chinese freedom of action for some time to come.

The environmental approach does seem to demonstrate that any future Chinese leadership will have to deal with a series of issues that leave comparatively little freedom to maneuver, if we assume rationality of decision making. The virtue of this approach is that it emphasizes the weight of factors over which no Chinese leader has personal control and thus indicates future policy directions and remaining areas of political controversy. The environmental approach is thus a first approximation to answering the question what policy changes will take place in China once Mao has left the scene. The trouble is that, even allowing for the relatively narrow range of choice on many critical issues, enough leeway remains to form the basis for widely varying policy choices. It makes a difference, for instance, whether China decides to re-ally with the Soviet Union, to join Japan against Russia and America, or to balance between Washington and Moscow. Beyond this lies the ability of any Chinese decision-maker to depart from what seems to be the necessary, rational solution to policy questions, at least for a period. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were, at least to many observers, irrational departures from the "proper" course of Chinese political and economic development. Yet they are the two major facts of Chinese history since 1949, and each substantially determined the course of events for years afterwards. Unless one assumes that latitude of decision in the future will be severely constricted as compared with that in evidence over the last quarter-century, it will be possible for future Chinese leaders again to depart from what seems to be the narrow path of correct policy. They may do so at their, and China's, peril, but they may do so. History may in fact be considered the study of what, in retrospect, appear to be such departures, and their consequences.

Finally, this approach does not order the issues for the policy-maker. Policy formation is as much a choice between competing demands of different spheres—the domestic economic versus the foreign political, for instance—as it is a choice between alternatives in the same sphere. In any case, the environmental approach provides only the outer framework for analyzing the problem of succession in China. To inquire more closely into what is likely to happen in the post-Mao period when unhappy and incongruent choices have to be made, we must look at the other three modes of analysis.

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B. THE PERSONALITY APPROACH

The personality approach is where most statements concerning succession in China begin, and often end. Since Chinese politics has so long been dominated by the personality of Mao Tse-tung, it is natural, indeed vital, to ask what will happen when he is gone, and—given the dominance of strong personalities over most of twentieth-century Chinese history—whether the rise of a charismatic authority figure to prominence is not a central feature of the Chinese manner of conducting political affairs. Moreover, communist systems in general seem to depend upon small-group or one-man leadership. Hence, the conclusion is that China must, and therefore will, find itself another Mao, and Chinese politics consists in testing the comparative strengths of the various groups, cliques, factions, and institutions headed by different individuals. Interim periods may occur, but in the end one man (perhaps, to be sure, representing one dominant institution, generation, or approach to the solution of Chinese problems) will emerge supreme. It is certain that Mao's overriding authority will extend beyond his death and it will therefore be difficult for any successor to rival him. Moreover, Mao's successors are not likely to be overjoyed at the prospect of another personalist ruler. Nonetheless, if the future Mao-Stalin exists, he can probably be found (if the proper, Pekinological analysis is done) among the several hundred top leaders in China today.

Until early 1974, attention was devoted to Chou En-lai. He alone seemed to have the institutional authority, length of service, political and personal attributes, and that special magnetism accompanying charisma that are needed to fill, if only partly, the shoes of Mao. If Chou recovers his health (and if his indisposition is not also political), he could succeed to, or be forced by developments to compete for, Mao's mantle. Although his tenure might turn out to be relatively short (given his advanced age), it must be remembered that even four years is a political era and that such a period would give the Chinese leadership the time it needs to recover from Mao's passage and find a new leader for the longer term. This is especially true if Teng Hsiao-p'ing, increasingly Chou's *alter ego*, provides an additional increment of experience at critical junctures. It is entirely possible, of course, that Chou will not outlive Mao or that, because Chou is now in the vulnerable number two position, Mao might purge him just as he did Lin and Liu before him. While such an occurrence would surely disrupt the search for a worthy successor and even dangerously disorganize Chinese politics as a whole, several reasons argue against such a likelihood.

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Mao still needs Chou (and Teng) to provide continuity of leadership. Chou long ago proved he is no personal threat to Mao; indeed, that is at least part of the reason he survived politically for so long. The "New Course" so evident in China and obviously led by Chou probably has Mao's approval.[11] Even were the Great Helmsman to change political direction once again, Chou is the most adept of all Chinese politicians at anticipating and going along with the Maoist current. Indeed, Chou's seeming ability to overcome charges placed against him in the anti-Confucius campaign support this contention. The major problem seems to be Chou's health. His stamina has until recently been one of the wonders of the political world; it may be faltering.

Because Chou cannot last forever, and (presuming, as this approach does, that policy flows from personality) a search must be instituted for other leaders. Chiang Ch'ing, Mao's spouse, seems an unlikely candidate, despite her relative youth. She appears to be rigid in her policies. She does not have a personal following, and her radical group, so powerful during the Cultural Revolution, is all but disbanded. Since a de-Maoification process will probably be instituted after his demise (it is under way even now), her influence should decline accordingly. She may well become the Soong Ching-ling of the late twentieth century. The search must therefore turn in other directions. Because of the still unsettled ordering of the top leadership and the advanced age of many of Mao's associates, we must look to younger leaders and to representatives of China's major institutions as candidates.

One observer has characterized the alternative possibilities as a choice between royalists (Chiang Ch'ing and her followers), bureaucrats (either Chou and others in the government apparatus or such up-and-coming Party officials as Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao or Yao Wen-yüan), and generals (mostly regional figures such as Ch'en Hsi-lien or Hsu Shih-yu, or a regional-central military figure such as Li Teh-sheng).[12] This mode of analysis assumes Chinese politics, especially as it concerns succession, to be palace (i.e., factional) politics. Inevitably, factional politics partakes of some aspects of bureaucratic (i.e., inter-institutional) politics, generational politics, and center-regional politics—frameworks that are considered more fully in our third and fourth approaches to the study of Chinese political behavior and succession. Here, we stress those aspects of such relationships that center on the role of the indi-

[11] The term was first applied to Malenkov's Soviet domestic policies after Stalin and to Hungarian policy under Nagy, and has now been applied to China. See the excellent article by Jürgen Domes, "New Course in Chinese Domestic Politics: The Anatomy of Readjustment," *Asian Survey*, III (July 1973), 633-45.

[12] See Ting Wang (fn. 5).

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vidual, not so much as a representative of his institution, but as an independent actor who, having reached the top of the ladder, is now more nearly able to carry out his own programs than in his previous post. Social and institutional constraints still operate, to be sure, but they merely provide a backdrop, assumed to be rather broad, to the application of personality. In this approach, situational exigencies and role requirements, far from "squeezing out" the personality factor, are themselves thought to be minimized.[13]

For purposes of studying succession in China, however, it seems almost impossible to work out an informative analysis, mostly for lack of data. We need to know a broad range of politically relevant actions over a long period of time in order to assess the comparative political "styles" of the relevant actors. The problem is that for many of them few of the data needed for drawing psycho-political conclusions are available, and that, under Mao's rule, all political actors continue to skew their activities in accord with their evaluations of his desires. We can go a certain distance, however, by asking what type of leader the post-Mao situation is likely to call for, and then matching the qualities that are considered desirable with those of the top leaders now competing for succession.

Eight traits seem especially useful in the post-Mao period: (1) ideological sensitivity, in that any potential successor must show his ability to reason in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terminology, and thus to demonstrate the ideological acceptability of a project although he may believe in its feasibility for more practical reasons; (2) existence of a personal following, as evidenced by more than ordinary prominence in his institution or locality, together with possible indicators of charisma; (3) established authority in an institution or locality, as evidenced by a record of past exploits (especially before 1949) and a record of career stability since 1950 (i.e., no serious setbacks such as being purged in the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution); (4) maintenance of a geographic or institutional power base in the army or the Party (location in the government or the revolutionary committee structure is less desirable, unless there is concomitant retention of leadership in the military or the Party); (5) ability to conduct political infighting effectively, as indicated by substantiated reports of success in past battles, sheer survival over the years, and ability to bounce back from attack or demotion; (6) a record of not having made too many enemies, of

[13] Fred Greenstein, *Politics and Personality* (Chicago 1969), 14, feels that situation and role overpower personality factors in the end. In China, however, this conclusion has been far from evident, at least during the twentieth century.

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TABLE 1. PERTINENT DATA ON SELECTED CANDIDATES FOR THE MAOIST SUCCESSION AS OF THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS, AUGUST 1973

Name	*Central Party*	*Central Military*	*Field Army*	*Military Region*	*Heads Prov. Military*	*Heads Prov. Party*	*Heads Prov. Revol. Ctte.*	*Age*
Li Teh-sheng	P, VC	MC, GPD	3rd	Nanking[a]	X	X	X	c.60
Ch'en Hsi-lien	P	?	4th	Shenyang (X)[b]	X	X	X	60
Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao	P, SC			Nanking	(Pol. Comm.)	X	X	c.60
Hsü Shih-yu	P	MND	3rd	Nanking (X)[c]	X	X	X	c.60
Wei Kuo-ch'ing	P		1st	Canton	(Pol. Comm.)	X	X	c.59
Hua Kuo-feng	P			Hunan (Mil. Dist.)	(Pol. Comm.)	X		?
Wu Teh	P			Peking	(Pol. Comm.)	X	X	c.63
Han Hsien-ch'u	CC		4th(?)	Fuchow (X)[d]	X	X	X	60
Ting Sheng	CC		4th	Kwangtung (X)[e]	X	X	X	60
Yang Te-chih	CC		3rd or 5th	Tsinan (X)[f] (Shantung)	X	X	X	63
Ch'in Chi-wei	CC		2nd	Chengtu	X			?
Yao Wen-yüan	P					(2nd Secy.)		c.42
Chi Teng-k'uei	P			Peking	(Pol. Comm.)	(2nd Secy.)	(Vice-Ch'mn.)	?
Wang Hung-wen	P, VC			Nanking	(Pol. Comm.)			37

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effectiveness in doing an assignment (as, for example, troubleshooting), and of the ability to conciliate seemingly opposed factions; (7) demonstrated literary and forensic ability; and (8) relative youth, i.e., not more than 65 years of age, and Han Chinese ethnicity. Although most of these qualities are often associated with success in any field, they seem particularly germane to the present and future short-term Chinese situation.

On the basis of the above, let us consider the list of all members of the Tenth Central Committee Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Military Commission, as well as the Chairmen of the Provincial Party Committee and the Commanders of the Provincial Military Regions and Districts, as the locus of the top Chinese leadership and the body from which, in all probability, Mao's successor or successors will come. Application of the eight personality criteria quickly reduces the list of approximately 150 leaders to a very small number. Included are: Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao, Ch'en Hsi-lien, Hsü Shih-yü, Han Hsien-ch'ü, Li Teh-sheng, Wang Hung-wen, Wei Kuo-ch'ing, Hua Kuo-feng, Wu Teh, and possibly Ch'in Chi-wei, Ting Sheng, Yang Teh-chih, Yao Wen-yüan, and Chi Teng-k'uei.[14] Each of these men has occupied important posts at both regional and central levels (criterion 4), has moved up

KEY TO TABLE I:

P	Member of Politburo	X	Head of designated unit
CC	Central Committee	VC	Politburo, Vice-Chairman
MC	Military Commission	SC	Politburo, Standing Committee
MND	Vice-Minister of National Defense	Pol.Comm.	Political Commissar
GPD	General Political Department		

NOTES ON CHANGES AFTER THE TENTH CONGRESS

[a] Li shifted to Commander of Shenyang Military Region and presumably relieved of Anhwei Party and Revolutionary Committee headships

[b] Ch'en shifted to Commander of Peking Military Region and presumably relieved of Liaoning Party and Revolutionary Committee headships

[c] Hsü shifted to Commander of Canton Military Region and presumably relieved of Kiangsu Party and Revolutionary Committee headships

[d] Han shifted to Commander of Lanchow Military Region and presumably relieved of Fukien Party and Revolutionary Committee headships

[e] Ting shifted to Commander of Nanking Military Region and presumably relieved of Kwangtung Party and Revolutionary Committee headships

[f] Yang shifted to Commander of Wuhan Military Region and presumably relieved of Shantung Party and Revolutionary Committee headships

SOURCE: *Peking Review*, No. 2 (January 11, 1974), p. 5.

[14] Chang, Ch'en, Hsü, Han, and Li are discussed below. The last three are provincial military leaders who before January 1974 wore several hats in their respective provinces. Several otherwise noteworthy figures do not appear on this list, largely because they are too old, do not have the requisite personal following, or do not possess a regional base. Thy include K'ang Sheng, Liu po-ch'eng, Tung Pi-wu, Yeh Chien-ning and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

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the hierarchy in a regular manner since 1949 (criteria 3 and 5), and, with the exception of Wei Kuo-ch'ing, who is a Chuang, each meets the age and nationality requirements. These data are summarized in the accompanying table. Several statements may be made about the group. There is a surprising preponderance of figures whose careers have been associated with the coastal China region, roughly encompassing Shantung, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Fukien, Liaoning, and Kwangtung provinces, and Shanghai city. The Nanking military region seems especially prominent. Several of the group have been moved up the line rapidly after rather lengthy but middle-level careers in one Party or army location. This is particularly true of Li Teh-sheng, Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao, Hsü Shih-yu, and Wang Hung-wen, all from the Nanking military region. There is an almost complete absence of government ministers or others associated with the State Council, largely because they have no independent territorial power base. The prominence of military leaders, particularly regional commanders, is also noteworthy, and has often been remarked upon in the past.

Of the group, Li Teh-sheng seems to be in the most promising position; until late 1973, he occupied the top Party, army, and revolutionary committee chairs in his province (Anhwei), sitting on the Military Commission as well as heading the General Political Department of the PLA; he is also a Vice-Chairman of the Politburo. Only Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao and Hsü Shih-yu rival him in this regard. Interestingly, all three are associated with the Third Field Army system (Ch'en I, now deceased, was head). We have very little information concerning any of this group with regard to criteria (1) and (2), and little but negative evidence concerning criteria (5), (6), and (7). Li Teh-sheng, for instance, hardly ever speaks at public gatherings in any but official, formal terms, and we therefore do not know the extent of his ability to reason in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terminology. Nor have we heard that he has a personal following; a career army man, he barely rates an entry in the various biographic dictionaries of Chinese communists. We may presume that he is an able political infighter, otherwise he would not have survived the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath so successfully. But we have no idea as to his troubleshooting-conciliation record.

A bit more is known about Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao. He does seem adept at Marxist terminological argumentation, makes speeches comparatively often, and seems to have a personal following in the Shanghai area, and somewhat broader power, as evidenced by the presence on the Politburo of two of his associates, Wang Hung-wen and Yao Wen-

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yüan. He also seems to be an effective troubleshooter, but the extent to which he has made enemies along the way to his present position is not clear. Given the *Sturm und Drang* of the "Shanghai Revolution" in early 1967, many may be out to "get" him. His weakness is his lack of a military background (he appears originally to have been a journalist-propagandist) despite his position as political commissar of the Nanking military region, a post which seems to be an artificial attempt to provide him with a military title. He also suffers from a too close association with Chiang Ch'ing's Cultural Revolution Group (he was its Deputy Head), a group that will probably experience a substantial loss of effectiveness after Mao passes on.[15]

Certain aspects of the factionalist approach to Chinese politics can be applied to this list. Nathan's ninth characteristic of factionalist politics is especially noteworthy, because it denotes factional politics as the politics of personality. Hence, "rumor, character assassination, bribery, and deception are used. Passions of jealousy and revenge are aroused, opportunism and corruption are fostered, and urgent short-term political goals require the compromise of principle."[16] This is a good statement of the operational characteristics of the personality approach to succession in China. Essentially, as we shall see, Nathan's model of factional politics is a restatement, for the domestic case, of certain aspects of a balance-of-power politics model, and as such will be analyzed further under the politics approach. Still, there seems to be much truth in equating the expression of personality in politics with fac-

[15] Hsü Shih-yu and Ch'en Hsi-lien, two powerful regional military figures who are also members of the Politburo, may have enhanced their usefulness to Mao by their support in the Lin Piao crisis of 1971. Hsü seems to be in the better position, being in command of the Nanking Military Region until late 1973 and the Shenyang Military Region after that, and historically associated with the Third Field Army system. He also holds a central military appointment, which Ch'en does not (so far as we know). Ch'en's weakness may stem from his association with Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army system. He lost his provincial base in the reshuffle late in 1973, but gained a voice at the center and moved to Peking, evidently becoming a supporter of Chou En-lai. The status of Wang Hung-wen is interesting. A former youthful Shanghai textile worker who apparently studied to be an engineer, he was active in organizing the "revolutionary rebels" in that city in 1967. He then became a Vice-Chairman of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee and a member of the Ninth Central Committee and its Presidium. Now he is a Vice-Chairman of the Tenth Central Committee Politburo and thus the first figure produced by the Cultural Revolution to achieve long-term national status. It is difficult to tell whether his position is merely honorary (there are other such representatives on the Politburo: a peasant leader, a woman Red Guard, and two national minorities figures) or whether it is a genuine reflection of his power. In the absence of more firm information, it is probably wise to take his prominence seriously, since it is otherwise difficult to explain why a Vice-Chairmanship, for which there is much competition, was "expended" on him.

[16] See Andrew Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," *China Quarterly*, No. 53 (January–March 1973), 34-66; quote from p. 49.

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tional politics. Thus, each of the men listed above may be regarded as either heading a faction or belonging to one.[17]

The personality approach takes us a bit further into the details of succession in China than does the issues approach, and is supplementary to the latter. It suffers, however, from having to regard every political move or stage as being intimately connected with the interrelations among leaders and their comparative personalities. Clearly, Chinese politics, as politics elsewhere, is more than that. Moreover, the personality approach is almost impossible to apply ahead of time, since we know neither the details of the personalities of the comparatively large number of players of the factional game nor the details of their relations and their moves. It is impossible, for instance, to develop a plausible scenario of developments in the post-Mao period based upon the personalities approach alone. However, one thing seems clear: there is no reason why there should ensue such a high level of disharmony as to merit consideration of such possibilities as warlord politics or even the outright breakup of post-Mao China. The factionalist approach does point out that all actors operate within the system, that he who attempts to go beyond the "rules of the game" finds his way blocked by a coalition of all the others, and that systemic stability is the usual result. Factional politics, in the sense of the politics of personality, may be a rough game for the individual participants, but the system as a whole may be "above" it in the sense of surviving the demise of many of its leaders and of successfully dealing with many of the problem issues emphasized in the first approach.

C. THE SOCIETAL APPROACH

The personality approach leaves out many of the obvious societal variables that must be considered in any discussion of succession in China. These are taken up in the third approach. This variant includes, as constantly operating factors in Chinese society: (1) the role of political culture in foreclosing certain outcomes to the succession struggle and

[17] Despite recent official Chinese pronouncements on the Lin affair, it is not clear, at least to this observer, that things were as simple as Mao would have it. It is quite possible that Lin was being pressured by important military leaders to press Mao, in turn, to revise—if not reverse—central features of Chinese domestic and foreign policies. Lin may have felt that he had to bend to these pressures, lest he be denied support in the critical days after Mao's demise. On the other hand, Lin's power, as long as Mao was alive, would still derive principally from the Party Chairman. Lin therefore had to waffle between his military colleagues and his mentor, which led him into the same fatal trap Liu Shao-ch'i had encountered before him. Mao, perceiving Lin tergiversate, began to suspect him of double-dealing, and a vicious cycle began that ended in Lin's death.

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increasing the probability of others; (2) the influence of Maoist ideology upon succession politics; (3) the weight of Party history in framing alternatives; and (4) the structure of and relationships within and between institutions comprising the Chinese polity, including the questions of successive leadership generations as a factor in post-Mao politics, Party-army relations, and center-province relations.

(1) From the standpoint of political culture,[18] the major question for post-Mao China is whether the politics of emotional mobilization, confrontation, and self-assertion associated so completely with the personality and policy of Mao Tse-tung can survive the demise of the Party Chairman. Will not the traditional Chinese orientation toward dependency, fear of *luan* (disorder), and avoidance of politics—a tradition still being bred into Chinese citizens by the very workings of the Chinese family structure and the storehouse of Chinese cultural values (and therefore feared by the Maoists during the Cultural Revolution)—reassert itself once the Great Helmsman has departed this world? Given the relative failure of the Cultural Revolution to achieve its goal of permanently freeing the Chinese citizen from the shackles of the past; given the increasing inappropriateness of mobilization politics to the demands of more rational and technical modes of thinking associated with modernization; and given the very fact of the elimination of most of the abuses of pre-1949 Chinese society against which the Maoist approach to politics was developed in the first place: it is not probable that Chinese politics after Mao will revert to a style reflective of traditional China, where government was left to an emperor and a special class chosen for the task, and where the ordinary citizen did not wish to become involved with the unpleasantries of political participation? Will not the latter-day near-equivalent of this tradition, "modern revisionist" bureaucratic rule, be the probable future, and will not the Soviet model, therefore, in the end be the pattern for China?

The answer is not clear, to say the least: the lasting effect of the Maoist intervention in Chinese political culture will not be known for decades. It may be that Mao has succeeded in creating a new Chinese political man free from the conformities and fears of the past. Perhaps participatory socialism, overlaid by Leninist assumptions about, and methods of, organizing politics will survive in China. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that although the Maoist approach

[18] Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley 1971), has become the standard work. See also Lucian Pye's *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968).

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will contribute to the emergence of a new Chinese political culture, it will not dominate it. Bureaucratization, rationalization, division of labor, specialization—all the characteristic features of modernization—are inexorable; they are also inimical to the Maoist style. Maoist attempts to change the political outlook of the Chinese citizen will surely not be cast aside, and Chinese politics will never revert completely to its traditional form. There does seem to be a tendency in Chinese political culture toward the emergence of a single leader and the need, felt by many Chinese, for some personalized form of external political authority to match the domination of the oldest male inside the family. But the China of tomorrow will be vastly different from the China of traditional and transitional times. Because of the requisites of modernization, because of the tendency in communist political systems to stress relationships of political rather than familial hierarchy, and because factional politics favors collective leadership over personalism, the probability of reversion to traditionalism or, alternatively, the emergence of a new Mao, is relatively slight.

(2) The question of the Maoist ideological legacy in the context of succession is many-sided.[19] It seems clear that the function of ideology in China after Mao will change and perhaps diminish in importance. There is sure to be a natural decline in the direct application of Maoist ideology to contemporary problems, simply because the Party Chairman will no longer be available for comment. The process of textual exegesis will then begin, as the competitors for succession seek to find the right quotation or the right parallel to justify their separate programs or argumentations. Over the long run, this is corrosive of faith, since the demonstration that contradictory arguments can be justified by reference to the same body of scriptures produces a rise in the level of popular cynicism. If succession is fought among a fairly large number of individuals (i.e., more than five), each of whom chooses to argue, as he must, in terms of his comparatively great fidelity to Mao's life and work, ideology becomes a totally dependent variable, the vocabulary of—rather than a factor in—the succession process. At some point, of course, the tension will become extreme between the freezing of the corpus of Mao's works at the point of his death and the constant erosion of content that is the result of selective quoting to justify a program

[19] There are many studies of ideologies in China and of Mao's "thought." Still the best on Mao is Stuart Schram, *The Political Philosophy of Mao Tse-tung* (New York 1963), supplemented by compendia of Mao's post-*Collected Works* pronouncements. The best recent work on ideology in China is Chalmers Johnson, ed., *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* (Seattle 1973). Franz Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley 1966) is by no means out of date.

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or fight a political campaign. One contender may win out and, much as Stalin did in 1928, become the sole interpreter of Mao's legacy. Alternatively, ideology may cease to play even the subsidiary roles that it now plays in Chinese society—as common vocabulary, specifier of goals, vehicle for mass mobilization, and justifier of suffering and pain for the common good.

In terms of Schurmann's distinction between pure and practical ideology,[20] after Mao's death his "thought" will more and more come to be regarded as pure ideology (i.e., a set of basic ideas designed to produce an overarching world view) instead of maintaining its present role as practical ideology (i.e., an action program for carrying out concrete activities serving the goals of pure ideology). A new practical ideology will then arise to deal with new practical issues. In this regard, the struggle for power among individuals, factions, and institutions may well serve as a forcing house for accelerating the obsolescence of Mao's thought as practical ideology. The "thought of Mao Tse-tung" will become Mao*ism* in name as well as effect and its various canons, initially frozen, will be subject to ever greater degrees of "interpretation." It is not to be supposed, however, that those most adept at reasoning in Maoist terms will hold an intrinsic advantage during the succession period. They may be placed on the defensive by their more practical-minded colleagues who will present them with problems and recommended solutions, justified in Maoist vocabulary only as an afterthought. People like Yao Wen-yüan will therefore retain a degree of utility, but only as scribes in the service of practicing politicians.

In a theocracy, the general hardly possesses supreme power—in fact, the Talmudic scholar retains an unusually large residue of authority. But without a single head unifying in himself the right to make decisions of practical importance and to promulgate theoretical dogma, a theocracy risks breaking apart into squabbling factions or, more likely, transforming itself into some other form of government. China under Mao has, of course, never been a theocracy, although at times it appears to have approached it. But with Mao's passage, the unifying function of his person and his policy will have ceased. His successors will at first fall back upon his ideology as a substitute. But when they discover that it cannot perform functions for which it was not intended, and that it provides a convenient framework for conducting political struggle among themselves, they will treat it instrumentally instead of reverently. The process may not be so lengthy as in previous cases of theological decay if, as seems likely, the pressures of the environment and

[20] *Ibid.*, chap. I, "Ideology."

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the standoff of factional struggles conspire to demand more of the Maoist scripture than it is capable of. An interesting and critical choice may well present itself: whether to forbid further ideological evolution out of fear of "revisionism" or other sins, or whether to permit the development of "creative Maoism" in an attempt to justify and popularize policies required for other reasons. Soviet experience, if it can be accepted as relevant, leads to the conclusion that a new supreme leader may tend toward the first option, but that collective leadership—even with one man assumed to be *primus inter pares*—leans toward the second.

(3) The weight of Party and Chinese history will surely be a lasting influence upon post-Mao China,[21] although *perception* of the past must be passed through the twin filters of the personalities of the top leaders and the set of issues that have to be faced at any given moment. The past also acts as a series of lessons on how to behave, politically and socially, as well as on what pitfalls are to be avoided. Thus, most Chinese communists probably regard it as axiomatic that the struggle for succession should never be allowed to go the length of threatening the unity of the country against predatory foreigners (particularly the Soviet Union) and, more positively, that every effort must be made to build an increasingly strong and independent China. The lessons of neocolonial dependence—the product of domestic weakness and division from 1840 to 1949—are still vivid in China, and it is therefore doubtful whether any contender for power will willingly carry his struggle to the point of weakening the country as a whole to gain a possible advantage over his rivals. A corollary is that there is a diminished probability of a recurrence of campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution in post-Mao China, particularly as long as China faces an overt Soviet military threat, and as long as economic rates of growth continue to be high.

Whereas the leaders' perceptions of the more distant Chinese past form a generalized, if diffuse, background to their attitudinal structure, their views of Party history are more specific and clear. Of pertinence to succession is the view that political struggle must have military backing. Contenders for succession, therefore, are likely to be military

[21] Perhaps the best recent treatment of Party history is Jacques Guillermaz, *A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921–1949, 1949–1972*, 2 vols. (New York 1972 and forthcoming). Albert Feuerwerker has persuasively argued that, for current policy purposes, one need consider the Chinese communist perspective on Chinese history only as far back as 1840. See, for example, his "Chinese History and the Foreign Relations of Contemporary China," in Richard Lambert, ed., *China in the World Today*, in *The Annals*, CDII (July 1972), 1-14.

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men, especially commanders of ground forces or heads of military districts or regions, or Party men who can command the loyalty of such military men. Of our list of fourteen potential successors, seven are military men. Chou En-lai himself has long-standing ties with many military figures, and Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao, Wang Hung-wen, and Wei Kuo-ch'ing can at least claim to be political commissars, if recently appointed, of military regions. Yao Wen-yüan, however, does not have any known historical or present ties to the military.

Also pertinent to succession is the knowledge that in the past, political struggle has been long, arduous, and factionalized, but often nonsanguinary, and that losers in the struggle for power are not always stripped of authority, excommunicated, imprisoned, or put to death. Rather, they are "re-educated" and reintegrated into political life.[22] We may thus expect contenders for power to play waiting games, to make and break alliances quickly and with the greatest display of opportunism, to be vigilant against the overtly ambitious power seeker and to combine against him, and to capitalize on those issues that seem to support their particular causes. Anticipating our discussion of the political approach to succession (and repeating the conclusion drawn from the personalities approach), it is quite possible that the post-Mao leadership struggle will not result in the emergence of any single leader, but that collective leadership, the product of a balance among contending groups, will not only be the initial reaction to Mao's death but will foreshadow a perhaps surprising degree of long-term stability.

(4) Institutional, generational, and center-provincial relations after Mao's death are broad topics that can hardly be dealt with adequately within a restricted space. Here we must depend upon the summarizing work of others, particularly on their data dealing with Party and military elites. Scalapino characterizes the typical latter-day Chinese leader, member of the Ninth Central Committee, in the following manner:[23] he is relatively elderly (in his sixties), male, of Central-South origin, ethnic Chinese, likely to be a soldier of peasant background, of poor-to-modest educational background with comparatively little experience abroad, and of the third to the fifth generation in terms of his first admission to the Party; he has a career pattern that closely reflects the

[22] Should we consider the list of recently rehabilitated leaders purged during the Cultural Revolution, which is now rather lengthy, as constituting candidates for succession? Probably not, for three reasons. First, those on the list fail to measure up to several of our eight criteria of succession. Second, they probably will not be able to make the necessary psychological adjustments to compete for power effectively once more. Third, there will always be a residue of suspicion around them, no matter how "clean" they now appear.

[23] Scalapino (fn. 3).

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history of the Party itself, and a pattern of career mobility steadily upward with but few "bumps"; and he is Mao-oriented in terms of central loyalty, but also loyal to a subsidiary leader such as the commander of a field army; and, more and more, he possesses a local power base in either the Party or, more typically, the army. Although we must be careful not to equate aggregate characteristics with the attributes of a single individual, this listing seems to typify the emerging type of Chinese leader. Moreover, it is perhaps significant that almost all of the Tenth Central Committee Politburo and Central Committee leaders named on the list above are fairly close conformants to the Scalapino typology. A partial exception among the top five contenders is Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao, whose class and career background are atypical and whose regional military base is dubious. Interestingly, several of the Scalapino characteristics fit closely our own list of ideal traits for post-Maoist leaders, although the two lists evolved independently. Thus, traits (2), (3), (4), (5), and (8) explicitly reflect the Scalapino typology; we do not possess the requisite level of detailed information to make judgments as to the other traits. Over the long run, therefore, it is increasingly likely that the leadership which emerges (whether one-man or collective) will have characteristics that are common to these two lists.

Turning to the military, the Whitson data argue that overall loyalties within the PLA have changed only slowly and that the personally and geographically centered system established before that time has largely survived, even after the Cultural Revolution.[24] The major thesis is that the five field armies comprise a system of adherence and loyalty, that each may be located geographically within China, and that a balance of power, complete with representation in each other's regions and representation at the top of the Party and the army in Peking roughly proportionate to the distribution of power at the regional level, exists among them. Recently, however, some changes have developed. One is the obvious decline of the Fourth Field Army system following Lin Piao's demise in late 1971, and the concomitant rise of Third Field Army figures, in the post-1971 makeup of both the Ninth and the Tenth Central Committee Politburos. This change merely restored much of the pre-Cultural Revolution status quo, however, inasmuch as the Lin Piao loyalists had managed to secure more than their

[24] William W. Whitson, *The Chinese High Command* (New York 1973), especially chap. 9. Whitson's methodology, and hence his conclusions, have been subject to challenge by William Parrish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," *China Quarterly*, No. 56 (October/December 1973), 667-99. Moreover, Whitson seems to have changed his mind as to the evolving center of military career loyalties, from the field army to the military region.

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"rightful" (i.e., roughly equal) share of power at the center. A second change is a possible shift in the intra-military institution of primary loyalty from field army to military region—i.e., from ties based upon common history and personal loyalty to ties based upon common geographic location over a relatively long period of service.[25] Finally, there is a trend of replacing military with Party figures at the local, provincial, and regional levels—a trend, it should be noted, reflected in the top Party leadership, as evidenced by new members of the Tenth Politburo.

The societal approach is an obviously necessary ingredient in the mix of variables thought to be useful in forecasting succession outcomes in China. Yet it also evidences shortcomings that can be surmounted only by supplying elements of the other three approaches. It is not clear, for instance, how one combines the role of political culture with that of ideology in determining succession, or what the relationship is between the weight of the past in the thoughts and acts of Mao's successors and the evolving structure of and relationships between Party, army, center, region, and generation. We do not yet have convincing criteria by which to judge these elements, although their comparative merits in forecasting succession outcomes might be one such criterion. Basically, the question is how one chooses to integrate the various societal forces at work in China. For that, we must wait for a grander synthesis than we possess at present. Finally, the societal approach is not good at generating alternative scenarios of succession, or of setting out likely stages of succession. Because of its high level of generality and its aggregate, statistical character, it cannot be expected to deal in the specifics which are necessary to a concrete consideration of post-Mao China.

D. THE POLITICS APPROACH

Because it sometimes operates at a more detailed level of analysis, the politics approach may prove helpful at this point. Most theories of politics, unfortunately, assume a well-ordered, integrated polity, and then inquire how power is distributed within established institutions and how decisions are made on known issues. The "rules of the game" are usually known, and a comparatively fine degree of detail about personalities, the workings of institutions, and issues is assumed. In the case of succession politics in China, none of these conditions obtain.

[25] See George C. S. Sung, "China's Provincial Politics in 1971: A Biographic Approach," The Rand Corporation, P-4998, April 1973; and William W. Whitson, "Chinese Military and Political Leaders and the Distribution of Power in China, 1956–1971," The Rand Corporation, R-1091, 1973.

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Written rules are either not to be found or make little difference to outcomes. Sometimes it is only faintly clear which institutions and people are involved in the political struggle, and we usually do not know, at any given time, with what issues they are seized. The politics of succession only arises in polities where rules of procedure either do not exist or evidence no regularity in being followed. If we had a more detailed knowledge of the workings of the Chinese political system, theories of decision-making (such as the organizational process and governmental [bureaucratic] politics model),[26] role theory, elite theory, and theories of individual and collective choice[27] would be more directly applicable.

Three theories (later to be reduced to two) do seem relevant to succession politics in China. These are factional theory, balance-of-power theory, and coalition theory. Nathan has summed up factional theory for the Chinese case, adducing fifteen descriptive characteristics:[28]

A. *Power Limitations* (between factions)

1. Existence of a code of civility generally adhered to by all factions.
2. Because of limited power of factions and their relative power equality, little incentive exists to try to overcome factional rivals. Defensive political strategies are therefore adopted.
3. Initiatives are taken only by surprise and after secret preparations.
4. Such initiatives cause a temporary unity of the other factions in collective self-defense.
5. Any alliance or combination of alliances is possible. Alliances are therefore constantly shifting.
6. Ideological agreement is *not* a basis for alliance.
7. Supra-factional decisions are taken only by consensus among the factions.
8. A power cycle describes the dynamics of the factional system:
   (a) a crisis arises, for internal or external reasons;
   (b) one faction receives a mandate and takes office upon consensus of, presumably, a majority of the other factions;

[26] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston 1971); Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1968); and Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds., *The Study of Policy Formation* (New York 1968).

[27] See Joseph L. Bower, "Descriptive Decision Theory from the 'Administrative' Viewpoint," and Enid C. B. Schoette, "The State of the Art in Policy Studies," in Bauer and Gergen, *ibid.*, chaps. 3 and 4 respectively. The study of political succession in communist states need not be isolated from succession in other entities, political or otherwise. For some suggestive parallels, see Richard Carlson, *School Superintendents: Careers and Performance* (Columbus, Ohio 1972); Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York 1969); and Alfred D. Chandler, *Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrialist Enterprises* (Cambridge, Mass. 1969).

[28] Nathan (fn. 16).

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(c) the consensus declines as the crisis passes and as the other factions unite to block the faction in power from becoming too strong;
(d) a new crisis thus looms.

B. *Clientelist Ties* (within factions)
9. Factions, led by one person, manifest a politics of personality.
10. Doctrinairism is rampant: struggle is carried on in terms of honor, face, and minute differences in ideology.

C. *Size and Shape of the System as a Whole*
11. The number of factions is relatively small, less than twenty.
12. There exists an overriding shared interest in allocating goods within the system and according to its rules, and not outside of it.
13. Hence, there can be no questioning of the basic principles of the system or the framework (constitution, history, ideology, etc.) *that encompasses it.*
14. Issues are resolved only slowly and with difficulty.
15. The system as a whole exhibits stability.

If Chinese politics is factional in character (and its history since at least 1928 would indicate that it is), certain implications for succession are apparent. First, we should not be overly impressed with analyses that seem to separate the Chinese leadership into mutually incompatible factions. Those led by Chou En-lai can today ally with the "royalists" under Chiang Ch'ing (or Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao, or whoever) and tomorrow with one of the regional military factions. Alliance reversals are highly probable. Second, the succession process may well take place over a lengthy period, allowing ample time for a new successor or successors to emerge. Third, there is no *a priori* reason to conclude that "warlordism," "breakup," or other manifestations of extreme disunity will be the rule in China after Mao. On the other hand—fourth—a factional system indeed ought to excel in bringing to the fore new personalities who vie for power, serving as a reasonably efficient vehicle for casting up "revolutionary successors."

The big question, of course, is whether all factions will continue to abide by the "rules" of the system. Evidently (if we are to believe the accusatory literature), the Lin Piao (Fourth Field Army) faction attempted to overcome its major factional rivals through a surprise attack. The "system" "worked," however, in the sense that the other relevant factions apparently united to oppose this attempted coup and put it down. In the process, however, other factions (notably Chou's and the Nanking regional military faction) grew stronger. Although the factional system is skewed by the continued presence of Mao, it

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would appear that a new ruling coalition has emerged in the aftermath of the Lin affair, consisting of a defensive alliance of the royalists, the bureaucrats under Chou, and the Nanking-Shanghai Party-army regionalists. Later, as the Lin-induced threat receded, the alliance broke up into a system of mutually balancing and opposing factions.

The makeup of the Tenth Central Committee Politburo would seem to suggest a finely balanced factional alliance system, with the Nanking-Shanghai faction possessing an initial "mandate" to rule, limited by the continued presence of the Party Chairman and his "royalist" followers and the balancing efforts of Chou En-lai and his central bureaucrats. One possible interpretation of the factional system extant at the time of the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 is illustrated by the following diagram:



NOTE: Asterisks indicate age under sixty-five.

FIGURE 1

At that time it appeared that the Nanking-Shanghai and the central bureaucratic factions each had acquired military and political wings, which made for strength. The "royalists," however, apparently had not,

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and for this reason, plus that of their advanced age, they will be vulnerable once Mao has left the scene. By contrast, the Shanghai political group (Chang Ch'ün-ch'iao, Yao Wen-yüan, and Wang Hung-wen), associated with the "royalists," as shown, seemed to have assured themselves of continuing strength by virtue of their provincial power base and their possible association with the Nanking military group. The central bureaucrats under Chou are also vulnerable for reasons of age: only Wu Teh is not elderly by Chinese political standards. When Chou leaves the scene, they may also be in difficulty. At that point, the other provincial Party and military figures, who now probably do not comprise a faction and should perhaps be regarded as semi-independent, may become increasingly prominent as their favors are competed for by the Nanking military and the Shanghai political groups (which may well fall apart when the present linchpins of the system—Mao and Chou—are gone).

The factional situation can change extremely quickly. That is one weakness of this approach, as demonstrated by the difference in the situation as of early 1974. Chou En-lai had augmented the strength of the central bureaucrats by the addition of Teng Hsiao-p'ing (the rehabilitated former General Secretary of the Party) to the Politburo. He then used him to negotiate a series of transfers (see page 17) of regional military commanders which broke their hold on the provincial Party and destroyed (if it ever existed) the alliance between the Shanghai Party politicians and the Nanking regional military leaders. Moreover, when Chou's health began to give way, Teng was able to take on some of the burdens of the Premier's office. The factional structure thus appeared to be changing into a simple division between Chou and his followers on one side and the central-regional radical-royalists on the other. The provincial military and Party leaders seemed more and more to be without particular unity and to be groups manipulated by the two antagonistic groups at the center, as illustrated in Figure 2.

Despite these changes, however, the overall structure seems to be more firm than at any time since 1964. Mao's disappearance will not change things radically, although Chou's demise may well do so. Collective leadership, guided—and therefore modified—by Mao, Chou, and now Teng Hsiao-Ping, seems to be a fact in post-Tenth Congress China. But having served its purpose of blocking Lin and providing the factional basis for the present arrangement, the new balance seems to have broken apart as the original reason for its existence has faded and new issues and new bids for power have emerged. However, it does

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

NOTE: Asterisks indicate age under sixty-five.

FIGURE 2

not follow that the factional system, so long the rule in China, will not be able to weather this storm.

Communist polities have seen factional struggles for succession before, and the lessons derived therefrom should be considered as material relevant to the factionalist approach. Perhaps the best example for our purposes is the battle between the various factions in the Soviet Union following Lenin's death in 1924. Their number was never very large—about five, depending on whose analysis one accepts—and the outcome was supremacy of one man, Stalin.[29] This should give us notice that factional systems sometimes become unstable. The problem in the Soviet Union seemed to stem not only from the personality of Stalin, the range of issues facing Soviet leaders as a whole, and the societal determinants of politics in Russia, all of which were different from the determinants of politics in China. More to our point is the progressive diminution in the number of factions through elimination of the de-

[29] Robert Vincent Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), gives an account that can be read with profit by every student of Chinese politics.

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feated from further competition, plus the fact that Stalin's rivals never effectively combined against him. The increasingly small number of players also made alliance recombinations progressively more difficult. Inspection of the Nathan list shows that several of the characteristic features of factional politics were not adhered to in the Soviet case. These include points (1), (2), (4), (5), (6), (11—the number of factions was *too* small), and hence, (15).

The question now arises whether a factional system is really so stable after all or whether, under certain circumstances, it does not exhibit signs of evolution toward another system. (It surely can be argued that the change in character caused by the removal of a vital element—in China, the death of Mao; in the Soviet Union, the death of Lenin—is such a circumstance.) A balance of power among various factions is a long-term outcome only if members of the system agree to abide by the rules of the system. Balance-of-power politics, in fact, requires that several additional tacit "rules" be agreed to by the various factional leaders. These include: "negotiate rather than fight"; "stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor"; and "permit defeated or constrained essential actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners."[30] *If* these additional "rules" are adhered to by the various factional participants in the post-Mao struggle for power in China, long-term stability may result, and "collective leadership"—the communist euphemism for a balance-of-power situation—may well become the rule rather than an ephemeral exception. That such can well be the case over a period longer than a mere transition from one-man leadership to another is seen, again, in the Soviet instance, this time in the post-Khrushchev era.

There are major differences between China after Mao and Russia after Lenin which may give rise to quite different outcomes. Perhaps the most important element is the advanced age of a number of the factional leaders, particularly Chou En-lai. His very existence, like Mao's, is guarantee to the working of the factional system, although the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing modifies this statement some-

[30] A comparison of Nathan's list of characteristics of factional politics with the attributes of a balance-of-power system presented by Morton Kaplan reveals striking similarities. It would seem that factional politics is really a special case of balance-of-power politics. See Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics* (New York 1957), as updated by his "The Systems Approach to International Politics," in Morton Kaplan, ed., *New Approaches to International Politics* (New York 1968), 381-404. The balance of power, of course, is much broader as a means of preservation of independence and advancing interests among autonomous political units. See Thomas W. Robinson, *Hans J. Morgenthau's Theory of International Relations*, Ph.D. diss. (Columbia University 1969), for an elaboration.

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what. Other factional leaders in China are nearly as elderly; in the Soviet Union most of the leadership was relatively young at the time. Younger Chinese leaders may choose not to obey the rules (in the sense of regularities derived from past practice) of the factionalist game. Moreover, as reinstitutionalization continues—with the completion of Party rebuilding, reconstruction of government ministries and mass organizations, reconstruction of revolutionary committees as local and regional organs of administrative power, and progressive military withdrawal from direct political involvement—the number of factions is likely to decline and the number of adherents to one faction may rise. Politics, including succession politics, in China might then be analyzed better as one of the decision-making models mentioned above than as a factional model. In the Soviet Union after Lenin, to cite the obvious parallel, factional cleavages nearly always reflected institutional divisions within the top reaches of the Party. They almost never included military or regional factions.

If a balance of power is one alternative outcome, the rise of a new supreme leader must be considered as another. The Soviet experience places us on notice that a similar outcome is possible in China; and the theory of political coalitions gives us some idea as to how the process might take place.[31] Paying attention to the "size" (i.e., the relative power) of the several coalitions, the theory states that there is a tendency for "winning coalitions" to form whose total power is just enough to place themselves in office and thus allocate benefits (positions of authority) in a manner that would maximize the power of each coalition member. According to this theory, no matter how many coalitions one begins with, the contest ultimately boils down to a struggle between two or three groups, each bidding for supreme power. That is really balance-of-power politics at the level of the smallest number of players. The outcome is often transformation of the system as a whole through the victory of one of the coalitions. While there are a large number of sociological and political variables than are thought relevant, the system will be transformed whenever what was thought to be a minimum winning coalition (whose aim is perhaps only a policy change on particular issues) becomes in reality a system-dominant coalition (one whose power is so great as to be able to overcome all other contenders at once).[32] A systems-dominant coalition carries with it a high probabil-

[31] William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven 1962); and Sven Groennings and others, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior* (New York 1970).

[32] Theodore Caplow, *Two Against One: Coalitions in Triad* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1968), considers coalition type (dependent upon relative power), coalition level,

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ity of remaining in power over a long period, but this does not have to occur. Other coalitions may unite to prevent the threatening coalition from becoming too powerful. Or the dominant coalition, having achieved supreme power, may disintegrate under its own weight, as Riker predicts. But given enough time and, therefore, sufficient "plays" of the succession politics game, the probability of a systems-dominant situation, and hence one-man leadership, must be considered to be high.

III. Conclusion

Each of the four approaches contributes a significant element to a better understanding of succession in China. Each is also partial and incomplete if left to stand alone. The environmental approach apprises us of the issues that increasingly override personal, factional, and institutional differences in the Chinese leadership and warn of the narrowing range of policy choices that may face any successor to Mao. Having provided the starting point and framework for analyzing succession, we can go on to talk about people and societal forces, and hence the political struggle that is their joint product. We cannot stop at the level of who's who among the changing Chinese leadership, for social and cultural forces are too strong in China, and institutionally derived hierarchical relationships, present in most other communist polities, are much less evident in late-Maoist China. With a vaguely understood but nevertheless constantly present web of cultural constraints, Chinese politics takes on a unique flavor that must be examined in detail if probabilistic and reasonably accurate statements are to be made about personnel and policy matters after Mao. The fourth, political, approach, therefore bases itself as much upon the data provided by environmental constraints, personality idiosyncrasies, and societal forces in China as upon theories of politics that are thought to be applicable across national boundaries.

One way to put our four approaches together is to attempt to periodicize developments after Mao. Four stages seem likely, depending on whether Chou survives Mao and on how long he is able to remain in office. Presuming that Chou does outlast Mao, in the first stage (lasting from the announcement of Mao's demise to perhaps three months later), a collective leadership may form; the solidarity naturally produced by the demise of a great leader should prevent an immediate outbreak of factional struggle. It is unlikely that there will be any great policy changes within this period, as the leadership seeks to

coalition status, and type of situation of the system as a whole. All reflect complex political-sociological variables.

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demonstrate its fidelity to the policy of the departed leader and to reassure the populace that all will continue as it had been. Chou En-lai (or Teng Hsiao-p'ing, to the extent that he can act in Chou's stead) will act as the "glue," keeping the factions together. Presuming the absence of an international crisis (such as greatly increased Soviet military pressure), the Chinese leadership will probably be able to handle policy questions by temporarily treating these as administrative matters—that is, by making no policy changes at all.

This stage is likely to terminate, however, when the first major policy question presents itself and demands solution on a basis not inherently obvious from consulting the Maoist ideological legacy or by continuing policy lines agreed to when Mao was still alive. It is probable that the issue will be domestic, although international questions often serve as catalysts for debates on domestic issues. Although the range of issues is large, it may be that what some perceive to be an overly relaxed attitude toward bureaucratization of administration could serve to touch off charges of Soviet-style "revisionism" within, say, the governmental apparatus. This would put Chou on the defensive, given that the governmental sphere is his own and that his natural tendency is to delegate administrative power to his ministers. Whatever the issue, however, it will cause cleavages to appear in the heretofore solidly collective leadership, and the cleavages will probably reflect factional lines. Since it seems likely that a "mandate" will already have been given to the Shanghai/Nanking Military Region Party-Army group, in the immediate post-Mao period this group will attempt to carry through a series of minor policy changes and justify them in terms of the Maoist ideological legacy. Moreover, it seems likely that this group will be able to have its way with regard to a number of such issues. However, opposition may gradually rise as other factions perceive that the Shanghai/Nanking group is arrogating too much power to itself, that some of its policies are ineffective, or that its decisions are subject to ideological criticism. It is difficult to forecast how long this phase will last, but it seems unlikely, at least to this observer, that it would extend much beyond two years after Mao's death.[33]

[33] Chou's presence and role will be critical in determining the length of this phase and in making certain that the increasingly intense factional struggle that will follow does not result in harm to China's foreign position or domestic strength. If Chou were to leave the scene at this point, either through death, election to retire (not an unlikely option), or being forced out of office, factional differences could come to dominate policy issues. If Chou were to remain in power, he might well be able to modulate those differences and, possibly, transform them into institutional disagreements, which are inherently safer to handle.

The possibility that Chou En-lai came under political attack in late 1973 and might

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Two indicators will signal the end of this second, transitional, phase. One is the first purge of an important leader or leaders, a reshuffling of positions among the same group of decision-makers, or changes in institutional lines of authority. The other is a variation in ideological line following debate on one or several issues. Of particular note would be attempts, whether successful or not, to vary emphasis from one aspect of Mao's "thought" to another, or even outright revision. It is at this point that personality will become more than normally important. If, for instance, one contender for power were to exhibit charismatic qualities, and if he were in a favorable factional-institutional position, he might emerge as the new Mao.[34] However, if there is no such man, if the number of factions remains relatively large, and if they are of relatively equal power, long-term collective leadership is likely. For this phase, which could last several years, the personality and politics approaches are perhaps the best tools of analysis.

A third phase will then begin. China will, for all intents and purposes, have "gotten over" Mao's death. A new leadership will be in power, whether or not it will have managed to legitimize itself. The top decision-makers will be confronted with a wide variety of issues for which no readily apparent answer is to be found in the Maoist lexicon or even in parallels with the Party's past. In the absence of international complications, the dominant issues will probably be educational policy, economic allocation, differences over location of population, and struggles over institutional primacy. Silent de-Maoification, in progress for some time, may now continue more openly in the sense of announced

be forced to retire is supported by the esoteric literature stemming from the campaign to criticize Confucius and Lin Piao. One article speaks of Fan Sui, a former Prime Minister of the state of Chin from 266–256 B.C., who, after meritorious service to Prince Chao in supporting centralization of rule against the Confucionist policy of installing autonomous local rulers, "asked to return the seal of prime minister because of illness." Actually, according to the article, he resigned because "he was sitting on top of a volcano that could erupt at any time" and because he was fearful of his life and that of his family. The parallel with the dispute in contemporary China over the autonomy of the military regions and the provincial Party secretaries, and with Chou's role in transferring the regional military commanders in late 1973 is obvious, as is Chou's later statement that he was old, ill, and progressively handing his duties over to others such as Teng Hsiao-p'ing. See Lo Ssu-ting, "Struggle Between Restoration and Counter-Restoration in the Course of Founding the Chin Dynasty," *Hung Ch'i* [Red Flag], No. 11 (November 1973), 30-40, and translated in *Peking Review*, Nos. 17 and 18 (1974), 7-10 and 19-22 respectively; quotation from pp. 9 and 10. The very fact that the article was reprinted in China's foreign-language information journal seven months after its publication in the chief Chinese-language journal indicates that Chou's status was becoming increasingly precarious and that he might indeed elect to retire rather than be forced from office.

[34] Still the best study of charisma is Ann Ruth Willner, *Charismatic Political Leadership: A Theory*, Center of International Studies Research Monograph No. 32 (Princeton 1968).

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changes in doctrine, or be challenged through speeches attacking those who seek doctrinal revision. This could split the leadership into conservative and revisionist camps, although it is more likely that splits will be complex and reflect an admixture of personality, issue, geographic, and institutional differences. If there is no single all-powerful leader in office, such splits could weaken the ability of the political system to resolve questions with minimum social cost. More probably, however, if periods of indecision and bickering are kept brief, the country could be the stronger for it. In this context it should be kept in mind that a strongly entrenched factional system could tend toward pragmatism in policy, since factional conflict, although carried on in the vocabulary of the prevailing ideology, is often resolved in a practical, log-rolling manner.

Once Chinese politics has progressed to that point, however, it can no longer be regarded primarily from the point of view of succession to Mao. In particular, the personality and political approaches will become progressively less appropriate, since they will fail to consider the larger context. The environmental and societal approaches must increasingly be brought to bear, especially where the more distant future is concerned. At that point, succession politics, artificially separated in the first place from the study of Chinese politics as a whole, will increasingly tend to blend back into the larger context, and the succession period will have ended.

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TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

By ROBERT O. KEOHANE and JOSEPH S. NYE*

"REALIST" analyses of world politics have generally assumed that states are the only significant actors; that they act as units; and that their military security objectives dominate their other goals.[1] On the basis of these assumptions it is easy to conclude that international organizations—defined as intergovernmental organizations—are merely instruments of governments, and therefore unimportant in their own right. Compared with the hopes and dreams of world federalists, the Realist position reflects reality: international organizations in the contemporary world are not powerful independent actors, and relatively universal organizations such as the United Nations find it extraordinarily difficult to reach agreement on significant issues. It is therefore not surprising that students of world politics have paid relatively slight attention to these entities, particularly after hopes for a major United Nations peacekeeping role were dashed in the early 1960's.

The Realist model on which the above conclusions about international organizations are based is now being called into question. Faced with a growing complexity of actors and issues, a number of analysts have begun to pay more attention to transnational relations. In this article we will contend that if critiques of Realist models of world politics are taken seriously, they not only call into question state-centric conceptions of "the international system," but also throw doubt upon prevailing notions about international organizations. If one relaxes the Realist assumptions, one can visualize more significant roles for international organizations in world politics.

In an important recent contribution to the literature on transnational

* We have profited from discussions of the subject with Hayward Alker, Graham Allison, Robert Dickerman, Samuel Huntington, Alex Inkeles, Peter J. Katzenstein, Stephen Krasner, John Ruggie, Robert Russell, Harrison Wagner, and other members of the Transnational Relations Study Group at the Harvard Center for International Affairs. Support for this research was provided by the Ford Foundation.

[1] For a general discussion, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass. 1972). For documentation of the point based on a survey of the literature, see John R. Handelman, John A. Vasquez, Michael K. O'Leary, and William D. Coplin, "Color it Morgenthau: A Data-Based Assessment of Quantitative International Relations Research," paper delivered to the International Studies Association, March 1973.

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relations, Samuel P. Huntington argues explicitly that international organizations are relatively insignificant in contemporary world politics:

> . . . internationalism involves agreement among nation-states.
>
> . . . every international organization at some points finds itself limited by the very principle which gives it being.
>
> The international organization requires *accord* among nations; the transnational organization requires *access* to nations. . . . International organizations embody the principle of nationality; transnational organizations try to ignore it.
>
> While national representatives and delegations engage in endless debate at UN conferences and councils, however, the agents of the transnational organizations are busily deployed across the continents, spinning the webs that link the world together.
>
> Internationalism is a dead end.[2]

Like Huntington, we begin with the proposition that transnational relations are increasingly significant in world politics. But we reach very different conclusions about the roles of international organizations.

Before making that argument systematically in the remainder of this paper, we must briefly deal with the issue of how transnational relations should be defined. Huntington defines "transnational organizations" as organizations sharing three characteristics: they are large bureaucracies; they perform specialized functions; and they do so across international boundaries. He explicitly includes governmental entities, such as the United States Agency for International Development (AID) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and intergovernmental entities such as the World Bank, along with nongovernmental organizations such as multinational enterprises, the Ford Foundation, and the Roman Catholic Church. Although this definition has the virtue of pointing out similarities between governmental and nongovernmental bureaucracies operating across national boundaries, it obscures the differences. Some of Huntington's observations are clearly meant to apply only to nongovernmental organizations. He argues, for instance, that "The operations of transnational organizations . . . usually do not have political motivations in the sense of being designed to affect the balance of power within the local society."[3] But this hardly applies to the Agency for International Development or the Central Intelligence Agency, both of which he designates as "transnational." He contends,

[2] Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics*, xxv (April 1973), 333-68; quotations from pp. 338, 339, and 368 respectively.
[3] *Ibid.*, 358.

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on the basis of literature about multinational enterprises, that personnel arrangements of transnational organizations move toward dispersed nationality patterns, in which country subdivisions are primarily managed by local personnel; yet no evidence is presented that this is true for AID or the CIA, much less for the Strategic Air Command—another "transnational" organization by Huntington's definition. Furthermore, the trends over time seem to diverge, and when Huntington discusses these trends, he finds himself distinguishing between "U.S. Government-controlled transnational organizations" and private groups.[4]

The anomalies into which Huntington is led convince us that for most purposes it is useful to retain the governmental-nongovernmental distinction, thus facilitating the task of examining both the differences between patterns of governmental and nongovernmental activity and the effects of each on the other. Only if one were to use organization theory in a sustained way to explain behavior of large bureaucracies that operate across international boundaries would it seem wise to adopt Huntington's definition.

The argument leads us also to reconsider some of our own past usage. In this article we will restrict the term "transnational" to nongovernmental actors, and the term "transgovernmental" to refer to sub-units of governments on those occasions when they act relatively autonomously from higher authority in international politics.[5] In other words, "transnational" applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only actors, and "transgovernmental" applies when we relax the assumption that states act as units.

Our choice of definition is not a matter of semantics but is related directly to the argument of this paper. Transnational activity makes societies more sensitive to one another, which may lead governments to increase their efforts to control this nongovernmental behavior. Such efforts, if pursued by more than one government, make governmental policies sensitive to one another: since one government may deliberately or inadvertently thwart the other's purposes, governments must design their own policies with the policies of others in mind. The re-

[4] *Ibid.*, 348-49.

[5] This is a slight modification of our usage in the volume cited above. We used the term "transnational interactions" to refer to "interactions in which one actor was nongovernmental," and the term "transnational relations" as a generic category that included both "transnational and transgovernmental interactions." We have become convinced that this was unnecessarily confusing. For a stimulating critique of our language as well as our ideas, see R. Harrison Wagner, "Dissolving the State: Three Recent Perspectives on International Relations," *International Organization*, XXVIII (Spring 1974).

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sult of this may well be attempts at policy coordination, which will increase direct bureaucratic contacts among governmental sub-units, and which may, particularly in a multilateral context, create opportunities for international organizations to play significant roles in world politics.

In the argument that follows we will first elaborate our concept of transgovernmental relations. In succeeding sections we will discuss the role of international organizations in facilitating or promoting various types of transgovernmental relations and the utility of international organizations as points of policy intervention in transnational systems. In our conclusions we will return to the question of the complexity of the connection among transnational relations, transgovernmental relations, and international organizations over time.

I. Transgovernmental Relations

During the last century, governments have become increasingly involved in attempting to regulate the economic and social lives of the societies they govern. As a result, they have become more sensitive to external disturbances that may affect developments within their own societies. For instance, integration of money markets internationally, in the context of governmental responsibility for national economies, has made government policy sensitive both to changes in interest rates by other governments and central banks, and to movements of funds by nongovernmental speculators. These sensitivities are heightened further by the expanding decision domains of transnational organizations such as multinational business firms and banks, reinforced by decreases in the cost of transnational communications.

As the agenda broadens, bureaucracies find that to cope effectively at acceptable cost with many of the problems that arise, they must deal with each other directly rather than indirectly through foreign offices.[6] Communications among governments increase. International conferences and organizations facilitate direct contacts among officials of what were once considered primarily domestic government agencies. In the words of a former White House official, "it is a central fact of foreign relations that business is carried on by the separate departments with their counterpart bureaucracies abroad, through a variety of informal as well as formal connections. (That is especially true in

[6] Karl Kaiser has been a pioneer in developing arguments about what he calls "multi-bureaucratic politics." See in particular his "Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of Multinational Politics," *International Organization*, XXV (Autumn 1971), and "Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process," in Keohane and Nye (fn. 1).

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alliance politics. But to a point, it also applies elsewhere.)"[7] There have always been such contacts. What seems to be new is the order of magnitude of transgovernmental relations, as bureaucracies become more complex and communications and travel costs decrease.[8]

We define transgovernmental relations as sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those governments. Thus we take the policies of top leaders as our benchmarks of "official government policy." Lack of control of sub-unit behavior by top leadership is obviously a matter of degree, and in practice by no means free of ambiguity. The policy of the central executive is often unclear, particularly on details, and policy means different things at different organizational levels. "One man's policy is another man's tactics."[9] As one observer has put it, "Central policy is always waffled; actors latch on to the waffled parts and form coalitions to shift policy at their level."[10] Nonetheless, to treat all actors as equal and to ignore the existence of a political hierarchy charged with "course-setting" and maintaining some hierarchy of goals is to misrepresent both constitutional and political reality.[11] It is precisely because this central policy task has become more difficult in the face of greater complexity that both the opportunities and the importance of transgovernmental interactions may be expected to have increased.

It is quite conceivable that executives entrusted with responsibility for central foreign policy, such as presidents and prime ministers, will themselves attempt to collaborate with one another in ways that conflict with the behavior of their respective bureaucracies. Yet we will regard only the relatively autonomous activities of the lower-level bureaucracies, as opposed to those of top leadership, as being transgovernmental. Otherwise, we would find ourselves in the anomalous position of regarding a head-of-state meeting, at which new initiatives that deviate from established policy are taken, as an example of "trans-

[7] Testimony of Francis Bator before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, July 25, 1972. *U. S. Foreign Economic Policy: Implications for the Organization of the Executive Branch*, 110-11.

[8] See John F. Campbell, *The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory* (New York 1971), 204 ff., for figures on the United States. On Britain, see Anthony Sampson, "The Institutions of British Foreign Policy," in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, eds., *Britain and West Germany: Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy* (London 1971).

[9] Raymond Bauer, "The Study of Policy Formation," in Raymond Bauer and Kenneth Gergen, eds., *The Study of Policy Formation* (New York 1968), 2.

[10] M. S. Hochmuth, comments at Transnational Relations Study Group Seminar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, February 8, 1972.

[11] Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important?" *Foreign Policy*, VII (Summer 1972).

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governmental politics" when indeed it is almost the paradigm case for the state-centric model whose inadequacies we are criticizing. The point of our terminology is to focus attention on bureaucratic contacts that take place below the apex of the organizational hierarchy—rather than merely to apply a new label to behavior that is easily subsumed by traditional models.

In view of our interest in the opportunities that transgovernmental relations may create for international organizations, we will concentrate in this essay on *cooperative* behavior among governmental sub-units. It should be recognized, however, that conflict is not excluded from transgovernmental relations any more than from other aspects of world politics. Occasionally, direct contacts among sub-units may themselves be conflictual. A case in point is "close surveillance" of each other's activities by the American and Soviet navies in the 1960's, which higher-level officials sought with some difficulty to control. Our emphasis on cooperative direct contacts does not, therefore, exclude the possibility of transgovernmental clashes of interests.

We will distinguish two major types of essentially cooperative transgovernmental behavior. Transgovernmental *policy coordination* refers to activity designed to facilitate smooth implementation or adjustment of policy, in the absence of detailed higher policy directives. Another process, *transgovernmental coalition building*, takes place when sub-units build coalitions with like-minded agencies from other governments against elements of their own administrative structures. At that point, the unity of the state as a foreign policy actor breaks down. Although transgovernmental policy coordination and transgovernmental coalition building are analytically distinct processes, they merge into one another at the margin. While bearing in mind that the distinction is in some sense an artificial convenience, we will look at the two processes in turn.

TRANSGOVERNMENTAL POLICY COORDINATION

The most basic and diffuse form of transgovernmental policy coordination is simply informal communication among working-level officials of different bureaucracies. Such communication does not necessarily contradict the conventional conceptualization of states as coherent coalitions vis-à-vis the outside world, although it may have side effects that influence policy. Face-to-face communications often convey more information (intended or unintended) than indirect communications, and this additional information can affect policy expectations and preferences. It is well known that international organizations frequently

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provide suitable contexts for such transgovernmental communication. As one official said of INTERPOL, "What's really important here are the meetings on a social level—the official agenda is only for show."[12]

Where patterns of policy coordination are regularized, it becomes misleading to think of governments as closed decision-making units. It has been argued, for example, that in the 1960's Canadian officials in Washington were "often able to inject their views into the decision-making process at various stages, almost as if they were American, and to actually participate, particularly in the economic sector, in the formulation of American policy."[13] In the Skybolt affair of 1962, British complacency about American planning, before cancellation was announced, was reinforced by "a steady stream of reassurances [that] flowed back and forth between the Air Forces. The USAF saw a staunch ally in Her Majesty's Government, and *vice versa*."[14]

From regularized coordination over a period of time, changes in attitudes may result. When the same officials meet recurrently, they sometimes develop a sense of collegiality, which may be reinforced by their membership in a common profession, such as economics, physics, or meteorology. Individual officials may even define their roles partly in relation to their transnational reference group rather than in purely national terms. Thus, in discussing trade discrimination in the 1950's, Gardner Patterson argued that "an important cost of discrimination was the necessity of reporting on it and defending it periodically in semi-public forums. . . . It was costly not just in terms of time and effort, but perhaps more important, in terms of the embarrassment of having many members of the 'club'—professional colleagues—charge that another member was not living up to some of its international commitments. . . ."[15]

Regularized patterns of policy coordination can therefore create attitudes and relationships that will at least marginally change policy or affect its implementation. This has been evident particularly in relations among close allies or associates, for instance between the United States and Canada[16] or among countries of the British Commonwealth. Even in relations among countries that are politically more distant

[12] *New York Times,* October 1, 1972.

[13] Dale Thompson, Testimony before Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense, House of Commons (Canada), *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence,* April 28, 1970.

[14] Richard E. Neustadt, *Alliance Politics* (New York 1970), 37.

[15] Gardner Patterson, *Discrimination in International Trade: The Policy Issues* (Princeton 1966), 36.

[16] See K. J. Holsti, "The United States and Canada," in Steven Spiegel and Kenneth Waltz, eds., *Conflict in World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass. 1971).

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from one another, policy coordination between bureaucracies with similar interests may occasionally take place. According to press reports, at any rate, United States and Soviet space officials who were engaged in technical talks on space cooperation in 1971 went considerably further than the National Security Council had authorized at that time.[17]

Patterns of regularized policy coordination have a significance that is not limited to the examples we have cited. As such practices become widespread, transgovernmental elite networks are created, linking officials in various governments to one another by ties of common interest, professional orientation, and personal friendship.[18] Even where attitudes are not fundamentally affected and no major deviations from central policy positions occur, the existence of a sense of collegiality may permit the development of flexible bargaining behavior in which concessions need not be requited issue by issue or during each period. James Coleman has suggested that the development of "political bank accounts," where a mental reckoning of political credits and debits relaxes the need for all payoffs to be immediate, is dependent on the existence of small-group collegiality.[19] When such behavior—once the prerogative of monarchs and diplomats—spreads throughout governments, the policy structure becomes more complex and decentralized. Some of the clearest examples of such behavior have been reported by students of the political processes of common markets, such as the European Community or the Central American Common Market, where the development of a sense of collegiality enabled officials and ministers in many instances to press policy coordination beyond what would otherwise have been the case.[20]

TRANSGOVERNMENTAL COALITION BUILDING

Transgovernmental policy coordination shades over into transgovernmental coalition building when sub-units of different governments (and/or intergovernmental institutions) jointly use resources to influ-

[17] *New York Times*, December 4, 6, and 16, 1971.

[18] Our thinking on the subject of elite networks was stimulated by our friend and valued colleague, the late Ivan Vallier, who was undertaking systematic research on elite networks in Latin America until his death in January 1974.

[19] James Coleman, "Political Money," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (December 1970), 1074-87.

[20] See Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1970); Lawrence Sheinman, "Some Preliminary Notes on Bureaucratic Relationships in the EEC," *International Organization*, XX (Autumn 1966); and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Central American Regional Integration," *International Conciliation*, No. 562 (March 1967).

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ence governmental decisions.[21] To improve their chances of success, governmental sub-units attempt to bring actors from other governments into their own decision-making processes as allies. When such coalitions are successful, the outcomes are different than they would be if each coalition partner were limited to his own nationality. The politics of such situations are more subtle and the rules less clear than in the classical coalition theorists' cases of electoral coalitions where resources are directly transferable into influence through a set of generally accepted rules, or national bureaucratic coalitions in which players hold formal positions that legitimize their rights to participate.

Transgovernmental coalitions may be employed by sub-units of powerful states such as the United States as means by which to penetrate weaker governments. U.S. aid agencies in the 1950's and 1960's frequently played a large role in writing requests for aid from the U.S. on behalf of potential recipients, and on occasion even served a liaison function among several ministries of a foreign government.[22] In Turkey, where the Planning Office and the Finance Ministry had equal authority but contradictory views on a U.S. aid project to bring local officials together, a *de facto* coalition developed between AID officials and Finance Ministry officials.[23] The Chilean military under Allende was willing to bear possible domestic opprobrium in order to receive American military aid. To some observers, the American strategy appeared to be an attempt to use transgovernmental politics to keep the Chilean Government divided.[24]

Transgovernmental coalitions, however, can also help agencies of other governments penetrate the U.S. bureaucracy. In 1961, when the U.S. Weather Bureau disagreed with the State Department's position at the United Nations on the control of the World Weather Watch, the Director of the U.S. Weather Bureau telephoned his Canadian counterpart and they discussed the common interests of their respective weather bureaus. The position of the two weather bureaus became the official Canadian position, which led in turn to defeat of the State Department's proposals.[25] In the late 1960's, a U.S. Defense Department official, worried that delay in returning Okinawa to Japanese control might

[21] This definition is based on the article by William A. Gamson on "Coalitions," in the *International Encyclopedia of Social Science.*

[22] Theodore Geiger and Roger Hansen, "The Role of Information in Decision Making on Foreign Aid," in Bauer and Gergen (fn. 9).

[23] Based on conversations with a participant (1973).

[24] *New York Times*, December 9, 1972.

[25] Edward Miles, "Transnationalism in Space: Inner and Outer," in Keohane and Nye (fn. 1).

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harm United States-Japanese relations, worked out with a Japanese counterpart how to phrase Japanese messages to ensure that they would enter the right channels and trigger the desired response in the U.S. bureaucracy.[26] In 1968, an Air Force general, to whom the responsibility for negotiating with Spain about military bases had been delegated, conferred secretly with his Spanish counterparts without informing civilian officials of the progress of his negotiations, and agreed to a negotiating paper that proved to be unacceptable to the Department of State. As this last case indicates, transgovernmental coalitions are not always successful: the agreement reached, which would have been favorable to the Spanish Government, was disowned by the United States, and a negative reaction against Spain took place in the Senate.[27]

It is obviously a necessary condition for explicit transgovernmental coalitions that sub-units of government have broad and intensive contacts with one another. In some sense, a degree of transgovernmental policy coordination is probably a precondition for such explicit transnational coalitions. A second set of necessary conditions has to do with conflict of interest among sub-units and the degree of central control by top executive leaders. For a transgovernmental coalition to take place, a sub-unit of one government must perceive a greater common interest with another government, or sub-units of another government, than with at least one pertinent agency in its own country; and central executive control must be loose enough to permit this perception to be translated into direct contacts with the foreign governments or agencies in question. Figure 1 illustrates four types of political situations based on these two dimensions.

Sub-units in a governmental system of Type 1 are most likely to seek, or be amenable to, transgovernmental coalitions. High conflict of interest among sub-units of the government suggests that there may be sub-units of other governments with which advantageous coalitions can be made; low executive power indicates that the central officials' ability

[26] Based on conversations with a participant (1972).

[27] In the cases of the weather bureau and the Spanish bases, the United States Government was divided while the smaller state apparently had a relatively unified policy. In terms of coherence, these relationships were asymmetrical in favor of Canada and Spain, respectively. Spain, Nationalist China, Israel, and Canada are among the countries that have taken advantage of the size and diversity of the United States Government to create asymmetries of coherence in their favor to counter asymmetries of power in favor of the United States. See Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy*, II (Spring 1971). For Canadian cases, see Roger Swanson, "The United States Canadian Constellation I: Washington, D. C.," *International Journal*, XXVII (Spring 1972), 185-218; Holsti (fn. 18); and J. S. Nye, "Transnational Relations and Interstate Conflict: An Empirical Analysis," *International Organization*, XXVIII (Autumn 1974).

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FIGURE 1

CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND EXECUTIVE POWER IN FOREIGN POLICY: FOUR TYPES



to deter such coalitions is relatively small. In the other three types, by contrast, the conventional assumption of unitary actors is more likely to be valid for external affairs, although for different reasons. In Type 2, conflict is contained by a strong executive; sub-units may perceive potentially advantageous transgovernmental coalitions, but they do not dare attempt to consummate them directly. In Type 3, low conflict of interest among domestic governmental sub-units ensures that the option of national coalition generally seems more attractive than the transgovernmental alternative, even in the absence of strong central control. Type 4, of course, exemplifies the traditional situation: national coalition reinforced by effective hierarchy.

Relatively frequent contacts among governmental sub-units, looseness of governmental hierarchies (low executive control), and relatively high conflict of interest within governments are all necessary conditions for the development of explicit transgovernmental coalitions. But they are not in themselves sufficient. In the first place, for coalitions to be feasible, actors with common interests must be able to combine their resources effectively. That means that political resources (such as funds, prestige, information, and consent—where required, for instance, by the rules of an international organization) of actors outside a government must be valuable to at least some actors within it. This requires a political context that is relatively open and free of xenophobia, since in a xenophobic society foreign resources are heavily devalued, or regarded negatively, by virtue of their origin. Even in democratic societies, the borderline between legitimate transgovernmental behavior and treason may be unclear.

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The need for resources that can be aggregated suggests that transgovernmental behavior may be particularly important in issue areas in which functionally defined international organizations operate. The procedures of the organization itself, for reaching agreement among its members, insure that the resources of one actor—at least its votes—may be useful to another; insofar as the organization has a specialized, functional orientation, the activities of national representatives may not be closely supervised by top leaders or their agents. More generally, the greater the natural sensitivity of governmental policies and the wider the acceptance of joint decision making on issues that cross national lines, the greater the legitimacy of transgovernmental bargaining is likely to be. An international organization, by symbolizing governments' beliefs in the need for joint decision making, tends to strengthen the legitimacy of this activity.

II. International Organizations and Potential Coalitions

Recurrent international conferences and other activities of international organizations help to increase transgovernmental contacts and thus create opportunities for the development of transgovernmental coalitions. The number of intergovernmental organizations more than tripled between 1945 and 1965. Nongovernmental organizations have grown even more rapidly.[28] In Europe, the Commission of the European Communities has played a major role in the growth of such contacts, with the result that "there is a steady flow of national economic and administrative elites to the seat of Community decision-making."[29] These elites are drawn from many sectors of national bureaucracies, by no means entirely from foreign offices. The pattern is not confined to Europe: In 1962, of some 2,786 people who represented the United States at international conferences, more came from other departments of the government than from the State Department.[30]

Governments must organize themselves to cope with the fact that the flow of business, including such conferences, is often transacted under the auspices of international organizations. The organizations' definitions of which issues cluster together and which should be considered separately may help to determine the nature of interdepartmental committees and other arrangements within governments. In

[28] J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, "Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System, 1815–1964," *International Organization*, XXIV (Spring 1970); Robert C. Angell, *Peace on the March: Transnational Participation* (New York 1969).

[29] Lindberg and Scheingold (fn. 20), 80.

[30] Arnold Beichman, *The "Other" State Department* (New York 1967), 92.

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the long run, therefore, international organizations will affect how government officials define "issue areas." The existence of the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, for example, helps to focus governmental activity in the monetary and trade fields, in contrast to the area of private direct investment, in which no comparable international organization exists.

The fact that international organizations bring officials together should alert us to their effect in activating *potential* coalitions in world politics. Many sub-units of governments, which do not as a matter of course come into contact with each other, may have common or complementary interests. Indeed, we may speak of some potential coalitions as *de facto* "tacit coalitions" if the independent actions of one member seem to serve the interests of others and vice versa. One of the important but seldom-noted roles of international organizations in world politics is to provide the arena for sub-units of governments to turn potential or tacit coalitions into explicit coalitions characterized by direct communication among the partners. In this particular bit of political alchemy, the organization provides physical proximity, an agenda of issues on which interaction is to take place, and an aura of legitimacy. Informal discussions occur naturally in meetings of international organizations, and it is difficult, given the milieu, for other sub-units of one's own government to object to these contacts.

It is intriguing to ask specifically why some potential coalitions become active while others remain merely potential. It is easy to see why the parallel interests of the American and Soviet armed forces (in large military budgets) are not reflected in transgovernmental coalitions between military officers in the superpowers; but it may be more difficult to determine whether the common interests of central bankers in a stable currency system have been implemented as fully by transgovernmental contacts as they might have been. To take another example, the natural allies of the American farmer—and therefore of the Department of Agriculture—in seeking access to European markets are the European urban dwellers and European finance- and consumer-oriented ministers, rather than the European farmers and agriculture ministers. However, this kind of potential coalition between agriculture officials in the United States and non-agriculture officials in Europe is difficult to organize, since regular contacts have not been established. The contrast between the difficulty involved here and the close ties existing among European agriculture ministries is instructive. Where analogous agencies with close patterns of working relationships have common interests and participate in the same international or-

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ganizations, it is likely to be much easier to create coalitions on the basis of those common interests than where the potential coalitions include a variety of actors that are not used to working closely with one another.

Even without an active secretariat, therefore, international organizations are of considerable relevance in many issue areas of world politics because they help to transform potential or tacit coalitions into explicit ones. When issues are linked or dealt with in institutional arenas with broad mandates, heterogeneous coalitions can be formed. Narrow institutional mandates discriminate against such coalitions. Thus, by defining the issues to be considered together, and by excluding others, international organizations may significantly affect political processes and outcomes in world politics, quite apart from active lobbying by their secretariats.

The second important role for international organizations, however, is the active one. Most intergovernmental organizations have secretariats, and like all bureaucracies they have their own interests and goals that are defined through an interplay of staff and clientele. International secretariats can be viewed both as catalysts and as potential members of coalitions; their distinctive resources tend to be information and an aura of international legitimacy. As Robert Cox has put it, "the executive head needs to fortify his position by alliance with domestic pressure groups. He must not limit himself to 'foreign' politics but know how to make domestic politics work in favor of his policies."[31] To the extent that the conditions enumerated in Part I of this article permit sub-units of governments to engage in transgovernmental coalitions, we would expect international secretariats or components of secretariats to form explicit or implicit coalitions with sub-units of governments as well as with nongovernmental organizations having similar interests.

Examples of alliances between parts of secretariats and governments are not hard to find. Many organizations have divisions that are regarded as fiefdoms of particular governments.[32] In a number of cases, lower-level officials of a secretariat have lobbied with governments in efforts to thwart the declared policy of their secretaries-general.[33] Rep-

[31] Robert W. Cox, "The Executive Head," *International Organization*, XXIII (Spring 1969), 225.

[32] See, for example, J. S. Nye, "UNCTAD: Poor Nations' Pressure Group," in Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (New Haven 1973).

[33] James Magee discusses a situation in which FAO bureaucrats conspired with African governments to thwart the director's decision to relocate two offices. "ECA and

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resentatives of UN specialized agencies in developing countries often strengthen old-line ministries against their rivals in central planning offices.[34] Chilean conservatives have used IMF missions to bolster their political positions.[35] With reference to the World Health Organization (WHO), Harold Jacobson argues that "many government representatives to WHO almost can be viewed as the director-general's agents or lobbyists within country sub-systems."[36] In some cases, international organizations initiate the formation of transgovernmental coalitions; in others, they or their own sub-units are recruited to the coalitions by sub-units of governments.

It must be recognized, however, that this activist, coalition-building role of international organizations is usually closely circumscribed. By no means is it a sure recipe for success. Yet the alternatives of passivity or of frontally challenging traditional notions of national sovereignty are usually less attractive. Secretariat officials often find the only feasible alternative to be to help governments, or sectors of governments, to perceive problems differently and to use their own resources in innovative ways. For example, as Ruggie points out, the World Weather Watch is not a supra-national operation but a set of national activities that the World Meteorological Organization (perceived as an ally by most weather bureaus) helps to coordinate, and the distribution of whose results it encourages.[37] Similarly, Maurice Strong has defined the role of the UN Environmental Office as one of stimulating the creation of new environmental units in member states, serving as an ally providing information and prestige for them, and thus encouraging a redefinition of "national interests."[38]

Coalition building shades down into transgovernmental policy coordination in this example, as is frequently the case. On a long-term and somewhat diffuse basis, the communications that take place as a

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the Paradox of African Cooperation," *International Conciliation*, No. 580 (November 1970).

[34] See Leon Gordenker, "Multilateral Aid and Influence on Government Policies," in Robert W. Cox, ed., *International Organization: World Politics* (London 1969). A related example is provided by the Jackson Report, which indicated that its investigations "revealed example after example where Departmental Ministers have advocated policies in the governing bodies of the particular agency which concerned them (e.g., a Minister of Agriculture in FAO, or a Minister of Education in UNESCO) which were in direct conflict with his government's policies toward the UN system as a whole." United Nations, *A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System*, Vol. I (Geneva 1969), v.

[35] See Albert Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York 1965), 291 ff.

[36] Harold K. Jacobson, "WHO: Medicine, Regionalism, and Managed Politics," in Cox and Jacobson (fn. 32), 214.

[37] John G. Ruggie, "The World Weather Watch," unpub., 1972.

[38] Based on conversations with Strong during 1972.

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result of policy coordination and conferences may be as important as the coalitions that form on particular issues. As we have seen earlier, international organizations facilitate face-to-face meetings among officials in "domestic" agencies of different governments who would have little to do with each other in traditional interstate politics. Strategically-minded secretariats of international organizations could very well plan meetings with a view toward this transgovernmental communications function. Recurrent interactions can change officials' perceptions of their activities and interests. As Bauer, Pool, and Dexter have pointed out in their discussion of the United States politics of foreign trade, concentrating only on pressures of various interests for decisions leads to an overly mechanistic view of a continuous process and neglects the important role of communications in slowly changing perceptions of "self-interest."[39]

CONDITIONS FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

To the extent that transgovernmental relations are common in a given issue area, under what conditions should we expect international organizations, in the sense of intergovernmental organizations, to be involved in them? One set of cases is obvious: where the international organization itself has created the network of elites. Thus, both the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), as described by Cox and Jacobson, are characterized by extensive "participant subsystems" that link national trade unions, employers, and government officials to the ILO secretariat, and health-care professionals to WHO's bureaucracy.[40]

More generally, however, we would expect international organizations to become involved in transgovernmental politics on issues requiring some central point or agency for coordination. This implies that international organizations are likely to be most extensively involved on complex, multilateral issues in which major actors perceive a need for information and for communication with other actors, in addition to the traditional functions, as listed by Skolnikoff, of "1) provision of services, 2) norm creation and allocation, 3) rule observance and settlement of disputes, and 4) operation."[41] Insofar as patterns

[39] Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Dexter, *American Business and Foreign Policy* (New York 1963), chap. 35, esp. pp. 472-75.

[40] See Harold K. Jacobson, "WHO: Medicine, Regionalism, and Managed Politics," pp. 194-205; and Robert W. Cox, "ILO: Limited Monarchy," pp. 114-27, in Cox and Jacobson (fn. 32).

[41] Eugene B. Skolnikoff, "Science and Technology: The Implications for International Institutions," *International Organization*, XXV (Autumn 1971), 772.

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of politics follow the transgovernmental mode, increasing the number of actors will tend to create greater demands for communication with other actors (often of different types), as well as for information about both technical and political conditions. International secretariats staffed with knowledgeable individuals, even without traditional sources of power, have the opportunity to place themselves at the center of crucial communications networks, and thereby acquire influence as brokers, facilitators, and suggestors of new approaches. They will continue to be dependent on governments for funds and legal powers; but the relevant agencies of governments may be dependent on them for information and for the policy coordination, by a legitimate system-wide actor, which is required to achieve their own objectives.

III. International Organizations and Intervention in Transnational Systems

Thus far we have discussed two ways in which international organizations are relevant in world politics—as arenas and as members of transgovernmental coalitions. They may also be important as points of potential governmental intervention in predominantly nongovernmental transactional systems.

Analysts of world politics have begun to talk less about *the* international system, and to realize that there are significant variations among systems in different issue areas.[42] There are differences in degree of interdependence of units, in hierarchy among units, and in clarity of the demarcation of the systems' boundaries.[43] There are also differences in degree of governmental participation. In many issue systems, nongovernmental actors account for a major portion of activities that cross national boundaries. To the extent that this is the case, we can refer to the issue system as a transnational one. The more transnational a system, the more likely it is that nongovernmental actors constitute the basic initiating and compelling forces in it. That does not imply that governments are absent from these systems. On the contrary, they may be very important actors. But their actions will be largely focused on regulation and control of transnational activities.

Governments frequently attempt to use international organizations

[42] James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill. 1966), 73-74. For another suggestive discussion of world politics in terms of networks of systems, see John Burton, *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules* (Cambridge 1968), esp. pp. 6-10.

[43] For a discussion of the conditions of existence for a system, see the article by Anatol Rapoport on "Systems," in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, p. 452.

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to achieve this regulation. Secretariats of international organizations may themselves perceive problems in the operation of these systems, as well as opportunities for their organizations to act effectively. The same is true of nongovernmental actors or sub-units of governments that may have interests at stake. Thus, the control of important transnational systems is and will remain a significant political focus for the activity of international organizations.

Analysis of this struggle for control, and the implications it has for international organizations, may be facilitated by thinking of transnational systems as having five key points of policy intervention insofar as any two states are concerned, with correspondingly more as additional states are included:

1. internal measures in country *A*;
2. border measures by country *A*;
3. international or transnational organizational measures;
4. border measures by country *B*;
5. internal measures in country *B*.

As a simple example, consider the following hypothetical incident in a transnational system based on a free market for skilled labor. Filipino doctors leave their native country to work in American hospitals for much higher salaries, with the consequence that a Filipino peasant dies from a simple disease because his village has no doctor, while there is a relative abundance of Filipino doctors in some American hospitals.

Figure 2 illustrates the five points at which policy can affect this transnational system: two (1 and 5) are generally considered purely "domestic"; two (2 and 4) are "border controls" where the interdependence of states is recognized but jurisdiction lies with only one state; and one (3) is an operating intergovernmental bureaucracy. Similar diagrams could be drawn for other transnational systems, including those involving monetary relations, trade, environmental pollution, and international investment. In all these cases, movements of people, funds, goods, or pollutants across national boundaries can be affected at any of these five points of intervention, insofar as two countries are concerned. As the two examples labeled "counter" in Figure 2 indicate, state policies may tend to thwart as well as to complement one another.[44]

In principle, domestic measures, border controls, and international organizations can complement, countervail, or substitute for each other.

[44] Where a larger number of countries is involved, problems of effectiveness become much more complex, and interdependence is likely to be more intricate.

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FIGURE 2

A TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM OF "BRAIN DRAIN"

	VILLAGE IN PHILIPPINES	MANILA (PORT OF EXIT)		BOSTON (PORT OF ENTRY)	U.S. HOSPITAL STAFFED BY FOREIGNERS
POINTS OF POLICY INTERVENTION, WITH POSSIBLE STRATEGIES TO REDUCE "BRAIN DRAIN" OR COUNTER-STRATEGIES TENDING TO FACILITATE IT:	1 *Phil. Internal* (persuade doctors to stay through financial or other incentives)	2 *Phil. Border* (deny exit visas or impose exit levies)	3 *I.O.* (WHO sends doctors to Philippines)	4 *U.S. Border* (restrict entry visas) (*counter:* encourage entry of skilled personnel)	5 *U.S. Internal* (discriminate against foreign doctors) (*counter:* recruit foreign doctors)

From a system-wide point of view, therefore, the policy problem in the abstract is merely one of finding the most efficient point or combination of points of intervention. For the monetary system, an economist may ask which combination of fiscal and monetary policy changes, exchange controls and/or trade barriers, and changes in IMF or GATT rules will produce the desired equilibrium. In practice, however, different groups generally have different interests and different degrees of influence at various points of policy intervention. Although there may be more or less common interest in system management, there are also likely to be conflicts. The holders of certain sets of interests may prefer that only certain potential points of policy intervention be used, and only in particular ways. Others may be opposed to all controls on transnational systems from which they benefit. Thus the choice of points of intervention is itself an important policy decision that imposes constraints on subsequent action. Insofar as control over an international organization confers influence over a transnational system, or a means to discourage intervention at some other policy point in the system, the organization can be an important stake in political conflict.

ACTORS' STRATEGIES AND THE USES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

If transnational relations are important in a set of issues, an explanation of outcomes made simply in terms of "sovereignty" and "national

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interests" will be insufficient. There is also, however, a distributional question. Some actors may believe that they are adversely affected by transnational activities and will seek strategies to cope with these perceived problems.

The most obvious response by disadvantaged groups is to use the weapons of sovereignty against the transnational adversary. Insofar as national regulation can be effective, groups with national political strength can redress the balance. In the field of international trade, tariff and non-tariff barriers are familiar strategies. To curb direct investment, nationally oriented groups may resort to expropriation, strict regulation, or bans on the flow of capital or technology. For example, the AFL-CIO in the United States supported the restrictive Burke-Hartke bill as a means of legislating relief from problems of "runaway plants" and the "export of jobs."

The chief difficulty with national solutions in the context of interdependence is that they may not only be ineffective, but may lead to policy conflicts among states, as governments attempt to counter the adverse effects of other governments' actions. This is the familiar "beggar-thy-neighbor" problem, applicable to a wide variety of issues in which interdependence is high. National actions to reduce the adverse effects of *societal* interdependence may have the paradoxical effect of increasing *policy* interdependence: that is, such measures may increase the extent to which governments depend on the actions of other governments for the achievement of their own goals.

In such a situation of policy interdependence, sub-units of governments are likely to resort to transgovernmental policy coordination or transgovernmental coalition building, as discussed above, making use of existing international organizations to facilitate these relationships. Yet in the context of intense transnational activity by nongovernmental actors, this may lead not merely to transgovernmental coalitions but to mixed coalitions including nongovernmental as well as governmental agents. According to one description of a preparatory session for the Conference on the Law of the Sea, for instance, officials of the United States Department of the Interior and representatives of certain multinational enterprises (both of which favored a definition of a wide continental shelf) lobbied with representatives of foreign governments against the declared U.S. policy (preferred by the Departments of State and Defense) of a narrow shelf.[45]

Such a strategy is inappropriate for actors whose political resources

[45] This situation was described to us by two government officials. See also Ann Hollick, "Seabeds make Strange Politics," *Foreign Policy*, IX (Winter 1972–73).

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are predominantly domestic. Having perceived that national self-encapsulation is a futile strategy, or having tried such a strategy unsuccessfully, actors may seek to politicize (i.e., increase the controversy over) an issue. By increasing controversy, they would hope to raise the level in the government at which the issue is considered—in order to reduce the scope for transgovernmental and transnational political strategies. Central political officials—responsible directly to the public in one way or another—would then negotiate internationally in the interests of nationally based groups. This could be called a national-assertion strategy (represented by the Nixon-Connally policies of 1971), as distinguished from a national protection strategy (illustrated by the Burke-Hartke bill). Thus, as Robert Russell has shown, transgovernmental coalitions among central bankers and working-level officials were increasingly constrained even before the events of 1971, as monetary issues became more controversial.[46] Such a strategy may well lead to the decline of international organizations which were established on different premises. In some cases, however, issues may be politicized partly by using international organizations to bring them to the attention of higher-level officials. The point is illustrated by the examples of UNCTAD in the trade field, and by UN investigations into operations of multinational firms.

Issues are unlikely, in general, to remain indefinitely at the top level of governmental attention. Politicization may facilitate the resolution of issues, or at least the establishment of new structures and new assumptions within which particular questions can be settled at lower levels of the governmental hierarchy. International organizations may also be important at this "depoliticization" stage, in once again facilitating transgovernmental coalitions. But the important point here is that if substantial restructuring has taken place, the coalitions that form will be different than they were before. Potential coalitions that could not be actualized in earlier periods may become possible now, and different groups may benefit. Thus, an international monetary organization set up to monitor floating exchange rates would look quite different from the IMF of the 1960's which was premised on fixed but adjustable rates. An international organization established to keep non-tariff barriers within stated limits might give more leeway to coalitions of protectionist groups than GATT, with its prohibition on quantitative restrictions.

It is therefore too simple to contend, as is often done, that the basic

[46] Robert W. Russell, "Transgovernmental Interaction in the International Monetary System, 1960–1972," *International Organization*, XXVII (Autumn 1973).

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strategic choice is between national encapsulation and internationalism. Internationalism has many dimensions, with very different implications for group interests as well as for normative values. International strategies by interested groups, as we have indicated, may take any of three forms: (1) exploitation of transgovernmental or mixed transnational-transgovernmental coalitions within an established framework of policy, and through established international organizations; (2) politicization of issues to remove them from transgovernmental bargaining, reemphasizing the role of responsible top officials of governments; and (3) restructuring of issues, as a result of a period of politicization, so that new transgovernmental and mixed coalitions can become effective, perhaps under the aegis of new or substantially altered international organizations. The second and third strategies, in particular, are not mutually exclusive but may reflect different phases in a cycle. When internationalization as a strategy for dealing with transnational issues is considered, distinctions such as these should be made.

IV. Conclusions

It should be clear from the examples we have chosen that we do not regard the involvement of international organizations in transnational and transgovernmental coalitions as necessarily contributing to global welfare or equity. Like other political institutions, international organizations reflect the interests as well as the attitudes of actors that are powerful in them. Opportunities for impact by international organizations by no means assure their autonomy or their dedication to the commonweal. Increased opportunities for certain international organizations may in some cases lead to the fragmentation of an international effort, which Sir Robert Jackson criticized, or to the pursuit of the interests of well-placed groups at the expense of the interests of less fortunate but larger sectors of the population. The effects of transgovernmental politics on the efficacy of democratic control may be very serious.[47] In some circumstances, an expansion of the influence of international organizations in ways such as we have suggested here may be undesirable. There is no magic wand that makes it unnecessary to undertake detailed, case-by-case normative analyses of the actions of international organizations.

With respect to empirical projections, our prognosis differs from that of the international functionalists and others who see transnational systems and societal interdependence as making national governments

[47] See Kaiser in Keohane and Nye (fn. 6).

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obsolete.[48] While there are some valid elements in the functionalist scenario, we suggest the following alternative view as somewhat more plausible.

The development of transgovernmental relations, as well as the involvement of international organizations in them, is generally stimulated by the activities of elites trying to cope with increased *societal* interdependence. Dynamic nongovernmental forces frequently provoke increased governmental efforts at control. However, as a side effect of increasing interchange among elites, transgovernmental politics and the activities of international organizations are likely to increase *policy* interdependence. That is, the policies of relevant actors—central foreign policy organs of governments, other governmental agencies, transnational actors, or secretariats of international organizations—will increasingly depend for their success on actions and reactions of other actors. Succumbing to one form of interdependence may be the price one pays for avoiding another. Efforts to cope with policy interdependence will in turn further broaden the scope of interstate agendas, involve more bureaucracies (national, international, and transnational), and thus provide more occasions for transgovernmental relations. For top leaders this leads to the further problem of losing effective control of their own sprawling and transgovernmentally active bureaucracies. A continuing struggle between groups favoring transgovernmental policy patterns and those supporting a return to strategies of national assertion or national protection is likely to ensue. Figure 3 provides a highly simplified sketch of some of the causal relations that may contribute to political struggles of this type.

This is not an argument for the superiority of international or transnational as opposed to national solutions, nor does it suggest a general view of the merits of international institutions. We have simply sought to establish the political significance of international organizations in certain issue areas—as arenas and members of transgovernmental coalitions, and as potential points of intervention in transnational systems. International organizations are not necessarily weak "because they are inherently the arenas for national actors," or because they require "*accord* among nations."[49] Which bureaucracies represent the nation? Who defines the "national interest," and how does it change over time? Is there transgovernmental coordination? Are there mixed coalitions

[48] See, for example, Angell (fn. 28); and David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago 1966).

[49] Huntington (fn. 2), 338.

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FIGURE 3

HYPOTHETICAL CAUSAL RELATIONS INVOLVING TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEMS AND TRANSGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS



of transgovernmental, transnational, and international actors? Viewed from the perspective of these questions, it is not always—or only—the transnational organizations that are "busily deployed across the continents spinning the webs that link the world together."[50]

A major policy task for those who create and manage international institutions is to ask themselves whether there are areas of activity in which international organizations could make an impact by aligning their activities with sub-units of governments. As Ruggie points out, traditional images of interstate politics and international organizations as entities "above" states unduly constrain institutional imagination.[51] Understanding the transnational and transgovernmental politics of an issue as well as the technical, economic, or military nature of the problem may permit a wider choice of organizational strategy and structure, and in some cases more constructive outcomes.

International organizations are rarely optimally efficient, and they are frequently quite unsatisfactory. Some improvements are possible, but many government officials will always find them hard to live with. For the foreseeable future, however, it seems that they will be impossible to live without. And if that is true, their political role and impact on various issues in world politics deserve both more and a new type of attention.

[50] *Ibid.*, 339.

[51] John G. Ruggie, "The Structure of International Organization: Contingency, Complexity, and Post-Modern Form," *Peace Research Society*, Papers, XVIII, 1971, 73-91.

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OIL, OTHER SCARCITIES, AND THE POOR COUNTRIES

By JOHN P. LEWIS

IF the international economic order is in general disarray, the cause of overseas development, together with relations between poor countries and rich countries, is in shambles.

A decade and more ago, most specialists in overseas development—whether as practitioners or pundits, in the poor countries or the rich—thought they more or less knew what needed to be done. The problem was doing it. But from the middle 1960's onward, doubts, disappointments, and disaffections began to build in the development-policy community. Thus, the cause had begun to lose confidence and momentum before the end of the 1960's, when the planet's opinion-makers started rediscovering the finiteness of the earth's resources. This newly reverberating awareness of scarcities—of natural resources, terrestrial space, and unpolluted places—seemed to challenge the underlying assumptions of the classic postwar development program more fundamentally than anything that had preceded it.

That was where the erosion of the development priority stood as recently, say, as the spring of 1973. The collision of scarcities and development still was largely conceptual—more a subject for seminars and study commissions than for emergency cabinet meetings. Since then, of course, we have been hit by the oil/energy crunch, alleged to be the first manifestation of what the growth-limits people have been talking about—and with utterly bizarre results. In recent months, we have been busily calculating whether the current-account surpluses that the principal oil-exporting states (we still call them "developing" and, more often than not, "poor") will run in 1974 with the rest of the world will be closer to $50 billion or $100 billion. A number of non-oil-exporting poor countries are due to have all of the gross foreign aid they presently expect for the year wiped out by their increased import bills for oil and oil products alone.

Moreover, although it seems rather clear that the hardest-hit victims of the energy crunch, particularly in the near term, will be some of the poor countries, the effect of the current trauma has not simply further confused and sidetracked issues of development policy; it has almost pushed them off the table.

Even when national regimes in the advanced countries have tried

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to keep some of the needs of the poor countries in view, their parliaments and publics have given them short shrift. The most extreme, potentially devastating, anti-developmental vote that the U.S. Congress has cast in years, for example, was the rejection, by the House of Representatives, of the Administration's request for the delayed U.S. contribution to I.D.A. (the World Bank's soft-loan wing, the International Development Association) in late January 1974. It was no accident that that vote came during the same month in which the reopening of some colleges was delayed for lack of fuel oil, and people had to queue up several hours each week to get gasoline. Dominant Western opinion is not just disillusioned over development; it has almost stopped considering it.

If this blindness persists, we are heading for disaster. But, to escape the blindness, we need some sense of what is salvageable and what is not in the old development doctrine, of which limits on growth are real and which exaggerated, and of how the collision between scarcities and development can be turned into a viable synthesis.

That, in very rough and preliminary fashion, is the attempt here. I shall not dwell at length on the implications of scarcer and costlier oil for the poor countries. Rather, painting with a broader brush and to some extent using oil as a case in point (although not a very representative case), I shall try to sketch some general hypotheses about the reconciliation of development and scarcity.

I

For a beginning, it is necessary to reach back to before the formation of what I am calling classic postwar development strategy. In retrospect the surprising thing is that we managed to be so optimistic about relations between poor countries and rich countries after World War II. For at least a hundred years two things have been going on in the world that were calculated to bring it a cropper—two things even more inexorably ominous than the appearance of worldwide wars, the invention of nuclear weapons, or the galloping hegemony of the automobile.

One has been population growth. The past century has witnessed the start and the gathering acceleration of history's one great, wholly unprecedented, clearly nonsustainable surge of human population expansion. From the beginning of time to the start of this century the number of our species grew to about one and a half billion. During the next half century we added another billion. During the latest quarter cen-

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tury we have been adding nearly one and a half billion more. Before World War II, the planetary population was growing at a rate of less than 1 per cent annually; if sustained, it would have caused a doubling in one hundred years. Now it is growing at nearly 2 per cent annually; if that rate is sustained, it means our numbers will multiply six times over the next hundred years.

Moreover, the planetary growth rate apparently has not yet started to edge downward. Processes of reversal, to be sure, are under way. But their strength and reliability are uncertain, and the expanding base to which new rates apply gives population prospects a formidable momentum.

The other ominous trend has been that of widening international income disparities. Here the century's accentuated nationalism has been a reinforcing factor. One hundred years ago the nation-state was scarcely a novel social form. But today it has become entrenched, it has multiplied, and national loyalties and identities have captured a wider array of men's minds than ever before. One result has been to increase the economic compartmentalization between countries, to some extent with respect to flows of goods and capital, particularly with respect to flows of people. Migrations of population have become officially impeded, and this, in turn, probably was a precondition for an extraordinary, ongoing divergence among the per capita incomes of different countries.

In any event, the degree of the income dispersion among countries has become as striking and unprecedented as is the population explosion. Moreover, although the measured income differentials surely exaggerate the differences in basic per capita welfare between countries, the welfare differentials clearly have widened radically also. And, as in the case of population growth, the income-welfare spread is still vigorously underway. Indeed, in the past two decades the first trend has fortified the second. Even when poor countries have been able to achieve aggregate growth rates as high or higher than those of most advanced economies, their populations have grown so much faster that their per capita incomes have fallen farther behind—in relative as well as in absolute terms.

II

Taken together, the world's population and income-disparity trends were a potent recipe for disaster. On a finite planet, a rapidly multiplying population was sure to run out of space, if nothing else, rather soon. And for all the world's ideological diversity, there was not a

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modern social ethic anywhere that could pretend to provide enduring justification for the existing, let alone worsening, inequality in international income distribution. The rich countries were living on borrowed time, and the whole ship was getting crowded.

Looking back, therefore, one might have expected gloom to have become the dominant mood soon after we escaped the convulsion of World War II. Instead, we entered an era of great hopefulness concerning the poor countries. Those countries themselves were caught up in the headiness of newly emergent nationalism. As self-determining states, they resolved to avail themselves of modernized techniques and productive processes and to achieve accelerated, self-sustaining productive growth along lines more or less in accordance with Western and/or Soviet models, whereby they would progressively improve the material welfare of their masses and soon attain national self-reliance.

In the 1950's and early 1960's the advanced countries built enthusiasm and support for this classic, reassuringly optimistic development program. It offered the rich countries advantages in the form of broadened world markets and improving sources of raw materials. It salved their humanitarian consciences. And, most important, it did so "on the cheap."

This last was because the classic development strategy did not require the rich countries to enter into any grandiose share-the-wealth schemes. We were able to tell ourselves that these were not only infeasible; they were unnecessary. For the important thing was not the difference between absolute levels of income and welfare in different countries; it was what would be happening to the different rates of change in their income levels. And it would now be possible for the poor countries to start catching up. This they could do if they bestirred themselves; if they took full advantage of the catching-up gains they could make by borrowing and adapting astutely some of the ready-made technological wares of the advanced economies; if they practiced sufficient austerity (which, after all, their long experience with poverty should well qualify them to do); *and* if, in this particular, critical start-up period, the rich countries provided a modest injection of outside assistance (no more, say, than 1 per cent of their respective GNP's for a limited number of years) to help the poor countries' self-help efforts get going. If all of these conditions were met, it now would be possible for the poor countries to bend their growth paths upward enough to begin catching up with the rich.

This benign convergence of per capita growth rates, to be sure, would take a very long time—so long that the model-builders almost never

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put numbers on this time dimension of their strategy, and so long that students of development constantly pondered the patience of the poor countries and worried about expectations outrunning performance. Nevertheless, it was the image of converging growth paths—coming together some day at levels of per capita welfare still higher than those now prevailing in the rich countries—that supplied the underlying ethic for the optimism of classic postwar development strategy. It was, if you will, a program for creeping international economic justice. That, we felt, was the most we could shoot for, and it should be good enough.

III

It is terribly easy now to debunk the classic strategy. By no means did it fail completely. During the 1960's, for the poor countries as a whole, despite the facts that foreign aid was far below the strategists' targets and that many regimes of developing countries were still learning the arts of government and economic management, the poor countries' rates of aggregate real-output growth did almost do the intended —i.e., they caught up with and maybe slightly surpassed the average GNP growth of the rich countries. But, as noted, the differential rates of population growth between rich and poor kept per capita growths from converging. A few countries, most of them fairly small, followed the classic design with outstanding success. In many others, of which India, as populous as all of Africa and Latin America combined, is the outstanding case, performance has been harried, erratic, and, compared with intentions, sluggish. Yet even in most of these cases, indigenous expansion in the past two decades has far outstripped whatever preceded; there have been substantial achievements.

For our present synoptic purposes, however, we must pass over these redeeming features and jump to the fact that, by the mid-sixties, perceptions of the classic development program were going sour—both in the donor countries and in the poor countries themselves. They were doing so even before our discovery of the finiteness of the planet began, in many minds, to dislodge the ethic of converging growth rates.

In the first place, there was disappointment with the lack of speed of the process. Some of the early expectations about the pace of progress had been grossly unrealistic, but in addition, many mistakes in development policy (both host-country and external) had been made; extraneous setbacks intruded; implementation was stretched out and inefficient; and delays, bottlenecks, and inefficiencies often compounded one another cumulatively.

The development-policy community was dismayed at the degree to

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which population growth in the poor countries diluted whatever output gains were achieved. Further, suspicion began to well up at the end of the 1960's that development strategy had been aimed at the wrong or at least at an insufficient set of targets. It had been presumed that growth would bring substantial benefits to the weakest sections of the population in the poor countries. Instead, in country after country, internal inequities seemed to be worsening, not diminishing. For the past four or five years, therefore, the preoccupation of development-policy makers has been to improve internal income distribution and to attack mass poverty and underemployment more effectively. Some of them, in recognizing that growth is not enough, and in concluding that trade-offs between growth and equity need to be redressed, seem also to have concluded that growth is unimportant.

Finally, both donors and recipients suffered a mounting disenchantment with foreign aid. Aid had been oversold, especially as to its speed of impact. It was replete with encumbrances. Recipients suspected its motives. They resented "strings." Perhaps most of all, despite all their umbrage at the interventionist political pressures that aid was alleged to bring, they resented performance conditions whereunder donor sovereign states presumed to tell recipient sovereign states what was in the latter's own best interests. Both sides resented the burdens which they had jointly created for themselves by having contrived and accepted unrealistically hard terms for past aid, whereby they had generated unrealistic debt servicing and repayment burdens for the poor countries. By 1970, both sides were impatient with the whole aid transaction.

IV

The classic development program was in deep trouble, therefore, even before it was assaulted along the scarcity salient. But the latter attack, although it has been cumulative rather than sudden, and oblique rather than frontal, has challenged the foundations of development strategy.

At first the wave of broadened ecological awareness that overtook Europe, Japan, and the United States in the late 1960's simply injected a certain turbulence into development policy: Did modernization have to equal pollution? Would increased environmental defense in the industrially congested rich countries shift comparative advantage to the poor countries? Was it benign or not to export polluting industries? Was it more benign to export rigorous antipollution standards, which might be no more appropriate for the poor countries than would their adoption of the rich countries' minimum wages? Should South Asia

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be denied the DDT it needed for checking malaria and accelerating foodgrain production? Who was in charge of averting the pollution of the world's one great commons and its ultimate sink—the oceans? After so many false alarms, were the terms of trade now, thanks to mounting scarcities, about to move decisively in favor of the producers of raw materials?

The questions were many. They ran in opposite directions. Some of the answers were uncertain, and the net implications for development were unclear. But that was with respect to what might be called "micro-" pollution and scarcity issues. By the early 1970's, the macro-ecologists were gathering full voice, and in March of 1972, when the Club of Rome issued the Meadows' *Limits of Growth*, they reached high C. In many respects the *Limits of Growth* was an unfortunate brief. The models upon which it rested were highly aggregative, brittle, and superficial. Because, on the one hand, the book became the instant banner of macro-ecology and, on the other hand, its economics were so primitive, it served to galvanize a higher proportion of competent Western economists into anti-ecological postures than need have been the case. For one need not be as bearish as the Forrester-Meadows group about the vitality of future technological innovation, nor as impervious as they to the adjustment processes by which real economies perceive and, via substitution, circumvent particular growth limits, to be sobered by the general proposition of finiteness.

Nonetheless, for reasons I have yet to understand fully, the Meadows tract froze the attention of the public-affairs community of the world as nothing had before. It knocked the underlying assumption (what I have called the underlying ethic) of the classic development program into a cocked hat. For, if the Meadows were even remotely right, there was no way that the onward-and-upward-for-everyone path toward global equity could possibly work. Global growth would have to be stopped and reversed. The advanced economies would have to be cut back sharply. The more radical ecologists in the affluent states also viewed the growth of poor countries with jaundiced eyes, counseling them instead to upgrade their spiritual and cultural aspirations. But within the growth-limits frame, whatever scope there is for further growth in the poor countries will require additional curtailment of real income by the rich. Rich country-poor country relations, in short, are seen as shifting from a harmonious to an adversary context.

Such is the collision between scarcities and development that has been posed conceptually. And now, in these past months, it seems to have taken concrete shape in the oil crisis. What is a sensible person

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of good will—a person, whether belonging to a rich or a poor country, who tries, at least spasmodically, to think like a citizen of the planet —to make of all this? Where do we go from here? Let me try out a half-dozen hypotheses.

V

First, as to population: One thing, I am quite sure, that anyone seeking a viable reconciliation between development and scarcity should do is draw a sharp line between the issues of zero population growth and zero economic growth. The case for the former is vastly more persuasive.

Social scientists and policy advisers in the past ten years have had an overweening tendency to see everything whole. The mood of the macro-ecologists at the moment is to wrap everything—population, food, energy, minerals, urbanization, wildlife preservation, natural-foods nutrition, economic growth, and the *Whole Earth Catalog*—into one round bundle. That is in keeping with current intellectual fashion, whereunder we have invented systems analysis, have enshrined general-equilibrium models, and are all for holistic approaches. (I had assumed the term "holism" was invented by Col. Robert McCormick in his anti-spelling period as editor of *The Chicago Tribune*. But it turns out, instead, to have been coined by none other than Jan Christian Smuts during one of the philosophical byways of his career. Although barbaric language, it is a perfectly sound concept.) It seems to me well-nigh obvious that organic models of social phenomena are more suggestive than atomistic models, that wholes can and typically do add up to more—or less—than the sums of their parts, and that everything relates to everything else.

But when it becomes a policy guideline, untrammelled holism can cause a profound confusion of priorities. There are times when policy, rather than trying to deal with everything at once, needs to go for the jugular. And the jugular of the problem of scarcity is population. The one kind of growth that most obviously cannot continue for very long is that in our numbers. Shortages of food, fuel, jobs, schooling and health facilities, and most particularly of water and space, are not just other variables interacting with population growth; they are its manifestations. With it arrested, there is a reasonable chance of our working out satisfactory adjustments in the other dimensions of activity. But stopping all other aspects of growth as well would merely serve to postpone the time by a few generations when further rapid population growth becomes intolerable.

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Stopping the population explosion as quickly as possible, therefore, is fundamental. The poor countries must do it to aid their scramble for improved welfare, and to improve internal equity. The rich countries must do it to ease the resource-saving adjustments they are going to have to make. It is a global imperative with which virtually all national needs, rationally examined, are consistent. Moreover, it seems to me that as an objective, zero population growth should by now have insistent appeal for any ethical system that attaches ultimate value to the human individual. In order to serve the interests of those individuals individually, it has become necessary to limit their numbers in the aggregate.

Thus it is high time, I think, that all of us—Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Irishmen, Poles, Americans, Nigerians, Indians, Brazilians—stopped temporizing with the population issue in international forums. We should resoundingly adopt the planetary ethic of zero population growth. We should resolve to better the most optimistic projections the demographers presently offer us. Since nation-states still are largely where the power lies, we should start holding countries publicly to account for their population performance. The international community should not intrude on their choices of method. At the same time it should, where it can, assist those choices (even though the effectiveness of such assistance typically has been exaggerated by Western enthusiasts of family planning). Member states should be encouraged to devise their own systems of incentives for reconciling private with social childbearing objectives. And very possibly, distribution of multilateral aid should be conditioned in part on countries' relative achievements in reducing their birthrates.

The need for a much more radical attack on population growth is my first hypothesis.

VI

Second, as to global economic growth: Given the first proposition, the case for zero economic growth becomes quite unpersuasive. About the really long run, of course, there is no question. Doomsday is not a new idea. Life on the planet, we have every reason to believe, will in due course cease. But it takes a fairly egocentric view of history to conclude that just now, in this particular clock-tick of time, we have reached the point when the processes of substitution, technological innovation, and market adjustment that have been supporting a substantial rate of global productive expansion for several hundred years can no longer work.

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In particular, the hostility to technology voiced by some of the ecological extremists is regressive romanticism. Mankind has long since been committed to an artificial, technological environment, and to all appearances vastly prefers it to grubbing for roots and berries. This is not the time to try arresting or reversing the commitment. On the contrary, the technological challenges are just getting interesting. What we need are redoubled, shrewder, partly redirected, transnationally more dispersed efforts to contrive energy-saving, capital-saving, territory-saving, existing-materials-saving and new-materials-using, trash-collecting, waste-cleansing processes. The ecological romanticism is benign to the extent it prompts us collectively to assign higher values to the conservation of space, natural beauty, wildlife, and wilderness. But it will take much continuing innovation to support these very ecological purposes themselves.

I know of no proof that, as the innovations we need for stretching or replacing particular resources become socially profitable, our scientific and technological institutions will be overtaken with impotence. Nor is there proof that the price system and other social planning mechanisms will fail to guide such activity with reasonable effectiveness. It is perfectly possible, of course, that thorny stumbling blocks will be encountered, and/or that innovation overall will prove harder (i.e., will be more costly, will yield smaller gains in output per unit of input) than in the past. But even this is not self-evident.

Energy is probably the pivotal requirement for continuing growth. For more than a century technology, made effective by investment and the necessary organizations, has been contriving a shifting, rapidly expanding array of energy supplies that has kept a step ahead of our escalating demand. Just now, for the first time, much of the world is encountering an energy gap. The reasons are complicated and various, but many of them are easy to identify. They include, among other things, the ravenous appetite of American automobiles. We have developed a pattern of demand that is using our best, most convenient, and most versatile, but also our scarcest energy sources—oil and natural gas—fastest. By some reckonings, this is sound strategy; by others, improvident. But in any event, we have evolved a collection of regulations and other public policies—of oil politics, of relative prices, and of corporate managements bridging foreign and domestic oil and bracketing oil and coal—that has simultaneously inhibited additional oil and natural gas development, has disoriented investment in refinery capacity, and has muted investment in substitutes. Research into ways to make the world's enormous coal reserves more economically accessible

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without ecologically undesirable consequences, on coal gasification and liquefaction, and on oil shales has been grievously undernourished. Although the problem of working out acceptable trade-offs between environmental and energy needs should be soluble over the longer run, the vehemence with which environmental considerations intruded on decision making at the end of the 1960's resulted in a one-time dislocation in energy development. More generally, the combination of the market and of public and corporate policy had produced an infirm brand of comprehensive energy planning in most advanced economies throughout the past two decades. And on top of all this came the Arab oil boycott.

The composite result is, indeed, a considerable mess. But to conclude that it is the beginning of the end is curious reasoning. It is more likely that because of a conjunction of errors and bad luck we have encountered an aberration—a dip, a pause in the old trend—rather than the beginning of a new trend. Moreover, the technological intelligence seems to support this view. With offshore oil, new coal-producing and -using technologies, and the more exotic fossil fuels; with the use of breeder reactors to make hydrogen by splitting water, thereby both making the energy product of nuclear fission more versatile and adapting such generation to less hazardous locations; with the well-advanced, if slowly advancing, possibilities for controlled fusion; and with the enormously exciting possibilities for solar energy, on which serious work has scarcely begun, the world may well have an abundance of energy by the year 2000, with further major developments still to come. And all that without reference to the winds, tides, geothermal energy, and intraoceanic heat exchanges, which may yet prove to be major sources. Moreover, in terms of real costs, it could be cheaper energy than we have now. And, for the first time since we took up coal in a big way, our predominant energy sources may no longer be nonrenewable.

In short, it is hard to see the production of energy as setting a global limit on growth. As to food, we are at present having something of a replay of the hysteria about impending disaster on the food front that swept the world about eight years ago. At that time the cry was "Famine 1975." I do not mean to minimize the urgency of the food problem, then or now. Certainly, promotion of agricultural production in the poor countries (promotion that is sensitive to equity considerations within those countries) should be pressed by every national and international means. Investment in and production of nitrogenous fertilizer, which, lacking any orderly worldwide planning, seem to lumber

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through an especially pronounced trade cycle, need to be turned upward again. And clearly, it would be helpful if the world's aggregate food reserves were to be raised somewhat and, in particular, be more efficiently and constructively managed.

But some of the present alarm about food surely is exaggerated. For example, the substantial drop in the world's foodgrain reserves from their level a dozen years ago is not *per se* ominous: the earlier level was not necessarily "right"; it reflected political lags in American farm policy that generated unwanted surpluses. Similarly, the low level at which average farm productivity remains in the poor countries today is not a bad sign for the future; given what we have seen recently of strong selective productivity responses by wheat and rice to applied research and to new technology and inputs, that low level is heartening; it means there is great accessible room for improvement.

Protein is a good example of the way the price system and substitution can work to sustain the growth process. Beef prices are soaring, and the per-acre yields of soybeans, despite substantial efforts thus far, have not responded to research in the manner of wheat and rice. By themselves, these two facts sound like alarming portents of a global inability to meet the rising need for proteins. What is happening, I presume, is that beef, which is the most expensive of all major proteins in terms of its use of land, is being priced out of the market. As a dietary staple, it may go the way of venison and gamefowl. But the total supply of proteins will continue to expand as, accordingly, both demand and resource allocation shift to more land-economizing proteins such as pork and poultry—and to that most efficient protein of all, soybeans. By such reallocation, the latter, even without research breakthroughs (which probably will also come in due course) can contribute to expanded supplies simply by being cultivated more extensively in places to which existing strains are adapted—including a variety of countries besides those where the crop is now largely concentrated, notably China, Brazil, and the United States.

On top of all this, although recent trends in the world's fish catch are not reassuring, it is also true, despite much talk about "farming the seas," that commercial fishing today is not yet out of the hunting phase from which animal husbandry emerged many millennia ago on land. It may soon be economically and socially profitable for it to so emerge, and then it probably will.

Thus, concerning protein and food in general, I find it hard to believe that the planetary system should not rather readily (albeit with

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hard and good work along the way) be able, during the next hundred years, to supply the dietary needs of an enlarged but eventually stabilized population with rising incomes and much improved nutritional requirements. As a beef eater I may deplore some aspects of the outlook, just as, had I been a member of the upper middle class a generation ago, I might have rued the rapidly declining economic availability of housemaids. But such private discomfiture is consistent with social progress.

Energy and food, of course, are not the only physical constituents of growth, and almost surely, somewhere along the line, awkward bottlenecks, stubbornly resistant to substitution, will crop up. Yet one hears very few such alarms from the scientists. Possibly some biological or climatic disaster will intervene; but a number of the concerned ecologists who sound most reasonable do not rate such chances very highly. It has seemed to me most likely that the need to cope with pollution would prove to be the most serious retardant to aggregate growth during the next several generations. Yet it is interesting that the most careful comprehensive study that has lately been made of these matters in the United States is quite unalarming.[1] It has concluded that, to make room for all of the expenditures required to implement the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's emission standards to the year 2000, it will be necessary to give up only one-tenth of one percentage point of annual GNP growth.

Global retardation of growth certainly is not prudent if it is unnecessary. The planet has too many urgent needs and uses for additional income. Hence, my second hypothesis for a sensible policy of development-*cum*-scarcities is that global economic growth can, will, and should continue for the foreseeable future, perhaps as briskly as in the recent past, perhaps damped down a bit. The frame within which growth shares between the rich countries and the poor must be sorted out is much less constricted than the Limits-of-Growth school would have us believe. However, there are ongoing scarcity restraints of which classic development strategy was not sufficiently mindful. And that Nirvana when everyone—Chinese, Indians, Ghanians, Americans—would share a material standard of living substantially higher than the contemporary American one looks a lot more unrealistic now than it did back in the 1950's.

[1] U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *Population, Resources, and the Environment*, R. G. Ridker, ed. (Washington, D.C. 1972), III; see also Ridker, "To Grow or Not to Grow: That's Not the Relevant Question," *Science*, CLXXXII (December 28, 1973), 1315-18.

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VII

Third, as to the need for growth in the poor countries and for net transfers from abroad: Here the case is the most straightforward. There is simply no question whether the poor countries will continue to require rapid productive expansion. The need has not diminished. Most of the poor countries do indeed need to do a better job on the distribution and employment fronts, and therefore need to change or amend some of their modes of agricultural and industrial expansion. But in many of the countries, average and total incomes remain abysmally low. There is no way they can meet their welfare needs simply by reshuffling existing income—or by accenting new (noneconomic) dimensions of social ambience. If they would be more egalitarian, they need more aggregate growth and more growth-supporting investment, so that they can spread income increments over a broader base.

That is the first point. The second is that—given access to transnational trade and flows of capital and technology—there is scarcely any poor country whose needs for income growth need be blocked by specific local shortages, whether of land, minerals, energy, water, or skills. The third point is that the poor countries are becoming impatient. In recent years, events in each of the Third-World continents have demonstrated that the masses are not about to wait forever for gains in internal equity. In consequence, their governments' demands for transnational equity grow in insistence.

Taken together, all these things plainly suggest that the need for net transfers of resources from the rich countries to the poor countries has not abated. On the contrary, if there is to be any prospect of a significant international convergence of welfare, the need for transfers is greater and more prolonged than we used to think. The mirage of eventual, painless, almost costless convergence, the poor countries' overdrawn rhetoric of economic self-reliance, and the rich countries' illusion that the obligations generated by their affluence could be discharged by giving single, self-terminating inoculations of foreign aid, have all turned out to be unrealistic. There is not only the same ethical case for continuing net transfers of resources from the United States or Japan to Paraguay or Bangladesh as there is for transfers from California to Mississippi; the peace-keeping case is not altogether dissimilar. And, for reasons partly connected with scarcity, the bargaining power of the poor countries for eliciting a considerable volume of such transfers probably is on the rise—even if the results are not yet apparent.

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VIII

Fourth, as to prospects for growth in the rich countries: The most burdensome claim that a new, scarcity-chastened development strategy will make on the affluent countries is the one just noted; namely, that a continuing worldwide share-the-wealth program is not, after all, unthinkable. On the contrary, one way or the other, and at least in moderate form, it probably cannot be avoided. But how painful and domestically contentious this need for continuing net transfers will turn out to be depends heavily on how vigorously the rich countries' own output can continue to grow.

Of the present set of questions, that may be the trickiest one. Surely there will be some specific casualties. I already have mentioned one likely candidate: beef production. Another might be what we in the United States continue to call the "standard size" eight-cylinder American automobile. This product may already be over the hill. Its use may continue to be squeezed by fuel prices and very possibly by tax changes. In various countries suburban sprawl will be retarded. There will be other specific impacts.

More generally, in ways touched on earlier, pressures from scarcities are likely, if the international market system is allowed to work, to place certain drags on the wealthier economies and tilt some growth advantage to the poor. If both groups of countries behave rationally, they will both recognize that the capacities of different environments to absorb many kinds of pollution are a function not only of population densities but of levels of industrialization and consumption. If so, the rich economies henceforward will need to internalize a higher ratio of the costs of environmental protection than the poor. That will give the poor countries a competitive edge in some products which both groups produce and will, like lower wage levels in the developing countries, encourage some out-migration of industry from the advanced economies. At the same time, if scarcities do cause prices of raw materials in general to rise relative to prices of finished goods (a trend long expected but not yet, despite the present glaring case of oil, clearly established) the poor countries as a group will gain relative to the rich. Finally, scarcities and pollution costs may accentuate a shift, already underway in the American and other advanced economies, in the composition of the final product. The services share of GNP is rising; services typically contain a very high proportion of (mostly indigenous, high-cost) labor; and usually they have enjoyed below-average productivity gains.

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However, it is very easy to exaggerate the adversity of such adjustments. For one thing (despite the example of oil, of which more in a moment) they are likely to be of modest, gradual scale. Second, since they so largely involve relative price movements, they will be quasi-hidden. Particular adjustments—for example, a failed business or closed factory—can be extremely painful for those directly involved; attentive governments will take great care to cushion their impacts. But not only is it unlikely that the German or Japanese or American publics will sense any deprivation if market processes of the sort suggested do succeed in shifting some fraction of their growth dividends to the poor countries; depending on which price deflators they choose, even the German, Japanese, and American national-income accountants may not fully detect what is going on.

My net hypothesis as to growth in the rich countries therefore is that it probably will continue to be substantial. Real gains in per capita welfare may be crowded a bit. But growth dividends should allow scope for governments to make further inroads into their own internal equity problems. Containing, as they will, a mounting fraction of services, including public services, the dividends should provide a good deal of room for general improvements in the quality of life.

At the same time, if governments are perceptive and publics are not bloody-minded, the rich countries' own growth prospects would suggest their capacity to provide significant external net transfers. The pro-poor, anti-rich market adjustments about which I have just been speculating are not apt to be large enough to obviate the need for such transfers. And the rich countries should not be in such a deprived, frustrated, sealed-off frame of mind that they have no ear for the need.

But if that last is not blindly wishful thinking, what is one to make of the current oil imbroglio?

IX

Fifth, then, as to oil: The oil situation in 1974 is a vivid illustration of much that we have been discussing, but it is so extreme a case as to be thoroughly unrepresentative. The danger is that in the violence of our reaction to it, we will lose track of the larger picture of development with scarcities.

Oil, together with natural gas, at present looks like the most severe and probably prolonged (albeit time-bound) materials shortage in sight. For reasons sketched earlier—reasons that are as much political and institutional as natural—the present scarcity of ready-to-be-marketed oil supplies represents a kind of large bubble in the global sys-

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tem's composite energy supply line. The bubble will pass, as additional, improved, and new energy sources are developed. But it will probably not pass quickly, for the repair of energy supplies may require extensive research and development as well as much time-consuming investment in construction.

Meanwhile, for some time—perhaps as little as five years, perhaps as long as fifteen—the market will be subjecting us to the pressures of an unusually strenuous process of adjustment. It is a process that has been delayed and muted for many years. The rumble first became audible three or four years ago, and then burst forth with an exaggerated thunderclap, not so much in the form of the Arab oil embargo of October 1973 as in the announcement from Teheran in December of that year of Persian Gulf oil at $11 a barrel.

Although there is impressive counter-opinion, it seems probable to me that high oil prices (not as high as at present, but substantially higher than a year ago) are here to stay, and, indeed, that they probably are needed—to curb and reshape demand and promote the expansion of alternative supplies. Moreover, no one ever promised that adjustment processes would be painless. In the course of working their needed effects, they always involve some reshuffling of economic penalties and rewards. But the oil case is a sport in terms of degree. The reshuffling has been sudden and gargantuan; and it is inducing traumatic reactions.

It is necessary to understand that what is being reshuffled is in large part economic rent—i.e., the premium that particularly desirable supplies can claim because of their scarcity. The economic rent attaching to particular supplies is not a fixed quantum; it fluctuates with constraints on supplies, vigor of demand, availability of substitutes, and perceptions of the future. But the economic rent in the case of oil was not invented just now; some of it has been there right along, particularly with respect to the remarkably low production cost of Persian Gulf oils. But, because the Gulf states have been backward, weak, and elitist, the producing countries until now did not claim a large part of the rent. Instead, the oil companies, after making copious provision for themselves, passed along much of the rent to Western consumers. On December 22, 1973, the producing countries hiked their claims of rent with a vengeance, to the tune of something approaching an extra $100 billion annually.

The sudden penalties, in terms of higher prices and of income and employment losses, which that move has inflicted on the rich, oil-consuming countries are severe. But they are probably also digestible (probably the international monetary system can cope; probably most of the

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Arabs' redundant earnings will be recycled as investments into the advanced economies; probably this will help to offset the adverse employment and income effects of ballooned oil-import bills; etc. . . .). However, because of their own afflictions, the rich countries' view of the mayhem that oil prices are beginning to work in the oil-consuming poor countries has been blocked.

The poor countries are the unfortunates who were standing on the corner of the rug when it was pulled from under Western and Japanese consumers. They make little nonessential use of petroleum. The effect of the oil price explosion is either to bite deep into production and incomes quickly and directly, or to demolish the typically precarious foreign-exchange positions of these countries. A number of them—India for one—face virtual disaster in the short run. Yet, insofar as the wealthier nations (who, under normal conditions, have responded to emergency foreign-aid needs) have an eye for the problem at all, they blame the present need solely on what strikes them as sudden highway robbery on the part of the oil producers. Let those producers, they tend to say, offset the grief they are causing their comrades in the Third World.

That is not an altogether unjust reaction. The extraction of economic rent by the owners of scarce resources in a sense always has verged on highway robbery. At least it has the weakest social justification of any income share. From Ricardo onward, generations of Western economists have recognized that economic rent is unearned and neither induces nor rewards productive effort. Even such an establishmentarian as F. W. Taussig, writing in 1911, could find no reason of principle not to socialize it.

But it is also true that in hundreds of other situations, both domestic and transnational, economic rent has not been socialized or largely taxed away. The international community has, for example, left the rents on South African gold and diamonds to the owners for many years; it would seem rather graceless of it to come down heavily on the first set of developing countries to strike it rich. Similarly, one understands the sentiment (if not the logic) of the Third-World solidarity that inhibits the oil-consuming poor countries themselves from pressing international claims against their more fortunate brothers.

If the machinery were available, I would rise above such compunctions. I would argue that the ethical case for economic rent always has been flimsy, and that failure to move in the past is no excuse for failure to move now against so gross, lumpy, and disruptive a set of rents as those presently being imposed by the oil producers. Accordingly, I

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would favor a graduated tax on per capita oil earnings that would scarcely touch a populous and only moderately large producer like Indonesia at all, but would make the likes of Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi pay through the nose—into a fund that, by a mechanical population- and poverty-based formula, would be quickly distributed to the non-oil-exporting poor countries.

But the fact is that this sort of thing is not going to happen, at least in time. The necessary machinery is lacking, and no one has the international political muscle and will to establish it quickly. For a dangerous span of time, therefore, until the international community can recover perspective and the countries themselves can develop indigenous energy substitutes, a number of the poor countries will be left in a desperately exposed position. At least for stopgap external assistance they must look largely to two sources.

One source consists of the multilateral institutions, I.B.R.D. and I.M.F.; the other of the oil-producing countries themselves. Despite the inventiveness that the Fund and the Bank have been showing in mooting responses to the impact of the crisis on the poor countries, one might expect that there would be a narrow limit to how far these institutions could get ahead of their presently shell-shocked rich-country member governments. Similarly, one might be skeptical about the speed and scale with which the oil producers would respond to the responsibilities that, by default, are being thrust upon them. One would worry, in particular, about both their disposition and their organizational capacity to extend their outreach beyond their own regional and fraternal groupings.

Compared with such expectations, recent indications have been moderately encouraging. The producer countries as a group have been indicating some disposition to cushion the impact of the crisis on poor countries; on February 21, 1974, the announcement of new joint ventures by Mr. McNamara, Mr. Witteveen, and the Shah of Iran promised a timely marriage of the expertise and outreach of the institutions to some of the resources of the oil producers. Nevertheless, there is little hope yet that the transfers in the near term will match the need. There is every indication that the total distribution will still be heavily skewed toward the producers' friends and neighbors. It appears that the terms will be inappropriately hard. Of the longer-term credits available, there will be much too little general-purpose, or "program" (as opposed to "project") funding. And there is as yet little sign of willingness to consider the only expedient that has much chance of bringing substantial quick relief to the poor-country consumers—namely, so-called "two-

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tiered pricing" which would accord the poor countries a concessional price for their oil (a system that, despite the conventional complaints against it, could be worked out in reasonably equitable, leak-proof form if there were a will to do so).

All of this is sufficient cause for worry. Yet what worries me even more for the long run are the mistaken ideas which the oil situation may be solidifying. Chief among these is the notion that someone else's acquisition of economic rent is just reason for the rich countries to back off from their own net-transfer obligations. In a world of gross disparities, economic rent—especially of the fat and fresh variety—is a fair target for redistributional efforts. But the basic principle for allocating net-transfer obligations among countries internationally, just as it is for allocating tax burdens domestically, continues to be ability to pay. And ability to pay continues to depend *primarily* neither on one's balance of payments nor on the scope of one's unearned windfalls, but on the level of one's income of all kinds per capita. The richest countries are still the ones that have the heaviest obligations to global income convergence. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, perhaps Iran, and possibly a few of the other oil newcomers do now belong in the club. But Indonesia and Nigeria do not. And there is no way, either in good conscience or as a matter of sensible development politics, that Japan, Germany, the U.S.S.R., or the U.S. can begin to step aside.

The essence of my fifth hypothesis therefore is that, if we would seek a viable synthesis of development and scarcities, we must take pains to unlearn some of the exaggerated lessons that the oil crunch is teaching just now.

X

Finally, as to alternative scenarios for implementing a development-scarcities synthesis: The substantive outlines of the global development policy sketched here are simple; they are almost banal; at any rate, they are straightforward. They are that the world needs to do a far better job of curbing population growth; that, if this can be done, the call for zero economic growth anytime soon is a bugaboo; yet, that there are lurking resource and environmental constraints on global growth which can no longer be overlooked, and that the poor countries need reinforced economic expansion in order to cope more effectively with their internal equity problems; that for both of these reasons it no longer is plausible to imagine that adequate inroads on international inequalities will be accomplished by the poor countries' own efforts at self-help, assisted only by catalytic, episodic injections of foreign aid;

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that therefore a substantial, continuing redistribution of income transnationally has become not only ethically necessary but a condition for the maintenance of reasonable world order; and that, while some of this is likely to be effected by market adjustments that favor the poor countries, neither the distribution of these benefits nor their scale will be sufficient to forestall the need for sizable, ongoing, deliberately contrived transfers of resources within the global system.

These, of course, are not uncontested propositions, but, one by one, most of them command wide support among analysts trying to look at the world through planetary lenses. If the same propositions were transplanted to a national context, they would be accepted, these days, as wholly conventional reform doctrine. But they tend to sound bizarre when applied transnationally. In a world of sovereign nation-states, where governments are held accountable to national rather than to planetary interests, such propositions invite dismissal as impractical and idealistic.

Such, precisely, is our principal problem: In the present alleged collision between development and scarcities, the reason the rich countries stand in some danger of succumbing to social Darwinism, the reason they may, by default, let the growth-limits rhetoric become a rationalization for neglect of the poor, the reason some of them may even embrace new forms of neo-imperialism, is not that they don't know better. It is not because men of good will find it hard to agree on what sorts of things ought to happen in the world. It is because it is so *very* hard to see how to make these things happen in a nationally fractionated system that is politically ill-structured for coping with the world's increasingly dominant needs.

Two types of scenario for implementing the kinds of global reforms I have been suggesting are commonly proposed. In fact, rather than being discrete alternatives, they are the poles of a continuum of possible outcomes.

On the one hand, there are those approaches and measures that would constitute what some have called a "cooperative" scenario. These are the kinds of things which a competent, enlightened, democratically responsive transnational political authority would do if there were such an authority. Lacking it, the impulse is to figure out some way to do them anyway. There are plenty of specific possibilities—among them, the so-called Special Drawing Rights "link"; international control of the sea and distribution of sea and seabed royalties to the world's most disadvantaged peoples; orderly, dignified, transnationally managed processes of debt adjustment and cancellation, in

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which poor countries are progressively relieved of the burdens generated by past aid that should have been given as grants rather than in the form of loans; the sort of taxes on the economic rents attaching to scarce, internationally traded, non-renewable resources that have been suggested in the case of oil; and, ultimately and most fundamentally, a transnational progressive income tax.

Such measures have in common the characteristic that they would transfer resources, not at the philanthropic or foreign policy whim of donor countries, but as a matter of right and routine. The volume of such transfers, besides being potentially substantial in the aggregate, would be quasi-predictable for purposes of indigenous development planning. However, the same measures also have the common characteristic of being seemingly impossible to launch in the present international political context. The recommendations of multilateral commissions are studded with them, and they occasionally make it through the UN General Assembly. But so far not one has a high probability of early implementation.

At the other extreme is the "conflicted" scenario. There is, that argument runs, a gathering "Poor Power" in the world, analogous to the Black Power that began to affect distributional outcomes within the United States in the middle 1960's. The poor countries are tired of being meek. They have, in UNCTAD, a legitimatized multilateral mechanism which, from its beginning in 1964, has been dedicated to concerting the demands of the poor countries, and which is becoming a more resilient, seasoned instrument. Meanwhile, the poor countries have been finding new levers of power, particularly in their ability to withhold scarce materials and resources, but also in their voting-rights potential for blocking certain, e.g., monetary, reforms that the rich countries seek in multilateral forums.

Most dramatic, of course, is the model of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. The astounding recent success of OPEC has conjured up visions of all manner of cartels rising up in developing countries out of previous inertia, divisiveness, and timidity, to hold the affluent world at ransom.

To the extent such efforts materialize and succeed, they will tend to channel more of the total quantum of resource transfers from rich to poor countries through the market mechanism. The "natural" effects of market adjustment will be augmented by successful mobilizations of market power. The poor countries certainly should do what they reasonably can along these lines; there is nothing about the clear and present prospects for the alternative, cooperative, scenario that argues

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the contrary. Similarly, it would be foolish for rich-country diplomacy to trivialize these potentials.

But as a sufficient scenario, Poor Power also fails. First, it makes no adequate provision for equitable treatment among the poor countries. The effect of successful Poor Power would be to benefit one fortunate group of underdeveloped economies at the expense, not only of the developed economies, but of other poor countries. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the sum of all opportunities to cartelize high-rent resources is equitably distributed across the array of the poor. And finally (as the oil case may correctly teach), Third-World solidarity may inhibit the poor from securing effective reparations from among themselves.

In the second place, the oil example teaches too much in other respects. It is very doubtful that OPEC's success in concerting action can be projected to many other commodity cases. In oil, the incentive for supplier discipline—i.e., the volume of economic rent to be claimed—is extraordinarily high. Probably there also are special organizational factors, including the nature of the multinational oil companies and their relationships with producer governments, as well as Arab solidarity, that have favored the establishment of supplier discipline. Even so, there is no proof that the discipline will survive very long in its present degree. Under most other, less auspicious circumstances, if one is talking about naked power contests between backward oligopolistic suppliers and affluent oligopsonistic buyers, one would probably still bet on the buyers.

As a pure type, neither the cooperative nor the conflicted scenario for pressing the cause of development in a context of scarcity is persuasive. When these alternatives are distinguished, the implication often is left that they cannot be mixed—that international transactions must either be wholly couched in a context of trust and conciliation, or they must be replete with conflict and suspicion. Fortunately—indeed, blessedly, since this is the only hope we have—that is nonsense. Just as most relations between governments involve some mixture of harmony and hostility, the actual scenario for future development policy will be located somewhere on the continuum between cooperation and conflict.

My final, optimistic hypothesis is that the scenario is likely, over time and if the poor countries play their cards right, to veer toward cooperation because basically they will have the upper hand ethically. But "playing their cards right" will be extremely important. It does not mean being meek or compliant. For a long time yet, predominant de-

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cision making in affluent national governments will respect strength and toughness and respond positively to reasonably well-mannered pressure. But the rich would respond adversely to extreme, violent militancy on the part of the poor. One begins to encounter speculation about a possible proliferation of terrorism, hijacking, kidnappings, assassinations, small-scale (but extremely frightening) nuclear blackmail, and anti-white racism on the part of Asian, African, and Latin American extremist groups, if not of national regimes themselves. Although such behavior could be extremely unsettling, it is hard to believe that it could effect, in the aggregate, much of a direct redistribution of global income in favor of the poor. What *is* almost certain is that, indirectly, it would retard redistribution by so inflaming the rich countries as to suppress all self-doubts about the justice of their affluence.

Assuming that such extremism is avoided, it is precisely those self-doubts among the rich that will prove to be Poor Power's greatest and, eventually, decisive ally. If one wants to be flamboyant about it: the mechanism by which the scenario of development policy will be moved toward an increasingly cooperative pattern will be one of subversion in high places. Among nation-state decision-makers, loyalties to parochial national interests will be progressively loosened and displaced by furtive, disguised, apologetically held but increasingly insistent loyalties to planetary interests. Actually, such subversion already is rather well advanced—among some national parliamentarians, many bureaucrats, some chiefs of government, and among many publicists, academics, opinion-makers, and the young who are newly entering public affairs.

As the process advances, actors for national governments, while disguising their inclinations in national interest-serving rhetoric, will more and more act as surrogates for the competent transnational authorities that are still missing. Gradually, case by case, they will succeed in patching together some of the systematic measures for redistribution, environmental management, and population restraint that now seem politically inaccessible. The patching will be clumsy and imperfect, but some of it will work; and as that happens, the machinery will get shaken down and perfected; as *that* happens, some of this transnational functional machinery will itself begin to possess some of the power that had heretofore been lent to it by the subverted states. And possibly, sooner or later, a comprehensive structure of competent authority will evolve. Meanwhile, even within our hapless framework of nation-states, we may be able to get on with the narrowing of global disparities.

That is an optimistic hypothesis, but it is the best hope we have.

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THE PRESIDENTIAL POLITICAL CENTER AND FOREIGN POLICY:

A Critique of the Revisionist and Bureaucratic-Political Orientations

By AMOS PERLMUTTER

The Foreign Policy Elite and Its Challengers

POLITICAL philosophers, social theorists, and moralists have been examining the nature of power since time immemorial. This search for a definition, which still goes on, has exhibited certain characteristics. First, the most intensive quests for what constitutes power have been initiated in times of political and moral crises or during periods of revolution and profound social change. Next, because the most conspicuous aspect of power is personal power—institutional power being more complex and less apparent—analysts have tended to focus on rulers and their corollary, the ruled. Finally, in examining this dichotomy between the rulers and the ruled, analysts have sought to discover the sources of crises, revolution, and change.

Devising a theory of the power elite became an honorable professional occupation for theorists at the time of the French Revolution: its antagonists were heavily engaged in historical, social, and methodological controversies. Some time later, Karl Marx emerged as the first, most astute analyst of power of the modern age, although his political analysis was marred by a preoccupation with economics and historical materialism. To Marx, the ruler was a single power construct: the few owners of the means of production. The real producers, the proletariat, were the ruled. Rationally conscious of their permanent need to protect their power, the owners used instruments of coercion and violence—the police, the military, and the state—to uphold their economic power and status. Thus, they were the oppressors of the real producers—the actual workers whom they exploited. In this battle between exploiters and producers, according to Marx, lay the heart of the class struggle, which could be resolved only by violence and revolution.

Outraged by Marx and Marxism, conservative political theorists rose to challenge him in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, notably the Italians Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, and Roberto

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Michels, a German professor teaching in Italy.[1] Arguing that Marx's class theory was not social-scientific but ideological, they elevated his analysis of the elite into a science and an ideology.[2] Whereas Marx's science afforded an ideology for the proletariat, this group assured the middle classes that socialism would become "bourgeoisified," and that the "iron law of oligarchy" would not discriminate between the left and the right. In this sense, socialism would develop as a class movement with a conservative orientation.[3]

With the rise of a complex and affluent industrial society in the twentieth century, the "classical" ruling-class theory reappeared under a new guise—that of the power elite. Its most renowned spokesman was the sociologist C. Wright Mills.[4]

According to Mills, power in modern times is institutional. Corporate linkage produces the cohesiveness of the "power elite." Domination, then, "will be in large part determined by the closeness of the links between the institutional hierarchies." The political directorate (the conglomerate of political, industrial, and military corporate hierarchical elites) takes advantage of the interchange and complementarity of institutional proximity.[5] Above all, the conspiracy of the power elite is hatched by the hierarchy—a cabal of the industrial, military, and university institutions.

Mills identifies the power elite with the political elite around the surrogate political center, the office of the President. It consists of corporate business executives, military professionals, armchair strategists, university professors, scientists, and technocrats. Their social status and background may provide access to the presidential political center, but it does not guarantee political power. Corporate, intellectual, and technocratic elites are by nature more cohesive than the political, elective, and representative elites. Clustered around the office of the Presidency, they become ever more cohesive, conscious, and conspiratorial.

[1] See analysis in T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (New York 1964), 31-41; Geraint Parry, *Political Elites* (London 1969), 27-29.

[2] *Ibid.*, 20-27.

[3] On the writings and critique of the power elite, see Parry's analysis (fn. 1); also Dankwart Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When, and How," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 690-717.

[4] C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (Oxford 1956). Mills was promptly challenged by a very specific group of social and political theorists, the pluralists. These were mainly professional political scientists and sociologists (inaccurately known as the "end-of-ideology" school). The pluralists, in turn, were challenged by the morality contingent, including professionals (political scientists and sociologists), but also by linguists, belle-lettrists, and journalists indignant about the slow process of social justice and an allegedly immoral war. Mills' disciples moved to restate the power-elite theory and applied it to the analyses of security and diplomacy.

[5] *Ibid.*, 3-7.

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Class backgrounds and loyalties are subordinated to the power of the center.

In this article I will challenge the concept of "power" that is derived from cohesiveness—the conspiratorial theory. I will suggest instead that the division over ideology and class within each elite cluster is greater than any division between the elite and the masses. The implications, of course, cut at the heart of Mills' monolithic theory. Further, I will attempt to demonstrate that foreign policy—ideologically, institutionally, and behaviorally—has been and probably will remain the area of "competence" of the few whose cohesion (i.e., political power) is derived from their proximity to the presidential political center, rather than (according to Mills), from class, social, and institutional proximity.

The "conspiracy theory" of the power elite, and therefore its influence on foreign policy and national security, stems from an analytical failure to identify the dynamics of power. Power is obtained through the dynamics of politics, and not merely from being a member of a cohesive corporate group that, naturally and by design, converts institutional proximity to power. The gap between power and powerlessness cannot be seen as a simple dichotomy between "rulers" and "ruled," or "government" and "the people." It is not a simple struggle between elites and non-elites, or between the "elite" and the "masses." Basically, it is between the politics of the politically elected and the appointed experts—a rivalry between the regime's institutions and the competition between and within their respective elites. The gap between power and powerlessness must be explained by the fact that supremacy over defense and security policy making is an end in itself which transcends any psychological make-up of the "elite," its organizational abilities, and its control over economic resources and the distribution of offices.[6] In other words, the political struggle between "in" and "out" elites is over the domination of the political center and the center of the center—the Presidency and its most coveted power: the power over foreign affairs and defense.

Consensus is a central elitist concept and a major weapon of the foreign policy elites. Consensus, according to power-elite theorists, is the instrument of mass manipulation by the power elite. Foreign policy consensus is that instrument which buttresses *a small, well-integrated elite (or coalition of elites) clustered at the political center.*

When we speak of the school of social-political scientists (or the bureaucratic-politics group), we are speaking of analysts of political

[6] See Parry (fn. 1), 30-63.

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and organizational power who have identified the strategic elites as the bureaucratic-politicians.[7] When members of this group analyze the politics of these "bureaucrats," they are actually analyzing the politics of the strategic elites.[8]

The "bureaucratic-politics school," although less ideologically oriented than the power-elite theorists, also fails to offer any viable alternative to the presidential political center. Its "value-free" analysis of the politics of security and diplomacy is dominated by modern organizational theories which are used to explain the mechanisms and complexity of political-bureaucratic decision making at the highest levels of foreign policy formulation and execution. These analysts do not attempt to alter the political power structure of the United States. They correctly identify the focus of foreign policy as being the presidential political center, but their analysis breaks down when they invest members of the court with disproportionate power, failing to discern the court's master—the President—as the real source.

The dichotomy of bureaucratic versus monarchical politics stems from the *unequal* relationship between the President and the members of his court. Most of the bureaucratic-politics analysts, like the power elitists, fail to see that the political struggle over foreign policy in the United States is neither a function of bureaucratic politics nor a struggle between elected politicians and experts, but a central institutional-constitutional political struggle.

The Power-Elite Theorists and the Foreign Policy Center

The new power-elite theorists are original in singling out the processes of American foreign policy making as proof par excellence of the persistence of the power-elite theory in the United States. On their own grounds, I wish to challenge their argument.

For the present purpose, I shall lump the revisionist-historians with the anti-cold war moralists. Their arguments are as follows:

[7] Suzanne Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class* (New York 1957), distinguishes between a ruling elite (the elective or political elite) and the strategic elite primarily concerned with administration and technocracy—the elite of merit.

[8] Although the field of bureaucratic politics is as old as the seminal studies of Weber and Michels, the political science profession in the United States has its origins with students of public administration and government—Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and Bernard Moses, to mention only a few. The new school of bureaucratic politics in political science mainly focuses on the politics and management of foreign affairs. Among the early political scientists and writers were Richard E. Neustadt (*Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership*, New York 1950) and Samuel P. Huntington (*The Common Defense*, New York 1961). The field of arms control is dominated by political scientists influenced by modern theories of organization and economic management, such as Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven 1966).

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1. American foreign policy is dominated by the few who make key decisions: the foreign policy directorate (i.e., the presidential court and the elites of the cold-war consensus).
2. The political directorate, the military, and the industrial elites are linked by virtue of their institutional proximity.
3. The power of the military-industrial complex stems from the "institutional mechanism" (or, as Richard Barnet calls it, the bureaucratic revolution) of the modern corporation and complex organizations.
4. The link between the political directorate and corporate power stems also from their common educational background (Ivy League schools) and their common war experiences (World War II, Korea, the cold war, Vietnam).
5. The consciousness of the foreign policy directorate is, in a Marxist sense, that of monopoly capitalism.
6. Above all, these decision-makers form a conspiratorial group, one that expresses a common will for action.
7. Their consensus ideology is the pursuit of militant anti-communism, American globalism, and the maintenance of the cold war. Psychologically, they are identified by their organizational commitments (corporate-technocratic) and by their association with complex organizations.

It should be mentioned here that although revisionists and moralists agree on the directorate's cohesiveness and consciousness, they differ on what constitutes the conspiracy of the directorate. Revisionists argue that surrogate economic monopoly capitalism is the root of the directorate's power and conspiratorial inclinations, whereas the moralists regard the power as stemming from social class, skills, or both, and the conspiracy as incidental.

Where the power-elite theorists fail is in their lack of any social, scientific, and historical-comparative analyses of the behavior of the directorate in the context of American political power. (It would behoove the power elitists to modify their anti-power elite ideology, but that would probably be morally abhorrent to them.) Kolko and Chomsky tend to attack the directorate on Marxian grounds, i.e., social and economic elitism;[9] Barnet, Stone, and others tend to challenge it on Michelian organizational grounds.[10] Like Marx, however, the moral-

[9] Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War* (New York 1968); Noam Chomsky, *American Power and the New Mandarins* (New York 1960).

[10] Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War* (New York 1972); I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (New York 1952).

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ist-revisionists do not address themselves either to political and institutional sources or to the purposes of political power and political elites and the ensuing political behavior. One finds no reference in their works to Weber, the great analyst of political institutions, authority, and status. Neo-Marxists, like the old master, consider politics epiphenomenal. They fail to heed the counsel of Bendix and Lipset "that the facts of politics must be studied in their own right and *not just inferred from the politicians' social background*."[11] In other words, this group either fails to perceive the critical relevance of the political center or ignores it. For instance, as issues of national security and foreign policy become more complex, they are accompanied by rivalry between and within the military-industrial complex. The division is not between civilians and the military, but between conflicting orientations, based on their perceptions of the enemy.

The power elitists propagandize, too, for an alternative system of values and beliefs, for a new consensus, a counter-elite. The moralists are not "value-free" social scientists. Kolko and Chomsky would have us believe that the chief malady of American political life lies in the high immorality of the foreign policy elite; that foreign policy directorates and multiversity corporate intellectuals are the equivalent of Marx's "oppressors." Economic corporations and monopoly capitalism have been linked to atavistic political realism, all conspiring at the top. Imperialism no longer becomes a Hobbesian-Leninist "last stage of capitalism," but the *raison d'être* of the American foreign policy directorate.

The above is, of course, a simplistic interpretation of the power and purpose of the foreign policy elites and of the political behavior of the President. Despite their expertise, the strategic elites are in no sense a political directorate. How powerful is a group which can be dismissed at the President's whim? After all, Robert McNamara, the arch-technocrat of them all, the "super imperialist," after seven years at the helm of a "political directorate"—the Defense Department—was relieved by a President suspicious of his failing loyalties, i.e., his growing doubts about Vietnam.

William A. Williams envisions an American empire set on an inexorable path toward economic imperialism since 1890, when capitalistic farmers discovered foreign markets.[12] The Open Door policy, for instance, is perceived as a policy of economic imperialism. Again,

[11] Rustow (fn. 3), 703; emphasis added.

[12] William A. Williams, *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (New York 1969).

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a single factor analysis of this sort simply is insufficient as an explanation for the behavior of American policy in the 1960's and 1970's. Kolko's and Williams' theory of "imperialists as economic exploiters"—that power relations within a society are derived from the power of the bank, that in the absence of the sword, power follows property (a view shared by the philosopher James Harrington)—simply does not explain motivations behind the war in Vietnam. And yet, as Charles Maier, a critic of the revisionists, has written, "They are unwilling to accept any description that tends to stress the decentralized nature of decision-making, or that envisages the possibility of expansionist policy taking shape by imperceptible commitments and bureaucratic momentum."[13]

Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Politics

Not unlike the concept of elite, that of bureaucracy has become all-encompassing and multi-purpose. Among other things, it now connotes management, administration, rational organization, and a type of authority legitimation. Even Max Weber, the most profound social theorist and analyst of bureaucracies in modern times, did not resolve the question of the conceptual and actual dividing lines between government, authority, and administration, or between types of domination and bureaucratic staffs.[14] Nor has the issue of the dividing lines between administrators, civil servants, bureaucrats, and politicians been resolved.

Inherent in the analysis of the bureaucratic-politics group (although not alluded to in their theories), is the pluralistic concept of power in society: that power in modern society is diffuse, that advanced societies are characterized by complex and highly differentiated organizations, and that power is dispensed in response to the diversification of interests. This pluralist orientation, combined with social scientific (and game theory) analyses, is the intellectual and methodological foundation of the bureaucratic-politics group.[15]

[13] Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," *Perspectives in American History*, IV (1970), 339.

[14] See Alfred Diamant, "The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed," *Comparative Public Administration* (1959), 59-96.

[15] The group includes the professional political scientists Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, who are considered to be the "high priests" of bureaucratic politics. Leslie Gelb should also be mentioned. Interestingly, the moralists I. F. Stone and Richard Barnet have made considerable use of the concept of bureaucratic politics. See Allison, *The Essence of Decision* (Boston 1971); Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics," *World Politics*, XXIV (Supplement 1972); Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Brookings, April 1972); and Barnet (fn. 10). In fact, John Newhouse, in *Cold Dawn* (New York 1973), identifies bureaucratic politics with the different schools' positions and doctrines on arms control. (Halperin's and Gelb's writings certainly have been influenced by the politics of arms control.)

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In contradistinction to the power-elite group, this group analyzes the elements of foreign policy in the proper context—politics. For that purpose, it uses the highly sophisticated concepts and methods of modern organizational analysis and game theory. There is no more analytically comprehensive approach to the study of the elements and the behavioral output available today.[16]

But that analysis contains a serious conceptual flaw. However sophisticated the approach of the bureaucratic-politics group, it is prey to the same pitfalls as that of the power-elite theorists. Although they correctly identify the locus and the pyramid of foreign policy decision making, they fail to identify where political power really rests. They make no clear distinction (even if it is inferred) between the President and the strategic elite, and they offer no theory concerning the dynamics of the relationship between the President and his court. The bureaucratic-politics group dodges any analysis of the politics of integrating the strategic elite (the bureaucratic politicians) into the office of the President. These theorists demonstrate no understanding of the dynamics of bureaucratic politicians—their power and influence. They also fail to see that relationships alter significantly over time, depending upon the changing nature of problems and the differing styles of succeeding administrations.

In the relationship between the President and his court, there are, after all, serious gaps of politics, power, and status. The bureaucratic-politics model of decision making along rational and organizational lines should lead serious theorists to infer the existence of inherent and actual disproportions of power between the President and his advisors. Unfortunately, the emphasis of the bureaucratic-politics authors is upon the conflict among members of the strategic elite within the court. They therefore give recognition and priority to position papers, options, stratagems (so well elaborated in the *Pentagon Papers*), and organizational-bureaucratic behavior; they do not even allude to the process by which the bureaucratic politicians—the court—gradually surrender to the monarch. And yet, the case studies of Cuba and Vietnam do not demonstrate the action or organization of an independent, autonomous, and authoritative political elite. On the contrary, they demonstrate the *subservience* of the court to the monarch—how bureaucratic politicians responded *after* the President had decided upon the priorities of the situation. The outcome (less so in the case of Cuba) demonstrates either that the bureaucratic politicians were as wrong as the President, or that in a foreign policy crunch only the President can act.

[16] I shall here deal only with key conceptual assumptions.

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The study of bureaucratic politics is the study of the politics of conformity. The strategic elite maneuver exclusively against each other. They cannot challenge the President in office. They are his scribes; there is no alternative political center. Senate committees have been unsuccessful in their attempts to challenge the President; the universities and foundations are outside the presidential center and therefore powerless. The power of political authority in the United States is derived from the set institutional framework of the American political system. Only in the absence of the presidential political center (or when the President is weak), do strategic elites seem politically important and significant.

The study of bureaucratic politics ought to explain the degree of bureaucratic-political influence on the outcome of specific challenges. For example, could the court have helped persuade the President to postpone or cancel his decision concerning the first bombing of North Vietnam? Could the court, or its influential members, have persuaded the President to keep the Russians informed during the early stages of the Cuban missile escalation, thus possibly preventing the Cuban missile crisis? Can the court mobilize its collective effort to persuade a President, or is it so divided by cliques, groups, and opinions (i.e., is it so non-integrated) that it is a check on its own influence? How is influence distributed in the court—a very complex organization of differentiated statuses, roles, and persons? When does this influence come into play—before, during, or after the President has made a decision on crucial issues?

The bureaucratic-politics school cannot provide answers to these questions, for its members have ignored the relationship between power and the political foundations of power. Power is inadequately defined in terms of organizational behavior, which subordinates political to bureaucratic-organizational explanations. Thus the "politics" of the court (not unlike the "politics" of the corporation) is used to explain the behavior and politics of American national security. The politics of national security is autonomous, and not connected with the inner politics of the court. Therefore the degree of the elites' political autonomy should be the central conceptual factor in differentiating bureaucratic politicians from elective politicians. Because the former (i.e., Mills' political directorate) possess no independent power, they are at the mercy of their monarch.

The extraordinary power accumulated by a non-elected expert such as Henry Kissinger (who, like other academic colleagues, was originally part of the Kennedy-Johnson court), cannot be explained by the bu-

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reaucratic-politics approach. In Kissinger's case, power does not stem from his role as a presidential court bureaucrat, nor from successful confrontations with lesser rivals. The source of Kissinger's present power is political. Direct negotiations with the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and China have established for him an autonomous credibility with the most prominent international figures. His friendly relations with members of Congress and with the press, and the esteem in which he is held by the American electorate, have established an independent constituency for him. These are raw sources of political power which have nothing to do with the restricted bureaucratic influence of the presidential court. Kissinger, however, is not totally invulnerable. Depending upon his own actions and choices, Kissinger is at all times potentially a member of the presidential court. Not unlike the others, he could therefore become dispensable.

Because the bureaucratic-politics school incorrectly identifies the "governmental process" with politics, its members offer no cogent analysis of the dynamics of security and diplomacy within the context of the American political system. There is no explanation, for instance, from Graham Allison as to *why* Kennedy opted for a blockade and not for invasion during the Cuban missile crisis, although there is a careful delineation of the President's management of the situation: the "governmental process." When Allison refers to the "behavior" of the government and the narrowly defined "unitary rational decision-maker"—centrally controlled, completely informed, and value-maximizing—what he is actually explaining is the political behavior of the bureaucratic politicians.[17] The politics of the latter is the politics of the court; the court is the instrument of the dominating monarch, whose politics in turn can be explained only within the context of the American political and constitutional systems. "For those who stress history as bureaucratic process, all questions of historical responsibility can appear ambiguous and even irrelevant. Foreign policy emerges as the result of a competition for fiefs within governmental empires. Bureaucratic emphases can produce a neo-Rankean acquiescence in the use of power that is no less deterministic than the revisionist tendency to make all policies exploitative in a liberal capitalist order."[18] What distinguishes the bureaucratic-political analysts from the power-elitist group is that the latter allege that foreign policy is dominated by a super-conglomerate imbued with Machiavellian or Hobbesian immorality, while the former convey a Kafkaesque caricature of the so-called "political directorate."

[17] Allison (fn. 15), 63.

[18] Maier (fn. 13), 344.

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Both, however, exaggerate the role of the "political directorate." The bureaucratic-politics analysts have failed to identify the locus and the dynamics of real political power in foreign and security affairs. They have confused action on the part of the strategic elites with politics, and processes of integration in the presidential court with influence over foreign policy. Political wisdom (or non-wisdom), political power, and political influence (or lack of it) cannot be explained in terms of a theory of action in a complex organization—in this case, the presidential court. The vicissitudes of action—i.e., bureaucratic short circuits, loss of direction, routine, lack of imagination, plain ambition, and so forth—explain only the dynamics of action of the few, in specific organizational and bureaucratic contexts. A theory of bureaucratic action explains the nature of the staff and its behavior: it does not explain the direction and purpose of the political system.

The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy

Fundamental to modern politics is the fact that the politics of national security and foreign diplomacy are central to society. Historically, foreign and security politics have been main priorities of the political center, conducted primarily on that level. Political theorists from Aristotle to Hobbes have identified the *raison d'être* of political centers as the direction of security affairs. In recent times (since 1945 in the United States), these political centers have gained predominance because administrative staffs in the Weberian sense—persons, structures, institutions, and machines—which handle functions of security and diplomacy are exclusively administered by the presidential political center.[19] In the absence of well-integrated political elites, a highly centralized political party or parties, and a powerful and permanent bureaucracy and civil service (especially administrative staff at the highest level), this presidential political center has become pivotal, with almost exclusive control over foreign affairs and national security—a function not shared equally by any other source of authority in U.S. society. In fact, both classical and modern political and social theorists define a ruling organization as political insofar as it is charged with the safeguarding of the territorial area.

Through most of the history of the United States, there has been no geographical center of values, beliefs, and symbols. Although Washington is not the country's economic, social, or intellectual center, the geo-

[19] See Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, ed. C. Wittich and G. Roth (Bedminster 1968), I, 212-15.

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graphic and political focus of government—the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary—is located there. The governmental system in Washington is not the only source of authority (political power being diffuse), but it is the highest and final system of authority. In this sense, the federal bureaucracy becomes the agent of the political center. Its authority being derivative, it is also revokable. In other words, precisely because there has been no single center of values and symbols, the federal system has developed into the central authority system. Parsons maintains that American society is characterized by the "non-political stress in American social structure." He argues convincingly that, for historical reasons, the American political system (i.e., the government) lagged behind that of the economy. According to Parsons, this is a function of "the economic emphasis inherent in our system of values, and the relative lack of urgency of certain political problems because of our especially protected and favored national position."[20]

Every four years the presidential political center (in particular the Departments of State and of Defense), is "occupied" by a newly elected President and his bureaucratic, appointed entourage—his court—composed of experts, counselors, advisors, and cronies. This process, after all, is the constitutional prerogative (as well as political practice) of the office of the Presidency. Drawing upon major reservoirs of values, symbols, and beliefs, the presidential center recruits its members from a variety of elites throughout the country.

The presidential political center, therefore, is dominated by elective party politicians, bureaucrats (civil service, military, scientists), and intellectuals. Neither the American political parties nor the governmental bureaucracy, however, are in a position to dominate the central functions (i.e., foreign policy and national security affairs) of the presidential political center exclusively.

The presidential political center has been and remains dominated by a small group most often referred to by derogatory titles such as "the elite," "the establishment," "the power elite," "the political directorate," "the rulers," "the power structure," "the military-industrial complex," and "bureaucratic politicians." Of course, each title has a different connotation. "The power elite" refers only to the "military-industrial complex"; "the bureaucratic politicians" bear little relationship to Mosca's "rulers"; the "power structure" implies a broad coalition of social, economic, intellectual, and political power; and "the political directorate" signifies a coalition of the "real" rulers (i.e., the corporate, po-

[20] Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process of Modern Societies* (New York 1960) 216, 213.

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litical, and military-industrial elites). Nonetheless, in general, use of the term "the power elite," be it by Mosca, Pareto, Michels, or C. Wright Mills, refers to the elite that dominates the presidential political center. Precisely because in recent times the focus of the presidential political center has been on foreign policy, "power elites" in general have erroneously become identified with foreign policy and national security.

Talcott Parsons shrewdly observed that "American society has not developed a well-integrated political-governmental elite, in the sense that it has developed a relatively well-integrated business-executive group."[21] This picture has now been completely reversed. The federal system has finally become the "political center," primarily due to *economic* and external challenges. The great depression called for a revolution of priorities and of values. This meant government expansion and intervention. The wild growth of corporate industrial powers also called for the development of what Parsons called the political system, by which he meant the federal government.[22] The American involvement in the second World War and the cold war promoted the growth of the federal system in size, level of influence, and scope to an extent American society had never known before. Before 1914 one could still distinguish the political center from the federal government. After 1945 the two converged, in the minds of many, into a single monolith. Between 1933 and 1941 the federal system—the government—wrested more and more influence away from the diffuse economic centers. After 1941, national security and foreign affairs became the major indicators of the federal government's growing scope of political influence (if not actual size). The defense budget is now unquestionably the highest spending item of the federal government and a considerable portion of the GNP. The defense budget and military spending have become dominant items on the agenda of the political center, thus reinforcing the presidential political center.

The Dynamics of the Presidential Political Center

My analysis of the dynamics of the presidential political center will examine: (1) the constitutional, institutional arrangements of the political center in its foreign affairs and national security functions; (2) the type of elites attracted and recruited to the presidential center; and (3) the structure of their internal contradictions.

There is little doubt that the Constitution (as interpreted since Lin-

[21] *Ibid.*, 216.

[22] Parsons' is a narrow definition of the political system, i.e., "government," which certainly does not include the American political system.

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coln's Presidency) arrogated to the federal executive as commander-in-chief an awesome political power: defense of territory, the maintenance of peace, and, above all, command of the armed forces. "Despite their strong fear of standing armies, the authors of *The Federalist* tried to convince their readers of the necessity for such an army."[23] The Federalists delegated to the chief executive the central political power: the security system of the United States. The necessity for political domination of standing (i.e., professional) armies was one of the strongest reasons behind Federalist support of the Union, "for they maintained that peace among the several states depended upon *having a central government which alone had the authority to maintain a professional army*. Indeed, without this provision a federal state would dissolve into component elements, each finding it necessary to support a standing army. A continuous condition of military rivalry would make it impossible to sustain republican governments."[24]

Since 1941 this power has reached staggering proportions. Because of the concentration of political power at the center, especially in the office of the Chief Executive, and because of the nature of modern warfare and diplomacy, the office of the President has become the single dominant power in national security and foreign affairs. Some argue that executive-legislative coalitions and the so-called bipartisan foreign policy enhanced the political power of the President in foreign affairs. It may well have buttressed the political center's consensus over foreign policy. In my view, however, the power of the President over foreign affairs was intensified by (a) the constitutional interpretation of his *inherent* power, and (b) the predominance of foreign policy. The President's towering power over the Senate in foreign affairs—constitutional, institutional, and behavioral—is not a simple matter of elite domination and bureaucratic politics. Constitutionally and institutionally, Congress is both the President's chief partner and his rival in the central functions of the political center, but Congress has not met the challenge inherent in this relationship.

Had the above powers simply been "given" to the President with the stipulation that they be used with "the advice and consent of the Senate," the diffusion of power still would keep the Senate from exercising a controlling power in the realm of foreign affairs. Again, this is due primarily to the absence of power in the hands of political parties

[23] I am in debt here to David Rapoport's perceptive analysis of the Federalists on executive power in its civil military context, "Praetorianism: Government without Consensus," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (University of California, Berkeley 1958), 174.

[24] *Ibid.*, 175; emphasis added.

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at the center. The Senate has been and is an important element of the political center—a fact often overlooked by analysts who refer to it in terms that imply it is outside the center of government. It has indeed been less influential than the President in deliberations of foreign affairs, not so much because of the separation of powers within the federal system, but because of the development of the American political system wherein the Senate had only derivative constitutional powers—advice and consent—rather than the inherent power that is in the hands of the President.

The Senate's political impotence has institutional as well as constitutional origins. Despite the fact that its members are elective officers—many are brilliant politicians—the Senate's political elite suffers in a behavioral sense from its lack of integration. Precisely because it lacks cohesion, particularly in confrontation situations with the President, the Senate cannot take advantage of the diffuse political center. Moreover, the Senate's attempts to challenge the President's court by recruiting its own bureaucratic strategic elite to staff key Senate committees dealing with security and diplomacy (Armed Services and Appropriations) have been dismal failures. The President, on the other hand, can take full advantage of his "inherent" constitutional and institutional powers, which give his office supremacy in the realm of security and diplomacy. Because the President exercises almost complete freedom in the choice of his advisors and appointees, his court is a potential base for a well-integrated elite. Despite the lack of challenge from elective officers, the effectiveness of the Presidential court depends upon what James Meisel refers to as the three C's—cohesion, continuity, and conspiracy ("common will to action").[25]

The dynamics of national security and foreign affairs must be explained not only in terms of executive-legislative competition and rivalry, or in terms of rivalries within the well-integrated strategic elite of the President's office, but in terms of (a) the President's handling of the security-diplomacy consensus; (b) the President's manipulation of the strategic elites; and (c) the still untested congressional restraints on the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief. (The Cambodian Resolution may be an extraordinary exception of congressional restraints.)

Thus, the Senate's constitutional lack of powers equal to those of the executive, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the President's role as Commander-in-Chief have considerably reduced the power of the

[25] See James Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class* (Ann Arbor 1965); also Parry (fn. 1), 31-32.

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Congress over foreign affairs. Further, the absence of a cohesive national political party has restricted the power of the Senate and left its most prominent members isolated. The Senate's key structures for domination over national security and foreign affairs, the Committees on Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations are also diffuse. The chairmen of these committees are not only elected politicians, but independent, powerful Senators with different backgrounds and orientations, who often checkmate one another. The power they possess is equal. The same applies to the members of the committees in which power is diffuse, autonomous, and equal.

By contrast, the President—as chief administrator—is the singular and authoritative officer. Elected by all Americans, the President is Commander-in-Chief, in charge of all national security and foreign affairs. His partners in fulfilling these functions are not elective equals, but bureaucratic subordinates who are in no position to seriously challenge their supreme commander. The office of the President may be likened to those of the Monarchs, Emperors, and Caliphs of the historical bureaucratic empires.[26] Unlike the rulers of the historical centralized empires, however, the President is not a patrician or a usurper, but a democratically elected official. As the master of his house, he is rarely challenged by the other members of the political center. (Very seldom does the Senate fail to confirm a cabinet member or an ambassador. Nor can it challenge his appointments of private advisors.) In a Weberian sense, the office of the President is a ruling organization where members are subjected to rational domination by virtue of the established and legitimate rational political order.[27] And, like the rulers of the historical centralized bureaucratic states, he has almost unlimited autonomy in security and diplomacy functions. Since 1941 he has been free to develop autonomous political and national security goals.

A. THE PRESIDENTIAL COURT

The elite recruited for the presidential court can be described as a non-elective, private set of bureaucrats, advisors, counsellors, public relations men, scribes, intellectuals, and cronies. (Functionally, this group resembles the court of the historical centralized empires.) Despite their differences in social status, educational background, and achievement, these dignitaries, ex-politicians, learned men, super-managers, technicians, and Nobel Prize-winning scientists are all equal in being subject

[26] See S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York 1963).
[27] Weber (fn. 19), I, 212-54.

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to the whims of the President. As members of the court, they live under the shadow of his total power.[28]

To summarize, the President's court has emerged in the absence of a cohesive political center, a central political party, and a centralized and continuous bureaucracy. Another element has been the perpetuation of the bureaucratic malpractices of modern complex organizations in the State and Defense Departments; Henry Kissinger has characterized these departments as rigid and non-innovative bodies, where the "machine becomes a more absorbing occupation than defining its purpose," and where "studying the problem can turn into an escape from coming to grips with it."[29] The President's court has thus been organized to bypass the professional military and diplomatic corps and the systems of merit and tenure. In addition, it serves to shield the President from Congress and the press.

What are the characteristics of the court? The President's recruiting policy depends greatly upon his personal style, experience, and *Weltanschauung*. During Eisenhower's administration there was a preponderance of conservative businessmen, bond lawyers, military officers, and small-town bankers. Kennedy's court was composed of technicians, foreign policy and national security professionals, scribes, intellectuals, belle-lettrists, and non-conservative military professionals. The Johnson court was full of Texans and what Eric Goldman has called "pragmatic liberals." Nixon's court, with the exception of Kissinger and Schlesinger, and formerly Shultz and Moynihan, was packed with public relations and advertising executives and assorted lawyers, generals, and politicians.[30]

The most significant aspect of the President's recruitment strategy is the fact that the criteria by which the elite is chosen have to do with what conservative and liberal Presidents alike take to be the most advanced representatives of the values, symbols, and beliefs of American society. The members of the court are not chosen—as power theorists would have us believe—because of their class or status, their power in American society, or their institutional proximity to power (i.e., the military-industrial and multiversity complexes). The court is selected

[28] See George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York 1970); Harry McPherson, *A Political Education* (Boston 1972); Eric Goldman, *The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson* (New York 1969).

[29] Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, vc (April 1966), 344. See also Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York 1969), 340-58.

[30] See Barnet (fn. 10) for an adequate but opinionated review of the types of court recruitees. Here *The Power Elite* could be cited as a major source of inspiration.

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in the knowledge that the President will dominate and manipulate it and use it to create a consensus for his decisions. The members are his creatures, whose course of action he dictates. Their reputations and credibility are at his mercy.

The above further buttresses my theory concerning the political center in the United States: constitutionally, it is divided. The disparate, pluralistic centers of values, symbols, and beliefs are the reservoirs from which it recruits its elite. Drawing upon the same reservoirs, the presidential political center itself becomes a temporary focus of symbols, values, and beliefs. *But it is only in the realm of national security and foreign affairs that the court represents an American consensus—a spectrum of the opinions and ideas of the United States* (minus the extreme poles of radical left and right). Again, this can only be explained behaviorally within the context of the American political system.

The President's function is to represent the progressive ideas of the nation. (These need not include the most up-to-date ideas and practices, nor the extreme poles or those filled with moral indignation.) Take, for instance, the intellectual-educational foreign policy elite and the armchair strategists: a list of members of the Executive Committee of the Harvard Center for International Affairs is testimony to the court's being recruited from the "center of the intellectual universe."[31] The same holds for recruitment from the business, industrial, and technocratic universes. Class, status, social and educational background of the courts' strategic elite may be relevant factors, but they fail to distinguish one administration's recruitment policy from another's. Nor do they underline a specificity of recruitment among carefully selected elites.

The elite may emanate from widely differing places. Nonetheless, it should represent society's centers of values, symbols, and beliefs. Although some Presidents (as was mentioned earlier) are not really interested in recruiting persons who are most representative of contemporary American values, the latter still gain entrance to the court.

B. THE STRUCTURE OF CONSENSUS AND THE COURT

A valid argument can be made that there are considerable differences of ideological orientation, emphasis of values, and manipulation of

[31] Robert Bowie was a high official in the Eisenhower administration. Samuel Huntington was a Humphrey advisor (1968). Both were members of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department. Henry Kissinger was President Nixon's National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, and was an advisor to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Edward S. Mason was a close advisor to Secretary McNamara. Thomas C. Schelling was also an advisor to Secretary McNamara.

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symbols between one court and another or within a single court. In fact, since 1965 we have witnessed a marked change in ideologies and placement of values, and a shift in priorities between and within the political center. To those who are morally indignant, or those who believe in a total revolution, this may well seem irrelevant. To those, however, who believe in reform and incremental but cumulative change, it is most relevant. Thus, when we speak of consensus we speak of several factors.

First, consensus is the broadest and most generalized acceptance of specific but universal orientations, beliefs, practices, and procedures. Consensus is a basis for actions and a pillar for successful policy-making. Consensus is not a program or policy; it is a collective perception and identification of friends and foes, and of issues. In foreign affairs, consensus is also an aspect of community support for regimes and authorities.[32] It is, however, an analytical and non-empirical concept. For this reason, there is no adequate definition of consensus or even an acceptable procedure for its measurement. We do know that consensus is a property of the political community that is articulated (if not invented) on the whole by elites outside the political center. This consensus becomes the support of any policy executed by the President and his court.

When we speak of consensus as policy, however, we refer to those who identify consensus with a specific political orientation or action. At that point, it ceases to be a property of voters and consumers, and becomes a property of authority. When the foreign-affairs elites speak of consensus, there is little doubt that they refer to the seldom-challenged property of the elites of the presidential political center. In this respect, consensus is a most influential variable, dominating the integration of the court's elite. Consensus is the security and diplomatic ideology (Pareto's derivative) of the presidential court. The elites outside the presidential political center who are not oriented toward the ideology of the consensus will not join the court. They become the counter-elites, conspiring against the center and aspiring to enter the court on their own condition: that their dissent should become the court's new consensus. In Mannheim's sense, the ideology of the elite becomes the utopia of the counter-elite. Consensus, therefore, is not only a criterion for elite recruitment, but an instrument by which the

[32] On the conceptual and analytical aspects of support, see David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York 1965), 170-89. While I do not accept the conceptual usefulness of this functional analysis, I know of no other author who has posed the problem analytically.

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elite is politically integrated once it has reached the presidential political center. The function of the court, then, is to inculcate the consensus into the political community. The maintenance of consensus and its support is crucial to the presidential function in national-security policy.

The court's elite becomes the guardian of the consensus-perpetuated ideas of "cold war," "peaceful coexistence," "polycentrism," "the balance of terror," or "détente." Broad and diffuse, consensus becomes the structure of a system of support for policies as diverse as lifting the Berlin blockade, helping the Greek regime in 1947, supporting anti-Communist praetorian "progressives" in Asia and Africa, maintaining the balance of terror, and so on. The cold war had the assent of the relevant community—the foreign policy elite. Paradigmatically in Thomas Kuhn's sense, the cold war was the "normal science" of the 1950's (when theory and fact were in close agreement and were affirmative).[33]

Revolution, according to Kuhn, has nothing to do with nature; it is a state of mind. Consensus, then, in his sense, is a response to a crisis, to an anomaly. A change in perception or in vision is tantamount to a new paradigm, a new consensus. It follows, then, that the character of the new paradigm—that the cold war only exists in the minds of the power elite at the center, and that the new consensus is not a change in the state of nature but in man's mind—also denies the basis for the old consensus. Yet the function of the court is to insist on "normal science," the accepted paradigm, and to refine, extend, and articulate it. One should not expect authority to perceive and act against its accepted cognitions. In the absence of serious antagonists in the realm of security and diplomacy elsewhere in the political center, the presidential court will continue to function in this manner.

Any attempt to analyze American foreign policy or to identify who really dominates it must begin with an analysis of the locus and degree of power within the American political-behavioral and constitutional context.

[33] Thomas S. Kuhn, "The Structure of Scientific Revolution," *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, 2nd ed., II, No. 2 (Chicago 1970).

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Review Articles

ARMIES AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA

By ABRAHAM F. LOWENTHAL*

Winfield Burggraaff, *The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935–1959*. Columbia, Missouri, University of Missouri Press, 1972, 241 pp., $10.00.

Luigi Einaudi and Alfred Stepan, *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*. Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, April 1971, 132 pp.

Alain Joxe, *Las Fuerzas Armadas en el Sistema Político Chileno*. Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1970, 176 pp.

Edwin Lieuwen, *Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910–1940*. Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1968, 194 pp., $6.95.

Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. Berkeley, Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973, 219 pp., $3.25.

Robert A. Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945: Yrigoyen to Perón*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969, 314 pp., $8.95.

Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, 309 pp., $10.00.

Victor Villanueva, *100 Años del Ejército Peruano: Frustraciones y Cambios*. Lima, Mejia Baca, 1972, 185 pp., $3.00.

Victor Villanueva, *EL CAEM y la Revolución de la Fuerza Armada*. Lima, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1972, 249 pp., $2.50.

La constitución es una cosa; los militares somos otra.**

I

ARMY officers rule in more than half the countries of Latin America; in most of the rest, they participate actively in politics without currently occupying the presidential chair. In Brazil and Peru, military regimes with sharply different reputations appear entrenched. Ecuador's military government seems to waver uncertainly between the Brazilian

* I express here my appreciation to several colleagues who commented on this essay in draft, and particularly to Henry Bienen, Peter Cleaves, David Collier, John Fitch III, Elizabeth Hyman, Robert Kaufman, Guillermo O'Donnell, and David Ronfeldt for their valuable suggestions.

** Attributed to a Dominican army officer, commenting on the temporary detention of the Dominican Republic's chief opposition candidate for president in the 1974 elections, as quoted by *El Nacional* (March 7, 1974).

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and the Peruvian "models," as do officers in several other countries. In Chile, the armed forces deliberated long before finally taking over in September 1973, shattering the longest period any Latin American country in this century had experienced without military rule. The armed forces of Argentina have recently relinquished office, but not without attempting to impose restrictive terms on their successors, which suggests the generals may soon be back. In Uruguay, the army is taking an increasingly direct and expansive role, while in Paraguay it continues to serve as an instrument of prolonged personal rule. In Panama, nationalist reform under military auspices prevails; in Santo Domingo, there is constant reshuffling; in Bolivia, renewed "stability" exists in the context of perpetual strife. Not even Cuba's revolution has ended military participation in politics; on the contrary, the armed forces may well be Cuba's strongest and most influential political institution.[1]

Why do most Latin American armed forces participate so overtly in national political processes? Why have things changed so sharply from the time, little more than a decade ago, when only one Latin American country was ruled by a military regime and the "twilight of the tyrants" was being heralded?[2] What different political roles have been performed by Latin American military institutions? What accounts for the differences? How do Latin American armies govern? How does military rule differ from civilian rule in Latin America?

As Lyle McAlister observed in his comprehensive survey in 1966, until about a decade ago the literature on what was then called "militarism" was mostly descriptive, not explanatory.[3] It concentrated on *caudillos* (personalist military leaders) rather than on military institutional development. Authors primarily concerned with the civilian political process discussed the political activities of Latin American armed

[1] More than half the members of the Central Committee of Cuba's Communist Party are army officers. See Eduardo Gonzalez, "The New Role of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Cuba," paper presented at the Conference on the Latin American Military, University of California, Riverside, April 1970; Gonzalez, "Political Succession in Cuba: After Fidel . . . ?" paper presented to the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, September 1973; and Jorge Dominguez, "The Civil Soldier as a Governing Institution in Cuba," paper presented at the 1973 meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, October 1973.

[2] Late in 1961, Paraguay's was the only military government in all of South America. See Tad Szulc, *Twilight of the Tyrants* (New York 1959), and Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York 1961), for the view that military participation in Latin American politics was declining.

[3] See Lyle McAlister, "Recent Research and Writing on the Role of the Military in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, II (Fall 1966), 5-36.

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forces as a peripheral matter; their treatment tended to be normative, prescriptive, and even polemical. Scholars almost invariably grounded their analyses in a "democratic-civilist" model of civil-military relations, derived from European and North American experience, which assumed that armed forces characteristically exercise limited defense and police functions of an essentially non-political nature. When military officers played an overtly political role, that was regarded as exceptional and regrettable. It was termed "intervention," implying the temporary introduction of a coherent body into a separate system; its policy consequences were assumed to be universally regressive. Most writers dealt with all military "interventions" as if they were more or less alike, the key difference among countries being whether or not "intervention" occurred. It was assumed (or at least hoped) that military involvement in Latin America politics would decline as socioeconomic modernization and mobilization occurred, as armies became more "professional," and as the influence of announced United States support for democratic regimes made itself felt.

During the early 1960's the literature began to change, particularly in four respects. First, the political activities of Latin American armies came to be regarded as a topic sufficiently important to be studied directly. Second, authors began to highlight distinctions among the political roles played by armies in different countries, though the first attempts to classify various kinds of military participation in Latin American politics were crude and unsatisfactory.[4] Third, various writers on Latin America (John Johnson foremost among them) began to question the earlier assumption that military participation in politics was invariably regressive.[5] Fourth, it was increasingly recognized that

[4] Lieuwen (fn. 2), for instance, distinguished among three groups of countries: those in which the military dominated politics, those in which armies were in transition from political to non-political bodies, and those in which they were non-political. At least six of the seven cases in the supposedly transitional category, however, have since then moved in the direction contrary to Lieuwen's argument, and some of his "non-political" armies have taken an active political role. In any case, Lieuwen's three descriptive categories lacked explanatory power; little was said to indicate why particular countries fell into one category or another. Essentially similar criticism may be made of Theodore Wyckoff's "The Role of the Military in Latin American Politics," *Western Political Quarterly*, XIII (September 1960), 745-63.

[5] They suggested that the military's institutional characteristics—its coherence and continuity, its technical orientation, its national perspective, and particularly its recruitment of officers from the upwardly mobile lower middle class—might dispose officers to support economic development, expanded participation, democratic procedures, and progressive redistribution. See John Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton 1962), and *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford 1964).

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the armed forces and civilian politics were often closely intertwined, that armies were not encapsulated institutions set apart from politics except when intervening.

In evaluating the literature published through 1965, McAlister noted that it tended to be broad and general; to begin to accept the notion that "the military is an integral component of Latin American society *interacting* with other elements rather than acting against them"; to be contributed primarily by North American scholars and mainly by historians; to lack firm data and empirical support for conclusions offered; and to be almost devoid of comparative studies.[6]

II

Writings on armies and politics in Latin America published since 1965 differ sharply from those reviewed by McAlister.[7]

1. Whereas the literature before 1966 tended to be general and regional, national case studies now predominate.[8] In fact, significant books

[6] See McAlister (fn. 3), 32-36.

[7] See Elizabeth Hyman, "Soldiers in Politics: New Insights on Latin American Armed Forces," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXVII (September 1972), 401-18; and David Ronfeldt, "Patterns of Civil-Military Rule," in Luigi Einaudi, ed., *Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future* (New York 1974), 107-28. A comprehensive bibliography is provided by Klaus Lindenberg, *Fuerzas Armadas y Política en América Latina: Bibliografía Selecta* (Santiago, Chile 1972).

[8] Among the major country studies published since 1966, other than those mentioned elsewhere in this article, are: on Argentina, Dario Canton, *La Política de los Militares Argentinos, 1900–1971* (Buenos Aires 1971); Marvin Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930–1966: An Interpretation* (Austin 1972); Carlos Astiz, "The Argentine Armed Forces: Their Role and Political Involvement," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXII (December 1969), 862-78; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Modernización y Golpes Militares: Teoría, Comparaciones, y el Caso Argentino," *Desarrollo Económico* (October-December 1972), 519-66; Virgilio Rafael Beltrán, "The Army and Structural Changes in 20th Century Argentina," in Jacques Van Doorn, ed., *Military Profession and Military Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts* (The Hague 1969), 317-41; on Bolivia, William H. Brill, *Military Intervention in Bolivia: The Overthrow of Paz Estenssoro and the MNR* (ICOPS, Washington, D.C. 1967); on Brazil, Georges-André Fiechter, *Le Régime Modernisateur du Brésil, 1964–1972* (Geneva 1972); Ronald Schneider, *The Political System of Brazil: Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime, 1964–1970* (New York 1971); Barry Ames, "Rhetoric and Reality in a Militarized Regime: Brazil Since 1964," *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics* (Beverly Hills 1973); Frederick M. Nunn, "Military Professionalism and Professional Militarism in Brazil, 1870–1970: Historical Perspectives and Political Implications," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, IV, No. 1 (1972), 29-54; Riordan Roett, "A Praetorian Army in Politics: The Changing Role of the Brazilian Military" in Roett, ed., *Brazil in the Sixties* (Nashville 1972), 3-50; on Chile, Frederick M. Nunn, *Chilean Politics, 1920–1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces* (Albuquerque 1970); Roy A. Hansen, "Military Culture and Organizational Decline: A Study of the Chilean Army," Ph.D. diss. in sociology (University of California, Los Angeles 1967); on Colombia, Richard Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia* (Lexington, Mass. 1973); Francisco Leal Buitrago, "Política e intervención militar en Colombia," *Revista Mexicana de Sociologia*, XXXII, No. 3 (1970), 491-538; Anthony Maingot, "Colombia," in Lyle McAlister and others, *The Military in Latin American Socio-*

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dealing comprehensively and comparatively with the differing political roles exercised by Latin American armed forces have recently been conspicuous by their absence.

2. It has by now become the established wisdom that armed forces interact continuously with other elements in Latin American societies. Emphasis is beginning to turn, however, toward examining the educational and other institutional procedures, including recruitment and socialization, which set military forces somewhat apart from other social groups, and imbue in military officers a sense of corporate autonomy and interest.[9]

3. Some of the most insightful writing on this subject is now being done by Latin Americans.[10]

4. Historians continue to be among the most prolific writers on the political roles played by Latin American armies, but major conceptual advances have come from several political scientists.

5. Careful empirical work now characterizes this literature.

Robert Potash's *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945: Yrigoyen to Perón*, draws on extensive data about the recruitment, com-

political Evolution: Four Case Studies (Washington, D.C. 1970); on the Dominican Republic, Abraham Lowenthal, "The Political Role of the Dominican Armed Forces: A Note on the 1963 Overthrow of Bosch and the 1965 'Revolution'," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, xv (August 1973), 355-62; on Ecuador, John S. Fitch III, "Toward a Model of Coups D'Etat as a Political Process in Latin America: Ecuador, 1948–1966," Ph.D. diss. in political science (Yale University 1973); on Guatemala, Richard Adams, "The Development of the Military" in Adams, ed., *Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1944–1966* (Austin 1970), 238-77; Jerry Weaver, "Political Style of the Guatemalan Military Elite," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, V (1969–70), 63-81; on Mexico, Jorge Alberto Lozoya, *El ejército mexicano (1911–1965)* (Mexico 1970); on Panama, Steve Ropp, "Military Reformism in Panama: New Directions or Old Inclinations," *Caribbean Studies*, XII (October 1972), 45-63; on Peru, Carlos Astiz and José Garcia, "The Peruvian Military: Achievement Orientation, Training, and Political Tendencies," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXV (December 1972), 667-85; François Bourricaud, "Los militares: por qué y para qué?" *Aportes* (April 1970), 13-55; Bourricaud, "Voluntarismo y experimentación: los militares peruanos: manos a la obra," *Mundo Nuevo* (December 1970), 4-16; Julio Cotler, "Crisis política y populismo militar," in José Matos Mar and others, *Peru: Hoy* (Mexico 1971), 87-174, and "Bases del corporativismo en el Peru," *Sociedad y Política*, No. 2 (November 1972), 3-11; Jane Jaquette, "Revolution by Fiat: The Context of Policy-making in Peru," *Western Political Quarterly*, XXV (December 1972), 648-66.

[9] Cf. Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt, 1960–67* (Cambridge 1971).

[10] In addition to previously cited works, see, for instance, José Nun, "The Middle-Class Military Coup," in Claudio Véliz, ed., *The Politics of Conformity in Latin America* (Oxford 1967), 66-118; Oscar Cuellar, "Notas sobre la participación de los militares en América Latina," *Aportes* (January 1971), 6-41; Liliana de Riz, "Ejército y política en Uruguay," *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologia*, No. 3 (September-December 1970), 420-42; and Alberto Sepulveda, "El Militarismo Desarrolista en América Latina," *Foro Internacional*, XIII (July–September 1972), 45-65.

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position, and training of Argentine officers, as well as on (almost overwhelmingly) detailed information about informal cliques within the Argentine military and their relations with civilian factions. The evidence Potash adduces—much of it from previously unavailable diplomatic records and from personal interviews—enables him to document the emergence of a highly professional, notably self-protective Argentine officer corps. The basic argument, which he spells out briefly in his conclusions (and promises to elaborate in a second book, on the Perón era), is that the Argentine army's more assertive role, reflected in Perón's rise, is attributable largely to gradual changes within the military over the preceding fifteen years. Potash emphasizes the doubling of the Argentine officer corps between 1930 and 1945, its increasing professionalism, the establishment of the equivalent of a National War College with year-long courses for senior officers, and the creation of arsenals and factories run by the military. These changes tended to confer increasing self-confidence on the officers in their own capacity to handle national problems, and have facilitated the Argentine army's adoption of an ever more overt political role.

Alfred Stepan's *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* is also based on a wealth of data, including detailed information on the social and educational background of Brazilian officers and cadets, reports on applications to military academies, extensive interviews with Brazilian officers sympathetic to the author's research, and an imaginatively executed content analysis of several military journals and of civilian political debate. Stepan focuses mainly on explaining why the Brazilian military in 1964 turned away from what he calls a "moderator" model to its current "directive" role.

Under the "moderator" model, the military institution is repeatedly called in to preserve the political balance, but is denied the right to attempt systematically to direct lasting changes within the political system. Until 1964, acceptance of this role by Brazilian officers was contingent upon their acknowledgment of the "legitimacy and feasibility of parliamentary political forms and upon their assessment that in comparison with civilians they possess a relatively low capacity for ruling" (p. 63). In 1964, however, what Stepan terms a "boundary change" occurred. Stepan stresses the confluence of developments external to the military (Brazil's macrosocial crisis and the widespread impression that the civilian political system was failing) with internal circumstances, especially the emergence of a focus on national development strategy in the Superior War College. By 1964 Brazilian officers were skeptical about the ability of civilians to solve Brazil's problems,

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and increasingly self-confident about their own capacity to implement a reasonably coherent development strategy (which was worked out with the aid of civilian technocrats). A full-scale, long-term takeover resulted.

Stepan concludes by examining the Brazilian regime's first four years in power; he challenges the "realist" assumption that military governments are less subject than civilian regimes to the problems of policy incoherence and instability. Stepan shows how the military's preoccupation with preserving unity has made for important discontinuities, ugly repression, and consequently eventual self-isolation, from which no escape is easily imaginable. Stepan does not directly confront the question of whether the Brazilian military might have avoided its present apparent *cul de sac*, but seems to imply that the tensions between the "military as government" and the "military as institution" will inevitably undermine the effectiveness of a long-term military regime and/or drive it to repression. It took less than five years for this process to become painfully evident in Brazil.

The impressive degree to which Peru's military regime has maintained its apparent cohesion and continuity and a reputation for tolerance for more than five years raises interesting questions, therefore. Do special circumstances in Peru account for the Velasco regime's ability to preserve its unity and self-confidence? Or is the Peruvian regime's relative success to date fragile, and eventually likely to be strained by the pressures Stepan discusses?

Important background material for analyzing the Peruvian case is provided in *100 Años del Ejército Peruano: Frustraciones y Cambios* and *El CAEM y la Revolución de la Fuerza Armada*, two recent books by Victor Villanueva, a retired Peruvian Army major.[11] In *100 Años del Ejército Peruano*, Villanueva concentrates on what he sees as a century-long "process of change in the military mind which brought it, slowly but persistently, to the need to capture political power," a need based fundamentally on a series of institutionally transmitted "traumas" and "frustrations." (p. 11). Several decades of collective experience have imbued Peruvian officers with an aversion for civilians, political parties, and "politics," a "generously positive self-estimation," a "subjective need for autonomy and power," and "confidence at being better equipped than civilians to govern the country" (p. 11).

In his most recent volume, Villanueva discusses a more specific in-

[11] For further discussion of Villanueva, see James M. Malloy, "Dissecting the Peruvian Military," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, XV (August 1973), 375-82.

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fluence on the current Peruvian regime: the mid-career education Peru's officers have been receiving since 1950 at the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares (CAEM), Peru's equivalent of the National War College. Whereas other writers on the current Peruvian regime tend generally but vaguely to attribute much of the junta's reform orientation to the CAEM program (about which little concrete information had previously emerged), Villanueva provides enough data to speculate about the specific impact of CAEM. On the basis of a reasonably well documented (though somewhat spotty) examination of the CAEM curriculum and professional staff roster for the 1950's and 1960's, Villanueva rejects the view that CAEM was significantly influenced by Marxists and other radical civilians. Rather, Villanueva argues, the CAEM doctrine emerged from a more narrowly military concern with institutional self-protection and self-assertion in the context of national development needs; most important, it "rationalized the old rejection the military felt for the civilian" (p. 170). Villanueva's work can be criticized: some of it is more polemical than profound; insufficient evidence is provided for several key assertions (for example, that civilian professors have generally been guided by the CAEM leadership regarding their approach, rather than vice versa); and the emphasis on long-term, institutional psycho-experience is sometimes farfetched. But much can be learned from a judicious reading of Villanueva's contributions; his books are rich in detail, full of specific comments and insights, and informed by a sensitivity to personal and contextual variables that are sometimes ignored in more scholarly treatises.

6. Though excellent studies of individual countries are now available, it remains largely true that systematic comparative work is lacking on the political role of Latin American armies.

A few exceptions should be noted, however.[12] The most valuable

[12] Four additional comparative efforts deserve mention. McAlister and others (fn. 8), contains competent but not closely related studies of Peru, Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico, with a useful final attempt by McAlister to derive comparative generalizations. Brady Tyson's "The Emerging Role of the Military as National Modernizers in Latin America: The Cases of Brazil and Peru," in David Pollock and Arch Ritter, eds., *Latin American Prospects for the 1970's: What Kind of Revolution?* (New York 1973), 107-30, presents insightful but inconclusive speculation on the possibility that Peru's regime will eventually evolve in a direction similar to Brazil's. James Malloy's "Populismo militar en el Peru y Bolivia: Antecedentes y posibilidades futuras," *Estudios Andinos*, II (1971–72), 113-36, strains somewhat to fit limited data on the Peruvian regime's first three years into a framework Malloy had developed in his earlier work on Bolivia. Charles Corbett's *The Latin American Military as a Sociopolitical Force: Case Studies of Argentina and Bolivia* (University of Miami, Center of Advanced International Studies 1972), brings together two very unlikely objects of comparison, apparently chosen simply because the author (formerly a U.S. military attaché) had first-hand familiarity with each.

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effort so far published is Guillermo O'Donnell's *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, which concentrates on Argentina and Brazil. O'Donnell challenges the widely accepted notion that rising levels of modernization are conducive to democratic political arrangements. He suggests instead that there may be an "elective affinity" between situations of "high modernization" and "bureaucratic authoritarianism," which usually takes the form of a military regime that diminishes the influence of the already activated urban popular sector on national politics. O'Donnell stresses the bureaucratic and exclusionist nature of these authoritarian regimes more than their military character, implying that the latter trait may be of secondary importance or even coincidental. The key point is that technocratic elites in charge of various kinds of bureaucratic organizations try to reshape society and politics to permit more extensive application of their own expertise; in order to have their way, they cut off popular participation and even employ force.

Not all cases of "bureaucratic authoritarianism" are alike. O'Donnell distinguishes between Argentina and Brazil chiefly with regard to the degree of autonomy and organization within the "popular" (mainly labor) sector of each before the eventual turn to authoritarianism. Argentina's more highly organized and complex popular sector, O'Donnell argues, precludes thorough, long-term demobilization—short of extremely harsh repression. Brazil's lower degree of prior popular mobilization, however, has permitted the military regime to consolidate its hold. O'Donnell enriches his discussion with a brief aside on Peru, whose current regime he characterizes as "populist authoritarian," because it does not aim to exclude the present participants, but to incorporate new participants within an expansive, nationalist, and anti-oligarchical coalition like that experienced by Brazil and Argentina during the eras of Vargas and Perón.

A more extensive treatment of Peru and Brazil is provided by Luigi Einaudi and Alfred Stepan in *Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil*.[18] They intelligently discuss why armies with essentially similar organizations, structures, and procedures, in countries with roughly comparable social and economic problems, and subject to the same kind of foreign (principally North American) doctrinal influences, forged national secu-

[18] See also Einaudi's *The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis* (Rand, Santa Monica 1969), "U.S. Relations with the Peruvian Military," in Daniel Sharp, ed., *U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru* (Austin 1972), 15-56, and "Revolution from Within —Military Rule in Peru Since 1968," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, VIII (Spring 1973), 71-87.

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rity doctrines that eventually led them to substitute direct, long-term rule for a previously more restricted political role. But, though well worth consulting for its concise, well informed, and clearly written analyses of the two cases, the Einaudi-Stepan volume is essentially a juxtaposition of separately conducted studies rather than the application of a comparative framework to different cases. Disciplined comparative statements are scarce, and the study's conclusions amount to little more than a restatement of the general propositions appropriately presented in the introduction. What is particularly regrettable is that Einaudi and Stepan say so little to explain why the Brazilian and Peruvian armies, similar in so many aspects detailed by the authors, now play such apparently different roles.[14]

III

The faith of a decade ago—that military involvement in Latin American politics would decline as a result of economic development, social modernization, military professionalization, and American influence—can no longer be sustained. As it appears that the military's significant role in Latin American politics is here to stay, attention has turned increasingly not only to analyzing why this is so, but also to examining the consequences of military rule for policy outputs and outcomes.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the recent literature on why Latin Amercian armed forces "intervene" is that so many writers still pose the question that way. Even a cursory familiarity with Latin America might well lead one to ask instead why armies have refrained (or appear to refrain) from taking an extensive and direct political role in a handful of Latin American countries: Costa Rica, Mexico since the 1930's, Venezuela since 1958, and Chile and Uruguay until very recently. Studies of these cases are scarce, however, and generally unilluminating.

Probably the major book on the military in Chile, *Las Fuerzas Armadas en el Sistema Político Chileno*, by Alain Joxe, disputes the conventional view that the Chilean army had not recently (before 1973) involved itself much in politics. Joxe asserts—plausibly, even persuasively, but by no means in a detailed or elaborated fashion—that the Chilean army has had a "latent and permanent participation" in the political process as the middle class's principal agent in shaping and

[14] Stepan begins to deal with these differences, albeit still somewhat sketchily and almost exclusively in terms of factors internal to the respective armies, in "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven 1973), 47-68.

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protecting the social, political, and economic systems for its benefit (pp. 40-41). Although the Chilean military has not taken office directly very often—in 1891, 1924, 1931–32 (and in 1973)—Joxe argues that each military takeover in Chile counts for ten somewhere else, because the army does such a thorough and effective job each time in rearranging the system to protect vital middle-class interests. But Joxe offers scant explanation of why the Chilean middle class, in contrast to others in Latin America, needs to rely on overt military "intervention" so infrequently.

For the reader interested in analyzing why some Latin American armies participate overtly in politics less often than others, Winfield Burggraaff's *The Venezuelan Armed Forces in Politics, 1935–1959* is similarly disappointing, for Burggraaff deliberately cuts off his account just when the Venezuelan army stopped "intervening." Within its purview, Burggraaff's volume provides some interesting information on how the Venezuelan army evolved from a *caudillo*'s personal instrument to an increasingly autonomous and coherent professional institution. But although Burggraaff asks "what motivated Venezuelan officers to intervene directly in politics between 1928 and 1958," he answers only by citing a catalogue of possible explanations among which it is "risky to assign weights" (p. 195).

Edwin Lieuwen's *Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910–1940* deals with a fascinating series of questions: how a traditional army was destroyed and replaced by a revolutionary one, how the revolutionary army was professionalized, and then, how the professional army was practically withdrawn from politics and civilian authority was established.[15] Of particular interest in Mexico's experience was the Calles era in the mid-1920's, when the decision was made to professionalize the Mexican army from the bottom up by developing a corps of young professionals. The task of removing the generals from politics (some by purge, many others by payoff) was in most cases left to later—the presidents were generals until 1946—by which time the autonomy and continuity of the military institution were assured. The questions Lieuwen poses are considerably better than the answers he provides, however; this may be because the main answers involve post-revolutionary social, economic, and political

[15] For knowledgeable skepticism regarding the degree to which the Mexican army has actually withdrawn from politics, see David Ronfeldt, *The Mexican Army and Political Order Since 1940* (RAND, Santa Monica 1973); and Franklin Margiotta, "Changing Patterns of Political Influence: The Mexican Military and Politics," paper presented at the 1973 Convention of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

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circumstances beyond the scope of the data Lieuwen considers in focusing on the military itself.

Few writers, then, discuss why some Latin American armies usually avoid direct and active political roles; none do so satisfactorily. What about the question almost all of them face: why do most Latin American armed forces participate overtly in politics?

A wide variety of explanatory propositions has been advanced. Some writers emphasize institutional, "internal," or "push" factors: the size and firepower of armies; the size, class origins, socialization, training, cohort experience, and degree of professionalization of officers; and the effects of foreign military assistance. Others highlight social, "external," "environmental," or "pull" circumstances: levels of economic and political development, political culture, and social stratification systems. Not only have many variables been cited; there has been little consensus on the effects of any of them. It has been argued that smaller, or larger, armies are more likely to "intervene"; that "professionalization" expands, or restricts, an army's political activity; that the emerging predominance of middle-class officers will promote, or restrain, their political participation and will make the army's policy impact progressively redistributive, or regressive; that foreign influence leads to "interventionism," or the contrary; that rising levels of development and modernization will promote democratic, or authoritarian, politics; that the political traditions and culture of Latin America require an apolitical stance by military officers, or that they reinforce their proclivity for politics.

Robert Putnam has attempted to test a number of these contradictory propositions for the decade preceding 1966.[16] Analyzing aggregate data, Putnam relates measures of a series of independent variables, such as socioeconomic development, political development, characteristics of particular military institutions, and foreign assistance and training, to the dependent variable, "military intervention," defined as the armed forces' veering away from the management and use of controlled violence in the service of the state, to participate in or influence other, non-military agencies and functions of the state.[17] Putnam's article is useful mainly for the doubts it casts on some of the hypotheses which have been widely discussed, particularly regarding the supposed influence of foreign military missions and of "coup contagion" (i.e., the

[16] Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," *World Politics*, xx (October 1967), 83-110.

[17] *Ibid.*, 89. The definition is paraphrased from Robert L. Gilmore, *Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela* (Athens, Ohio 1964), 4-5.

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effect of coups in neighboring countries) on the incidence of military intervention. Putnam's other major findings—that "social mobilization" is strongly and negatively related to "military intervention," but that "economic development" is positively correlated—are questionable. Putnam's work may be challenged regarding the reliability of its index and the validity of its scoring criteria, regarding its technique of longitudinal inference from cross-sectional aggregate data, and particularly because the causal models suffer from multicollinearity since there are fixed relationships among the independent variables.[18] In addition to these more specific methodological difficulties, Putnam's work suffers from its undifferentiated consideration of a wide variety of armies and political roles within the phenomenon being studied—"military intervention."

The same comment applies to Martin Needler's "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America."[19] Needler seeks to explain the frequency and timing of *coups d'état* and to ascertain whether there is any overall trend with regard to their effects on social and economic policy. He concludes that coups occur more often than not when economic conditions are deteriorating; that they increasingly tend to occur against constitutional regimes, often just before or just after elections; that their redistributive effects on economic and social policy, if any, are regressive; and that, though their incidence is cyclical, the secular trend is descending, i.e., coups seem to occur less frequently now than before 1960. Needler's empirical observations do not appear to hold up well, however, for the years since 1966 have been punctuated by coups, at least some of them clearly reformist.

Even for the period he discusses, Needler's argument lacks explanatory power. Although he offers some hypotheses, particularly the "swing man" proposition (which focuses on the dynamics of coups themselves and how these affect timing and policy orientation), Needler cannot say much that will meaningfully explain such an undifferentiated class of phenomena as Latin American coups. Essentially, his statements about trends are grounded in the view that expanded participation is inevitable and will lead to fewer coups, but this conclusion is by no means self-evident. Needler also believes that military "intervention," being self-protective of military corporate interests, is bound

[18] See Edward Tufte, "Improving Data Analysis in Political Science," *World Politics*, XXI (July 1969), 654; and Jerry L. Weaver, "Assessing the Impact of Military Rule: Alternative Approaches," in Philippe C. Schmitter, ed., *Military Rule in Latin America: Functions, Consequences, and Perspectives* (Beverly Hills 1973), 84-86, 96-98. I am indebted to John S. Fitch III and Jeffrey Hart for help on this point.

[19] *American Political Science Review*, LX (September 1966), 616-26.

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to restrict participation and to protect the socioeconomic status quo. However plausible these assertions, they do not necessarily hold true either; the current rash of military regimes in Latin America undermines Needler's first assertion; Peru's current experience, at least, would appear to contradict the second.

IV

Whereas Putnam and Needler lump together all types of military coups, a growing literature on specific countries underlines the great variance among examples of military participation in politics. Each case study highlights particular circumstances, but taken together they suggest four main distinctions.[20]

First, Latin American military institutions exercise their political influence either directly and overtly, as rulers, or indirectly, as a kind of specially endowed pressure group.[21] Nowhere in Latin America (with the possible exception of Costa Rica, where the officer corps is largely disbanded by each new administration) do armed forces play an insignificant political role or even one mainly limited to national defense and police functions.

Second, among those countries where direct military rule occurs, it may be personalist, factional, or institutional. A regime is personalist when a politician in uniform uses the armed forces (or part of them) to expand and protect his power, whether exercised on his own behalf or on behalf of a civilian group or groups. Personalist regimes are most common in countries with poorly institutionalized, unprofessional armed forces.[22] Factional regimes occur when a group of officers, aspiring to accomplish an institutional coup, assumes control, usually against the will of the established military hierarchy; this formulation is bound to be transitory, for the faction will soon find itself either displaced or able to transform the military institution to its liking. Institutional regimes occur, in turn, when the leadership of the armed forces rules on the basis of established procedures likely to survive the particular chief; this may happen when the armed forces' top officers take power (purging dissenters), or when a faction successfully gains dominance

[20] Cf. Manfred Kossok, "The Armed Forces in Latin America: Potential for Changes in Political and Social Functions," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, XIV (November 1972), 375-98.

[21] On the limitations of the "pressure group" concept for analyzing the political role of Latin American armies, see Hyman (fn. 7), 410-11.

[22] Cf. Samuel Decalo, "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, II No. 1 (1973), 105-27.

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within established channels.[23] Although its incidence has so far been infrequent, institutional rule is relatively stable once it has been accomplished, for no other social or political group is likely to remove from office a military establishment united in its will to govern.

Third, military regimes may be distinguished on the basis of their frequency and length. Brief, intermittent coups may be personalist (when no one *caudillo* can consolidate national control), or institutional (as was the case in Peru in 1962, and in Brazil and Argentina several times before 1964). Long-term military rule may reflect the establishment of a strong-man regime in the absence of mass participation or complex social and political organizations, as in Nicaragua or Paraguay; but it may also be institutional, as it is today in Brazil and Peru.

Finally, and perhaps most important, military regimes differ sharply in their programmatic aims and consequences. In some countries, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean, armies have served mainly to enrich *caudillo* leaders, their military henchmen, and their civilian accomplices. In other cases—in Peru through 1960 and in Colombia until Rojas Pinilla, for example—armed forces have protected land-owning "oligarchies" against challenges to their wealth and power, even those posed by urban middle-class elements. In a few situations—in Chile in 1924–25, in Brazil during the Vargas period, in Argentina under Perón, and in contemporary Panama and Peru—military regimes have helped middle-class groups, including organized labor, to reduce the influence of entrenched ruling classes. In such cases, armies have aided in extending the franchise and/or other rights to new participants in politics, and have spurred redistributive economic and social reforms. But in still other cases—in contemporary Argentina and Brazil, and especially in Chile—the policy of the military has been to restrict political participation, to demobilize and depoliticize, and even to repress.

V

What accounts for the dramatically different policies adopted by military regimes in different countries, or even at successive points in one nation's history? What can explain not only the frequency and level of military participation in Latin American politics, but also its

[23] For an interpretation of the current Peruvian regime (generally regarded as eminently institutional), as deriving primarily from the dominance of one army faction, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Peru's 'Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces': The First Five Years," in Lowenthal, ed., *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Peru* (Princeton, forthcoming).

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several forms: direct and indirect; personal, factional, and institutional; intermittent and long-term; reformist and regressive?[24]

Case studies, like those by Potash, Burggraaff, Einaudi, and Villanueva, tend to stress internal institutional factors. Discussions of the Peruvian case, for instance, underline the army's recruitment and promotion of officers from the provincial middle class; its training program, particularly the CAEM course and the experience of many officers in U.S. installations; its historic difficulties with and consequent distrust of civilians; and the experience of top-ranking officers who had to put down guerrilla uprisings in the mid-1960's. These factors are hardly irrelevant, but comparative data suggest that none, by itself, is a sufficient explanation for the Peruvian military's evolution. Most officer corps in Latin America come predominantly from the provincial middle class, but few (if any) parallel the Peruvian Army's current stance.[25] Peru's CAEM course is unusual among Latin American countries, but it is by no means unique, and most officers who have graduated from nearly equivalent institutions in Argentina and Brazil have emerged with attitudes and policy preferences very different from those declared by their Peruvian counterparts. Besides, not even the most extravagant proponents of the impact of education would argue that a nine-month course for mature professionals, or even shorter exposure to foreign training, could fundamentally affect their values and behavior. And other armies, in Latin America and elsewhere, have emerged from battles with guerrillas determined to repress them, rather than eager to foster structural change.[26]

If internal variables are insufficient to explain the variety of political roles played by Latin American armies, what about arguments that attribute the military's political behavior "not to the social and organi-

[24] Amos Perlmutter, in an article based primarily on Middle Eastern and Asian cases but explicitly generalized to Africa and Latin America as well, distinguishes between two subtypes of institutional military regimes: "arbitrator-types" and "ruler-types." Arbitrator-types are only briefly direct, if at all; they are "professionally-oriented," and are little interested in political ideology or organization. "Ruler-types" are more likely to be long-term and direct, to submerge professional considerations to others, and are much concerned about ideology and organization. But Perlmutter's observation about professional orientation does not appear to apply in the Latin American context (e.g., Peru and Brazil) unless one defines "professional orientation" as excluding long-term civilian responsibility, in which case Perlmutter's point is somewhat circular. See Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (April 1969), 382-404.

[25] Fitch shows that Ecuadorean officers come from socioeconomic origins very similar to those of their Peruvian colleagues, for instance. See Fitch (fn. 8), 248-49.

[26] This seems to have been the case, for instance, in the Dominican Republic and Bolivia. For another case where counterinsurgent activities have apparently stimulated military interest in structural reform, however, see Maullin (fn. 8).

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zational characteristics of the military establishment but to the political and institutional structure of the society"?[27] José Nun, in his essay on "The Middle-Class Military Coup," argues that armies in Latin America have usually acted as representatives of changing middle-class interests, compensating for that class's "inability to establish itself as a well-integrated hegemonic group."[28] Samuel Huntington elaborates this insight, portraying armed forces across the world as "doorkeepers to the expansion of political participation in a praetorian society; their historic role is to open the door to the middle class and to close it to the lower class."[29]

The Nun-Huntington hypothesis, though it obviously tends to obscure somewhat the heterogeneous character and interests of the "middle class" in most Latin American countries and to play down the effects of international influences on their behavior, represents a major analytical advance. It clarifies how the military can be reformist in one context and reactionary in another while pursuing more or less consistent lines of action. Virgilio Rafael Beltrán's analysis of several different types of military participation in Argentina, for instance, shows that the army was never aligned with "popular" sectors against the "middle class," but several times joined middle-class groupings, first against the oligarchic minority and then against the majority.[30]

But the hypothesis relating the military's political role to levels and types of middle-class participation explains less than it seems to. That military officers of middle-class origin act—in any particular circumstance or even in many—compatibly with general middle-class interests does not prove that the officers are protecting the middle class. As Fitch argues (in the context of Ecuador), the officers' "strong corporate self-identification with the military institution, rather than their peripheral identification as members of the middle class," may account best for their political position.[31] If narrow institutional requirements and general class interests coincide, the explanation may relate to common responses to similar problems rather than to any similarity of origin or perceived interest. This point is important because there are cases—Argentina in the early 1930's, Peru in 1968—when a military group deposed an eminently middle-class regime. The Peruvian case, in which the military's "revolutionary" program appears to have gone

[27] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968), 194. For an earlier, still useful formulation, see Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America," *European Journal of Sociology*, II (1961), 62-81.

[28] See Nun (fn. 10), 112.

[29] Huntington (fn. 27), 222.

[30] Beltrán (fn. 8).

[31] Fitch (fn. 8), 331-32.

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beyond what all but a small fraction of Peru's middle class will support, raises this question most sharply. But the Nun-Huntington approach, by itself, also fails to account for other cases—for instance, the substantially changed character of military participation in Argentine politics between 1955 and 1966, from "legalists" to long-term rulers. How can such "exceptions" be explained?

The most persuasive writers stress the confluence and interaction of macrosocial factors with those internal to the military institution.[32] Stepan, for instance, maintains that although an army's political role cannot be deduced from its organizational characteristics, the latter importantly affect the military's exercise of a role structured in large part by wider social forces. O'Donnell emphasizes the interrelation of social and institutional forces in Argentina, arguing that the level of military "professionalization" is a key variable, but that its impact is conditioned by the wider sociopolitical setting. "The professionalization of the armed forces in the praetorian context raises the critical point from which military intervention becomes probable," O'Donnell argues, implying that the more "professional" the army, the less likely overt "intervention" becomes. But "once that point is reached, the military intervention takes place with more cohesion, with a comprehensive justificatory ideology, and with the purpose of achieving goals much more ambitious than those in coups undertaken by less professional armed forces."[33]

VI

Perhaps the most interesting series of questions regarding military participation in politics—little discussed until recently—relates to the effects of military rule.[34] How do military regimes differ from their civilian counterparts, predecessors, and successors? What difference does it make whether or not politicians, technicians, and bureaucrats wear uniforms?

By far the most systematic and comprehensive effort to deal with the consequences of military rule in Latin America is Philippe Schmitter's

[32] The best recent literature on the political roles of African armies shares this emphasis. See, for instance, Claude E. Welch, "Radical and Conservative Military Regimes: A Typology and Analysis of Post-Coup Governments in Tropical Africa," paper presented at the 1973 Convention of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans; and Henry Bienen, "Military and Society in East Africa: Thinking Again about Praetorianism," *Comparative Politics*, VI (July 1974), 489-517.

[33] O'Donnell (fn. 8), 32. (My translation.)

[34] The volume Schmitter has edited (fn. 18) contributes much less than its title promises on this point. Only Weaver's essay deals systematically with the effects of military rule.

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"Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness, and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950–1967."[35] Noting that the supposed impact of different types of regimes on public policy is rarely accompanied by evidence, Schmitter draws on the literature to formulate a series of "speculative contradictory hypotheses" susceptible to testing against available socioeconomic data and indicators of public policy variables. (Schmitter limits his review to analyzing expenditures; dimensions of civil liberty, for instance, are deliberately ignored.) Some of Schmitter's arguments may scare off readers unfamiliar with quantitative analytical techniques and their argot; those not so handicapped may question his eclectic application of several methods and wonder about the quality of some of the basic data.[36] But Schmitter's exercises provide a very useful start, suggesting several effects that various types of regimes may have on patterns and results of public policy. Military regimes apparently spend more than their civilian counterparts on "defense" and less on social welfare; the highest defense expenditures occur when the military is an intermittent ruler.[37] The type of regime affects "how much Latin American polities can extract from their environments (i.e. total government expenditures and revenues), upon whom the burden of this extractive process will fall (i.e. taxation), how much of these scarce resources will be plowed back into the system to develop it (i.e. public investment), and which social groups will be benefited (i.e. sectoral expenditures)." But "indicators of overall system performance (*outcomes*) are much less predictably affected by regime-type—than are indicators of direct governmental allocation (*outputs*). How much Latin American countries invest, industrialize, increase their GNP, raise their cost of living, increase their school enrollment and/or engage in foreign trade seems more the product of environmental or ecological factors than the willful acts of politicians grouped according to their competitiveness or civilian-military status."[38]

Schmitter's essay, though making imaginative use of a wide variety

[35] Schmitter's essay appears in Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn, eds., *On Military Intervention* (Rotterdam 1971), 426-506. Cf. Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, LXIV (December 1970), 1131-48.

[36] For a critique of Schmitter's methodology, see Barry Ames and Edward Goff, "A Longitudinal Approach to Latin American Public Expenditures," paper presented at the 1973 Convention of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 9-11. See also Weaver (fn. 18), 93 ff.

[37] On military spending, however, cf. G. E. Heare, *Latin American Military Expenditures, 1967–1971* (U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 1973) for an argument that "[t]here is actually little direct correlation between military spending and the degree of military power in government."

[38] Schmitter (fn. 35), 492-93.

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of available data, points up the need for improved and more comprehensive data sets on specific countries. Even more, as Schmitter himself suggests, his study indicates the need for careful analysis of causality and process in individual cases or pairs of cases, conforming to or deviating from the modal patterns. To date, however, there is only one such study. Barry Ames, in "Rhetoric and Reality in a Militarized Regime: Brazil after 1964," looks at how the Brazilian military government and its civilian predecessors handled a series of issue areas: housing, tax, and educational policies.[39] He suggests that the policy-making process did not differ equally across the various issue areas from one type of regime to another; rather, it differed according to the priority given the particular issue by the military, the degree (if any) of prior policy commitments and clearly articulated goals, and the strength of clientele groups.

Ames's analysis, like Schmitter's, suggests that military regimes do affect public policies, but not as much as they claim or their critics assert. But lumping together all "military" regimes and distinguishing them from all "civilian" regimes may be profoundly misleading. As O'Donnell hints, certain social circumstances may produce regimes, whether civilian or military, that resemble each other much more than they do other civilian or military regimes under different socioeconomic circumstances.[40] The incipient literature on public policy making in Latin America should illuminate this point.

VII

The recent literature on the political role of Latin American armed forces is extensive, empirically based, and increasingly subtle conceptually. Obvious differences between the political activities and impacts of armies in countries like Brazil and Peru, the Dominican Republic and Argentina, Bolivia and Chile—indeed, the vast differences among the military institutions themselves and between the political roles played by the same army at different times in a given country's history—have dissolved easy assumptions about the nature of military involvement in Latin American politics. It becomes increasingly clear that armies participate in Latin American politics in several different ways, and that no simple explanation accounts for all. More important, it becomes evident that approaches relating characteristics of the military institutions themselves to the social context in which they operate provide the most

[39] Ames (fn. 8).

[40] David Ronfeldt (fn. 7), points out, indeed, that the line between "civilian" and "military" regimes is often hazy, and that most Latin American countries are usually governed by civil-military coalitions.

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promising avenues for explaining the various political roles played by Latin American officers.

What remains to be done?

(1) Additional case studies are needed to help us analyze how the political roles of armies have evolved within different national contexts, why coups sometimes occur and sometimes do not, why military regimes are sometimes brief and sometimes long, sometimes reformist and sometimes reactionary, how armies have been affected by macro-social and institutional changes, and what effects various forms of military participation have had on national politics and policy. Research on cases where military participation has become less overt (e.g., Venezuela), or where military rule has now entrenched itself (e.g., Peru), would be of greatest interest.

(2) Contextually sensitive analysis is particularly needed on how armies govern in Latin America, what coalitions they form, what clienteles they respond to, how they make and execute decisions, and generally whether, how, and why the substance and style of military regimes differ in Latin America from those of civil governments.

(3) Research is required on pairs of cases chosen to highlight theoretically significant differences: Peru and Brazil, Argentina and Chile, Panama and Nicaragua, for example. Emphasis should be given particularly to specific institutional aspects that may vary from country to country: recruitment, socialization, and training patterns, for instance. Because it may be unrealistic to expect individual researchers to attain the necessary degree of access to military institutions in more than one country, carefully designed collaborative projects seem indicated.

(4) How soldiers affect Latin American politics should be compared with what we know of their role elsewhere, particularly in other Third-World regions. "Neo-realist" writings on the Middle East and Asia distorted North American perceptions of the Latin American military in the 1960's.[41] Writings on Latin America, in turn, are said

[41] Johnson's writings (fn. 5) were influenced by the then expanding literature on military participation in the politics of the Middle East and Asia, a literature which tended to exaggerate the progressive impact of military intervention, even in Asia, by inferring too much from the armies' formal characteristics. See Robert M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference-Group Theory and the Ghanian Case," *World Politics*, XXIII (April 1971), 399-430. By the 1970's, revisionist writers were generally skeptical about the supposed progressive impact of military participation, particularly in African politics. See Claude Welch, ed., *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change* (Evanston, Ill. 1970); and Anton Bebler, *Military Rule in Africa: Dahomey, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Mali* (New York 1973).

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to have misled scholars when they turned to analyzing sub-Saharan armies.[42] Recent "revisionist" writings on the military role in African and Arab polities, together with those here reviewed on Latin America, should provide for a mutual correction of focus.[43]

(5) The most exciting task is to synthesize and integrate within an inclusive theoretical formulation the by now abundant literature on the political roles armies play in Latin America and in other regions.

It is not possible in this brief essay to take up that final challenge. It may be appropriate, however, to advance one central proposition suggested by the literature reviewed here: that the relation between the level of military institutionalization and the institutionalization of civilian political procedures may be a key determinant of the varying political roles army officers play.[44]

As Huntington argues, the single most important variable affecting military participation in politics is the ratio between the scope of political participation and the strength (autonomy, coherence, complexity, and adaptability) of civilian political institutions. Whenever popular participation exceeds the capacity of political institutions to channel it in a routinized, stable manner, "praetorianism" of one kind or another results, no matter what the absolute level of popular participation. Extensive and unmediated political activity takes place, not only by soldiers but also by priests, students, and labor leaders.

Important variations mark the spectrum of "praetorian" cases, however. Some armies "moderate" or "arbitrate"; others "direct" or "rule." Some act overtly for brief periods only; others take power for an extended time. Some push progressive, redistributive policies; others are conservative, if not reactionary.

Huntington postulates that the policy impact of military rule varies with the level of civilian political participation. In the "oligarchic" phase of limited participation, military *caudillos* (like civilian leaders) do not challenge the structure of power and rewards; they merely seek to assure themselves that they will benefit from it. Armies entering politics during a period of expanding middle-class participation in a previously aristocratic society are likely to play a "radical" role, opening

[42] See Welch (fn. 32), 2.

[43] Aside from the works previously cited, I have in mind particularly the books reviewed in Decalo (fn. 22), in Amos Perlmutter, "The Arab Military Elite," *World Politics*, XXII (January 1970), 269-300, and in Aristide Zolberg, "The Military Decade in Africa," *World Politics*, XXV (January 1973), 309-31.

[44] For comparable formulations, see A. R. Luckham, "A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations," *Government and Opposition*, VI (Winter 1971), 5-36; and Claude Welch, Jr. and Arthur Smith, *Military Role and Rule* (N. Scituate, Mass. 1974).

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the system and distributing resources and rewards more equitably than was previously done. But the impact of military involvement in an already highly participant polity (i.e., at the "mass praetorian" phase) is bound to be restrictive and repressive, Huntington argues, for the popular majority now threatens the prerogatives of the middle class, including the armed forces.

Huntington's persuasive argument does not fully explain, however, why military participation in different "praetorian" societies varies so much in duration, intensity, and style. Why do officers in Peru and Panama seem to go way beyond middle-class civilian politicians in their reformist zeal, for instance? Or, why is military involvement in the politics of Santo Domingo, Haiti, or Nicaragua so much closer to gang plunder than to institutional exercise of national responsibility?

A study of the differing levels of institutional strength among Latin American armies and the comparative strengths of civilian and military organizations in specific countries might be most illuminating in this connection.

An army's institutional strength may be measured, at least roughly, with reference to: (1) its resources (e.g., percentage of GNP and of national budget spent on defense, percentage of eligible men under arms, expenditure per soldier); (2) its professional level (e.g., years of schooling required of senior officers, number of military journals published, extent to which academic achievement and other "objective" measures affect promotions); and (3) its institutional cohesion and coherence, reflected also by its autonomy in such spheres as recruitment, assignments, and promotion.

If we were to rank the institutional strength of past and present Latin American armies, I suspect we would discover that military involvement in politics changes in a curvilinear fashion as armies gain in organizational strength and coherence.[45] At the lowest level of military institutionalization, officers participate in politics overtly, frequently, on a personalist basis, and often for long periods. At the intermediate level of military institutionalization, after "professionalization" has been emphasized, officers tend to participate less overtly (and if overtly, for briefer periods) than at an earlier stage, perhaps because they are protecting their still fragile corporate autonomy. At this intermediate stage, tensions are common between personalist leadership and institutional considerations; it is not unusual for the most professional officers (the best educated, least dependent on political ties for their previous promotions, etc.) eventually to displace the *caudillo* and restore civilian

[45] See, for instance, the suggestive data discussed by Fitch (fn. 8), 106, 112.

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rule. At a still higher stage of military institutionalization, in turn, armies are again more likely to play an overt role, this time long-term and directive, as officers achieve a self-confident sense of corporate autonomy and even superiority. At this stage, "intervention" may be reluctant, but when it comes it will probably be intensive and long-lasting.

Analyzing the relation between the strength of military institutions, the strength of civilian institutions, and the level of civilian political participation would also be of interest. If military institutionalization outpaces the evolution of parties and other civilian institutions, long-term, directive, and institutional rule by the armed forces is likely. The policy impact of military involvement will vary, however, with the level of mobilization and participation. At an intermediate stage, officers may self-confidently help to expand participation and even redistribute rewards, assured by their predominant strength that their own corporate interests are unendangered. At a high level of participation, rule by a well-institutionalized army may be equally overt, directive, and extended. But as military rule is occasioned precisely because mass participation was deemed threatening to the armed forces, its impact will be restrictive and regressive.

Conversely, when military institutionalization lags behind, as it does in most of Central America and the Caribbean at the intermediate level of civilian participation, or perhaps in Uruguay at a higher level, the consequences are also predictable. At the intermediate level of participation, officers are more likely to participate overtly, as personalist instruments, and for more extended periods than are the more professional units characteristic of other such politics. At a high level of participation, officers will participate less overtly and directively than would the highly institutionalized armies usually associated with high-participation situations.

The foregoing argument obviously needs elaboration and testing. No doubt it needs to be further qualified as well—particularly with regard to the impact of the specific previous experience of each country on participation of the military in politics, and of the relative timing of each country's economic growth and social mobilization.[46] It is offered in this preliminary form, however, as one contribution to the theory-building process that the extensive literature on armies and politics in Latin America now clearly invites.

[46] See David Collier, "Timing of Economic Growth and Regime Characteristics in Latin America," unpub. (Indiana University 1973).

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STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

By HARRY HOWE RANSOM

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., *The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities*. New York, Hill and Wang, 1973, 212 pp., $7.95.
Patrick J. McGarvey, *CIA, The Myth and the Madness*. New York, Saturday Review Press, 1972, 240 pp., $6.95.
J. C. Masterman, *The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1972, 203 pp., $6.95.
R. Harris Smith, *O.S.S., The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London, University of California Press, 1972, 458 pp., $10.95.
Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa*. Cambridge, Mass. and London, M.I.T. Press, 1973, 376 pp., $10.00.

I

SUBSTANTIAL recent progress has been made towards understanding foreign policy decision making. Yet the influence of that element in the process labeled "intelligence" remains a peculiar puzzle which, if not solved, blocks the way to better understanding of decision making, no matter what refined analytical model is used.

"Anyone concerned with national policy must have a profound interest in making sure that intelligence guides, and does not follow, national policy," Henry A. Kissinger told senators considering his nomination in 1973 for Secretary of State.[1] His reference was to the body of information labeled intelligence which is the product of a variety of governmental agencies that are assigned some part of the strategic intelligence function. He was trying to say that the product of the foreign intelligence system should describe objective reality as accurately as possible; that an intelligence agency should be independent of prevailing partisan influences. A decade earlier, former President Truman wrote that "by and large a President's performance in office is as effective as the information he has and the information he gets."[2] In the American setting, an "intelligence community" has evolved that can, in the words of Thomas L. Hughes, one of its former leaders, "come close to constituting the full official power to listen on behalf of the President—to collect, assemble, analyze, package and present the truth

[1] U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, *Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger*, 93rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C. 1973), Part I, p. 81.
[2] *Washington Post*, December 22, 1963, p. 1.

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about world events and trends, the truth that was supposed to make Presidents free to act, or not to act, as objective evidence indicated."[3] Yet, part of the mystery is that there seems to be in some cases no direct, predictable relationship between the quality of the information that is labeled intelligence and the nature of the decision.

How much do we know, in concrete detail, about the intelligence process or about the role and performance of the product of intelligence agencies in guiding, or following, foreign policies? Does intelligence information, in fact, "guide" foreign policy? That is to say, is the problem of an effective foreign policy ultimately no more or less than a problem of efficient intelligence agencies reporting the objective realities? Are there cross-national generalizations that can be drawn from recent historical experience about the policy, doctrine, structure, efficacy, or influence of intelligence in national decisions? Is it possible to generalize about the costs or benefits of large-scale secret intelligence activities, either in terms of normative (democratic) values or functional (policy outcome) efficacy? The search for answers is a formidable challenge.

As a governmental function, the intelligence process and product are normally shrouded in secrecy. As an intellectual enterprise, the mission of strategic foreign intelligence involves understanding past events, accurately interpreting current conditions, and predicting the future. The product, or result, of such intellectual efforts can be an influential factor in foreign policy decision making. Adding to the complexity of the subject is the fact that intelligence techniques have been utilized for a wide and disparate variety of foreign policy functions in war and peace, ranging from espionage for the purpose of collecting secret data needed by analysts, to interference in foreign elections, and through deception and sabotage, to political assassination and paramilitary adventures. That foreign intelligence techniques have been turned inward and utilized in domestic politics, as we now know from post-Watergate disclosures, is further evidence of wide-ranging functional definitions, if not confusion.

Conceptual clarity about the broad subject of strategic intelligence or intelligence activities has been absent from both academic treatises and government doctrine and organization. It would also seem that intelligence agencies, utilizing the special and even logical privilege of secrecy, have sometimes engaged in deliberate deception with regard to intelligence functions. Or, could it be self-deception? At any rate, the

[3] "The Power to Speak and the Power to Listen," in Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, eds., *Secrecy and Foreign Policy* (New York, London, and Toronto 1974), 14.

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general subject needs a conceptual clarity that has been lacking to date.

The scholar who enters this forbidden land seeking conceptual and functional clarification will find bits and pieces of evidence littering the diplomatic and military arenas of world politics. The amount of such evidence has increased apace, if unevenly, since the beginning of World War II. Until this dark side of world affairs is better illuminated, our knowledge of international interactions in the nuclear age, and about some crucial decision making, will remain incomplete.

What we know about strategic intelligence and foreign policy to date derives from a variety of disparate published works on the subject. From these sources, the best we can do much of the time is to assemble an impressionistic picture of the intelligence system. In its fifty-year bibliography,[4] published in 1972, *Foreign Affairs* found only one book dealing with strategic intelligence worth listing: Allen W. Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*.[5] Although that book was an uncritical in-house treatise, puffing the importance and glories of American intelligence operations during the cold war, and particularly of the CIA, Dulles without doubt occupied a privileged vantage point with regard to factual evidence on the subject. Consequently the book has reference value. The number of books purporting to shed new light on strategic intelligence continues to grow. The works can be divided into three categories. One category is the memoirs, or views of an alumnus or former insider, written and published with the tacit approval if not the help of the official intelligence establishment. A second category may be described as muckraking—whistle blowing—or axe grinding, offering authentic insights but failing some of the tests of scholarship. In a third category, a social scientist and/or historian objectively analyzes how the system works in specific historical contexts. The closer one comes to contemporary events, the more difficult is the task of gathering evidence, particularly for the social scientist who must guard against the easy speculation or gossip reported by the journalist, but who may lack the privileged information of a recent alumnus of the intelligence system.

A proliferation of literature in each of the three categories suggested above offers some promise of inching us toward satisfactory answers to

[4] *The Foreign Affairs 50-Year Bibliography*, ed. Byron Dexter (New York 1972).

[5] (New York 1963). Other books that might have been listed include: Paul W. Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion* (Chicago 1964); Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (Glencoe, Ill. 1956); Sherman Kent, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy* (Princeton 1949); George S. Pettee, *The Future of American Secret Intelligence* (Washington, D.C. 1946); Harry Howe Ransom, *The Intelligence Establishment* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970); and Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford 1962).

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the questions stated earlier, and some additional questions to be asked about strategic intelligence and foreign policy: How have governments organized for the strategic intelligence function, in war and in peacetime? What has been the impact of intelligence activities, in all their variety, on policy outcomes? What are the principal problems of intelligence policy, doctrine, structure, and function? Will it ever be possible to have sufficient evidence to give satisfying answers to these and related questions? Let us examine some of the recent literature with such questions before us.

II

Among the works by former insiders,[6] J. C. Masterman's *The Double Cross System* comes close to being unique, bringing to public scrutiny an authentic, if vintage, secret document. Masterman, a British historian and Oxford don, produced the top secret document at the end of World War II for internal governmental usage. "Double Cross" was an operation by which British Intelligence captured all German spies in Great Britain. They were converted into double agents by their British captors, and employed for counter-espionage and deception of the Nazi high command. The fact that the Germans were deceived about the time and location of the Normandy invasion in June 1944 may have been a crucial factor in Allied success on D-Day. The contention that Double Cross was a manipulative influence on German reaction to the invasion is based on the following: A network of false radio traffic, confirmed by presumably reliable secret agents, convinced German radio monitors that a number of Allied divisions were assembled in Southeast England, poised to launch an invasion toward Calais. Even after the real attack occurred in Normandy, the Germans seemed afraid to deploy concentrated forces, fearing a later main thrust elsewhere by what were in reality fictitious divisions.

Masterman's study is of historical value, particularly as it focuses on the role of deception in the strategic intelligence process. But it must be noted that the author urged the British Government to release the report for publication because of his concern about the low esteem into which the secret services were falling. In effect, he confesses that he was

[6] Books of interest in this category are: Paul W. Blackstock, *Agents of Deceit* (Chicago 1966); E. H. Cookridge, *Gehlen, Spy of the Century* (New York 1972); Sefton Delmer, *The Counterfeit Spy* (New York 1971); Heinz Höhne, *Codeword Direktor* (New York 1971); Heinz Höhne and Hermann Zolling, *The General Was a Spy* (New York 1971); Ladislas Farago, *The Game of the Foxes* (New York 1972); Reinhard Gehlen, *The Service* (New York 1972); Donald McLachlan, *Room 39* (New York 1968); and Maj.-Gen. Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top* (London 1968).

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motivated to seek permission to publish because he felt that the disclosure of past successes would bolster belief in the efficacy of contemporary secret services. The problem for those evaluating this report is that, because of this motive, the government censored certain passages prior to publication. Given the fact of government censorship, and given Masterman's public-relations motive in gaining official clearance to publish, we are bound to ask whether such a book is self-serving. It does report a striking success at deception—at least a seeming success in managing the adversary's intelligence perceptions. Whether objective history or not, it is a significant document. It begins with "The Theory and Practice of Double Cross," and develops the origins and history of a system by which, in Masterman's words, "*we actively ran and controlled the German espionage system*" in England during World War II (p. 3). Generalizing from his unique experience, he sets forth several conclusions: (a) espionage behind enemy lines often will fail "because the dice are hopelessly loaded against the spy" (p. 187); (b) wartime espionage is not easy and often unrewarding; counter-espionage is less difficult and "may yield satisfactory results" (p. 188); and (c) peacetime espionage is easier and likely to be more rewarding than wartime espionage. These are disputable points, and the arguments are not well developed. But Masterman's study will be of use not only to students of intelligence, but also to those seeking insights into international relations and the politics of national security bureaucracies. Yet it may be that Masterman exaggerates the strategic importance of Operation Double Cross. Successful though this operation appears to have been, it is not clear that the misinformation supplied to German intelligence, telling them exactly and misleadingly what the Allies wanted them to hear and believe, was as decisive as Masterman suggests. The catch is that, although the other side's intelligence might indeed receive the information, this is only one and not always the most pivotal step in the intelligence process. The crucial question is whether the information actually reaches the final decision-maker, and how that information is received. There are some historians (A.J.P. Taylor for example), who doubt that much of the information concocted by Masterman and his associates ever reached Hitler. There are those who argue that Hitler's "hunches" were frequently more of a dominating influence than were German intelligence reports. If that is so, one senses the possibility of an exaggeration of the ultimate importance of the Double Cross operation. At the least it is a difficult matter to measure (how do we know that the "turned-around" agents were not to some degree deceiving their new masters?); at most we

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can assume a self-serving exaggeration of the importance of "dirty tricks" by covert operators in war or in peace. While Masterman's book is a unique disclosure of a secret report on an ostensibly successful operation in World War II, he does not tell us what we really need to know about the intelligence process. That is whether the input of intelligence really made the crucial difference in decision-makers' choices which produced the outcomes.

A second book in the category of works by former insiders is Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.'s *The U.S. Intelligence Community*. His focus is on a topic broader and much more contemporary than Masterman's. His premise is that "much nonsense is written about the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community of the United States" (p. ix). He proposes to "set the record straight," writing from the experience and perspective of twenty-three years in U.S. intelligence services. His service began with the Office of Strategic Services in World War II and concluded as Executive Director-Comptroller of the CIA in 1965. Since then he has taught political science at Brown University. This book is in no sense a "whitewash," nor does it set forth a CIA "line," but we may assume that it contains no information that the CIA wishes to conceal. Kirkpatrick wrote an earlier book, *The Real CIA*,[7] a semi-autobiographical account of the organizational evolution of the American intelligence system. Though less revealing than the title suggests, and less critical than the topic demands, the earlier book offers authentic and rare—if CIA-sanitized—insights into some of the internal bureaucratic struggles of the intelligence community, and into some of the working methods of the intelligence system. In one sense the Kirkpatrick books supplement Dulles' *The Craft of Intelligence*. They present perceptions from the inside, from the viewpoint of privileged information, but essentially they defend the system. While willing to admit faults and failures, there is reluctance to question most major premises or cold-war assumptions about the intelligence system.

Kirkpatrick's more recent book addresses some current policy, organizational, and operational issues. After briefly treating the historical development of the intelligence system, he deals with the issues of accountability and control, by policy makers, by Congress, and by the courts. His analysis of the intelligence role in policy making and implementation focuses on the contrast between the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and subsequent decision making on Vietnam. In the former case, he found the intelligence performance and its use by decision makers to deserve good marks. With regard to Vietnam, the intelli-

[7] (New York 1968).

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gence-policy link was less than satisfactory. In essence, intelligence reports questioning the viability of certain basic Vietnam policies seem to have been ignored.

He also surveys overseas and domestic activities of the CIA which essentially are not related to intelligence, including the CIA's secret subsidies of numerous domestic organizations, first publicly disclosed in detail in 1967. He deals with such matters in the context of analyzing sources of criticism of the intelligence community, and discusses the question of secret intelligence in a free society.

In my most recent book on the nature, policies, organization, and control of the U.S. intelligence system, *The Intelligence Establishment*, I use the term "establishment" in its most general, and somewhat pejorative, meaning: an organization with great power and influence, but without much public visibility or public accountability in the democratic sense. Members of the intelligence establishment include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and several others, including sections of the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission. This intelligence bureaucracy annually devours more than $5 billion of the taxpayer's money.

Over the past fifteen years I have argued that there has been, both within the executive branch and Congress, too little sensitivity and attention to problems of policy, organization, and control of the intelligence community. I am convinced that there has been much conceptual and definitional confusion about the nature of intelligence activities. In 1947 Congress thought it was creating an intelligence agency to gather and interpret *information* on foreign affairs for decision-makers. Congress and the nation later discovered that under the roof of the CIA, all kinds of jiggery-pokery were being organized, ranging from espionage to a wide variety of secret political actions overseas, including paramilitary operations. Furthermore, it was discovered in 1967 that the CIA had become involved in secret subsidies to more than two hundred American *domestic* private organizations. Even more recently, and dramatically, we have learned of the CIA's possible involvement in Watergate (still not fully explained), and in the Ellsberg affair. The odds are that new scandals will be disclosed in the future.

Mr. Kirkpatrick discusses many of these issues in his new book, but in a tone sympathetic to the intelligence system. In general, although his opinions are stated more obliquely than explicitly, he believes that the system has been organized properly, which I do not; has effective

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policy controls, which I doubt; and that most of its programs are justifiable, a judgment from which I strongly dissent.

Although I vigorously disagree with Kirkpatrick on these and related issues, and although I can find an occasional factual error, his book does serve as a source of substantial information. The author is a serious student of intelligence activities, writing from a vantage point more informed than most writers. He treats the subject with a less critical approach than is needed. In essence, Kirkpatrick has faith in the intelligence system and those chosen to be its leaders. He believes that the system, though not without faults, is self-correcting. *The U.S. Intelligence Community* would seem to be designed to restore the faith of those who have become dubious.

III

The "whistle-blowing" or axe-grinding category takes an approach opposite to that of Kirkpatrick, although it may also be written by a former insider. Several works of this type have appeared over the years.[8] The most thought-provoking recent book is McGarvey's *CIA, The Myth and the Madness.*

McGarvey's main thesis is that the picture painted by Dulles and Kirkpatrick, attesting to the general soundness of doctrine and organization of the U.S. intelligence system, particularly the CIA, perpetuates "perhaps the greatest myth of the twentieth century" (p. 3)—that of the effectiveness of the intelligence system. He argues that "the CIA is an insufferable bureaucratic morass with little or no central direction, sorely needing drastic change" (p. 4).

Like the Kirkpatrick manuscripts, McGarvey's draft had to be "cleared" by the Central Intelligence Agency prior to publication. This means that the Agency has censored all information it judged to be directly in violation of security regulations. The Agency could not have been pleased with many of McGarvey's assertions. For example, he writes that we can expect "perhaps another war because of the present dry rot that infects our national intelligence structure." The entire system needs "radical change" because it "has not worked" (p. 15).

[8] Among earlier books in this category, although not by former insiders, are: Sanche de Gramont, *The Secret War* (New York 1962); Andrew Tully, *CIA* (New York 1962); David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (New York 1964); Wise and Ross, *The Espionage Establishment* (New York 1967). One former CIA insider, Victor Marchetti, encountered a court injunction when he and John D. Marks sought to publish a book which contained information the CIA wished to censor. Their book, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York 1974), was published with blank spaces indicating the censored passages. Another recent work by a former CIA agent is Miles Copeland, *Without Cloak or Dagger* (New York 1974).

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Such needed change, he writes, will "require hard decisions—decisions that will set the bureaucracy spinning, that will crush empires, fire men, reorganize the basic missions, and redefine the role of intelligence in United States national life" (pp. 16-17). Furthermore, "as it now stands, the intelligence establishment is of doubtful future value" (p. 34). In addition, "the entire intelligence community is a child of compromise. It merely represents an arena in which conflicting budgetary interests at the Pentagon and policy goals of the State Department are horse-traded" (p. 222).

The foregoing quotations illustrate McGarvey's hyperbolic style. His book is filled with impressionistic generalizations, backroom gossip, revealing anecdotes from his own broad experience, and some shrewd, if iconoclastic, observations about intelligence organization and process. For example, in making a distinction between the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and CIA, he suggests that the DIA as an arm of the military services is incapable of objective analysis, in contrast to the CIA, which according to him has less of a bureaucratic "axe to grind."

Because of his informed irreverence, McGarvey deserves attention. He writes from the vantage point of some fourteen years of experience in the system, including service not only in the Central Intelligence Agency, but in the National Security Agency and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. Like Dulles and Kirkpatrick, he believes an intelligence system is vitally important to national security. But unlike them, he thinks that much that has been done over the past quarter century—in organization, policy, and operations—has been a mistake. What he says rings true, even though the tone is that of the "guardhouse lawyer," and his criticisms are weighted on the negative side.

Boiled down, his message is that the vast intelligence bureaucracy is the product of organizational compromises in 1947 and later years, which have brought forth a huge intelligence boondoggle; most of those who work in the system are time servers and much of their work is involved in bringing forth evidence to support preconceived policy preferences. Any strength or potential leadership in the system is swamped by an endless proliferation of committees, producing a leaderless community. In fact, "community" is a fiction, as each bureau plays the game of empire building. A vast amount of unnecessary data are collected from all parts of the globe, overwhelming the ability of analysts to cope with such purposeless collection. An infatuation with technology has overtaken the system, adding enormously to the annual cost of intelligence, producing rampant duplication and mountains of useless data. The whole system is beyond the reach of policy controls

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or responsible surveillance, particularly by Congress. Furthermore, McGarvey prophetically sensed a danger that the vast intelligence bureaucracy would be turned inward and used to spy on American citizens. After Watergate, we discovered this to be a not unwarranted fear. He recommends total reorganization of the intelligence structure. In his view, this should occur along functional lines, eliminating the existing departments and bureaus. The book ends somewhat weakly, advising readers to write to their Congressmen and the President, demanding radical change.

L. Fletcher Prouty's *The Secret Team*[9] is a similar book. Its subtitle, *The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the World*, suggests something of its conceptualization and precision. The author served many years as an Air Force officer in a liaison role between the Pentagon and the CIA. One searches in vain through nearly five hundred rambling pages to find the identity of the "Secret Team" (ST). At one point, it "consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) and who react to those data, when it seems appropriate to them, with paramilitary plans and activities. . . ." At another, the "team" is led by "a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National Security Council." On the other hand, ST is "not a clandestine super-planning board or super-general-staff." Rather, it is "a bewildering collection of semipermanent or temporarily assembled action committees and networks that respond pretty much *ad hoc* to specific troubles. . . ." The reader will probably remain bewildered about the nature of ST throughout the book.

Although this work may best be described as political surrealism, it has an enlightening quality. Its incoherence may be truly representational of the intelligence system. Before Watergate, before the existence of the "plumbers" was disclosed, and prior to our knowledge that elements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were spying on Nixon and Kissinger, one might have been inclined to dismiss such a book as eccentric. Yet possibly, the real world of secret intelligence is symbolized by Prouty's fantasy of a "Secret Team."

IV

A third category of works on strategic intelligence is represented by Barton Whaley, *Codeword Barbarossa*, and R. Harris Smith, *O.S.S.* These studies analyze the performance of intelligence in wartime con-

[9] (New York 1973); quotations from pp. 2, 3, and 4.

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texts. They represent serious scholarly efforts to overcome the enormous difficulties of access to records and facts (eased somewhat by the passage of time), and to write about intelligence activities in particular World War II settings.

The misleading subtitle of Smith's book is *The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*. It is a secret history only in the sense that the author, barred from access to archives of OSS secret operations, resourcefully interviewed some 176 OSS alumni. Using information from these interviews and from the generally thin literature on the OSS, he gives an episodic account of various OSS operations. Appended is an analysis of the CIA with special attention to the OSS "heritage" as it influenced the creation and evolution of the CIA. (Smith, a political scientist, served briefly in the CIA.) The questions one would expect to be asked in such a study are: What impact did the OSS have on the outcome of World War II? And, how did the OSS experience influence the development and evolution of the Central Intelligence Agency?

Because of the padlocked archives and shallow literature, the OSS has remained a legendary organization. Created in 1942 by presidential direction, it was to provide a coordinated strategic intelligence to guide America's war effort. The disaster at Pearl Harbor was seen as a colossal intelligence failure, and the OSS was designed to prevent future strategic surprises. But it quickly came to have other than informational roles, namely psychological warfare, sabotage, and overseas secret operations of all kinds. OSS has its admirers as well as detractors. Admirers romanticize the group as dedicated and brave activists who, in the face of bureaucratic opposition, contributed significantly to Allied victory both by providing crucial intelligence and by covert operations. Detractors of OSS see it as something of a comic opera, contributing little to victory. In nine episodic chapters Smith recounts various OSS operations, ranging from the European to the Asiatic theaters. Smith adds to our understanding of the OSS role in various operations and provides an insight into internecine bickering among various elements of the Allied war system. But the questions initially posed about OSS efficacy and impact beg for answers. Such disparate functions as psychological and guerrilla warfare, espionage and strategic intelligence, and sabotage and other clandestine services are never clearly delineated.

In the concluding chapter, Smith makes an effort to analyze the impact of the OSS on the CIA, which he says is "in many ways the mirror image of OSS" (p. 361). The significant point, he believes, was that the CIA inherited from the OSS the principle of merging secret

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intelligence and covert political operations in the same organization. Out of this, he suggests, came "CIA's inherited justification for clandestine political operations unrelated to espionage and intelligence analysis" (p. 362). It was this principle and, in fact, OSS alumni that led the United States into such activities as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the entanglement in Southeast Asia.

Smith believes that yet another OSS heritage was later reflected in CIA behavior—the "tradition of dissent within America's intelligence service" (p. 363). This dissent manifested itself in many subsequent clashes between military intelligence analysts, who tended to take a "worst-threat" stance, particularly at budget time, and CIA estimators taking a more objective view. This tradition, he argues, kept the CIA a relatively "liberal" organization. This was at a time when Washington was in danger of domination by the FBI, Senator Joseph McCarthy, and militaristic cold warriors. By 1961, Smith writes, the CIA had become a split organization torn between a left-right ideological line. He raises doubt about the accuracy of the popular image of the CIA as a vanguard of American imperialism. Smith's final chapter, an essay on the OSS heritage in the CIA, appears to assign too much credit to both the OSS and CIA without demonstrating that their product was either necessary or significantly influential in the conduct of foreign affairs. He never seems to ask whether the world would have been much different without these organizations, and if so, why.

Barton Whaley's *Codeword Barbarossa* narrowly focuses upon Hitler's surprise attack on Russia in June 1941. It is a scholarly analysis of the parameters of strategic surprise. Why was Stalin so totally surprised that he suffered a nervous breakdown even though he received many and varied advance warnings? One explanation derives from Roberta Wohlstetter's theory of "noise," as developed in her impressive study, *Pearl Harbor*. According to Whaley, the Wohlstetter communications model is refuted by "Barbarossa," the code name for Hitler's plan to attack Russia. He sets forth an alternative theory of strategic surprise.

Wohlstetter's theory is that strategic surprise can result from a plethora of ambiguous information—"noise"—and that only in hindsight are the signals of impending events clearly seen and distinguished from a mass of contradictory information. Stalin received repeated warnings of a surprise attack, in fact dozens of "signals"—from Churchill, from United States sources, and from his own espionage agents. The generally accepted explanation of his surprise has been, in Whaley's words, "the monstrous fatuity of a Byzantine dictator and his authoritarian system" (p. 3). After becoming dissatisfied with that standard explanation

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of Stalin's blind disregard of warnings about Hitler's intentions, Whaley initially accepted the Wohlstetter concept of "noise" as an adequate explanation. He later discovered, through a truly impressive display of puzzle-solving scholarship, that contrary to popular notion, "in fact, the great majority of world leaders and intelligence services had miscalculated Hitler's intention quite as badly as Stalin" (p. 7). The question became, how did Hitler manage to inflict surprise on Stalin as well as on most others—statesmen as well as intelligence analysts?

Whaley has assembled a carefully researched catalog of pertinent events and factors that seem relevant to solving the mystery. He has identified no less than 84 separate "warnings" that might have alerted the Russians to the impending attack. On the surface, "these facts suggest an ostrich syndrome at the peak of the Soviet system. Yet quite another interpretation can emerge if some other, more subtle facts are admitted in evidence" (p. 129). In a detailed and novel analysis of these "more subtle facts," Whaley shows that Hitler took special steps to conceal "Barbarossa" from foreign intelligence services and particularly to *mislead* them about it. Indeed, the gigantic military operation was "effectively concealed from the very civil-military bureaucracy conducting it" (p. 147).

But the main point in Whaley's analysis is that Stalin was misled and became the victim of strategic surprise essentially because of, in the words of a German secret document, "the greatest deception operation in the history of war" (p. 172). The Germans launched a well-orchestrated deception scheme with four themes: invasion of Britain; defense against Russia; buildup against the Balkans, particularly an invasion of Greece; and, an impending ultimatum by which Germany would make demands on Russia—and thus give "fair warning." In the end, Stalin seems to have "bought" the last hypothesis. He expected not an attack but an ultimatum from Hitler. Whaley concludes that Stalin's surprise was not because of "noise" or ambiguous warnings. Rather, it was because the Germans had successfully reduced the ambiguity of warnings. "In short, surprise had been inflicted by the deliberately false signals and not by the ambiguous signals, much less the distracting noise" (p. 242).

In essence, Whaley challenges the prevailing notion that Stalin was warned, but stubbornly ignored the warning. He claims to have refuted the Wohlstetter concept of "noise" which prevents an accurate reading of signals that become so clear in hindsight. Essentially, then, this sheds new light on the art of deception in international politics and its consequences for intelligence estimating. Offered is a "new

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model of strategic surprise" (p. 243). Deliberate "disinformation," he argues, cannot be lumped with other varieties of "noise."

Whaley's book is full of fascinating details about espionage and intelligence activities during World War II. It is one of the significant books on the subject and will be of lasting value to those who would understand more about the mysteries of the intelligence process. It is well written and organized, contains more than one hundred pages of useful appendices, and includes an excellent bibliography. As for his thesis of strategic surprise of Stalin by Hitler, one cannot resist making the suggestion that Stalin may have been influenced by self-deception more than by anything else. He did not want Hitler to attack; this left him vulnerable to strategic surprise. Just so, Churchill's prophetic prediction of the attack: Churchill, desiring Russia as an active ally, wanted it to happen, and so predicted it.

V

Klaus Knorr has noted the lack of a theory of intelligence, either descriptive or normative. Without such a theory, describing how intelligence performs in reality or how it ought to perform, it has been difficult to judge whether intelligence work is effectively performed. In the absence of theory, there are inadequate guides also for judging questions of process or organization.[10] Whaley's is the only one of the books reviewed here that has a theoretical thrust. Taken as a whole, however, these books in varying degrees add to our knowledge of how intelligence systems work, and highlight certain universal problems of strategic intelligence.

It is possible to identify some major elements in order to consider at least some modest, tentative steps down the road to theory. There are analytically separate problems of intelligence policy and organization, of doctrine, of process, of product, and of impact. Each can be seen as a separate piece of the puzzle, although each is interrelated with the others. Products of a strategic intelligence system may be accurate or not, relevant or not to policies to be decided, have credibility (regardless of their accuracy or relevance) or not, and be influential or not in decision making (regardless of their accuracy, relevance, or credibility). Another way of putting this is to suggest that strategic intelligence is potential power (in a decisional setting), but, like all power, it is situational. The difficulty that scholars face in attempting to analyze the

[10] Klaus Knorr, *Foreign Intelligence and the Social Sciences*, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 17 (Princeton 1964), 46.

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influence of strategic intelligence in particular policy-making contexts is matched only by its importance to an understanding of foreign policy decision making.

Case studies and episodic accounts such as those by Masterman, Whaley, and Smith add to our understanding of important variables that condition the impact of strategic intelligence. Critiques and commentaries such as those by Kirkpatrick and McGarvey illuminate the policy and bureaucratic context in which intelligence professionals work.

But as long as theories of intelligence are virtually nonexistent, it may not be possible to develop criteria for measuring the effectiveness or impact of strategic intelligence in decision-making systems. In the absence of theories, argues Knorr, "we have no criteria (indicators!) for judging whether intelligence work in the United States is done well or badly or for specifying ways of improving it."[11] Possibly it is overly ambitious at this stage to call for theories. Some cautious first steps may be taken in the form of tentative hypotheses or generalizations. It is clear that little effort has been made, in the face of the enormous obstacles to gaining evidence, to evaluate the intelligence performance systematically and objectively. For several reasons, the role of intelligence is difficult to measure in terms of influence. One is that the outside scholar usually is denied access to the records. The material is usually highly classified, with the result (and perhaps intention) of keeping it permanently beyond the view of scholars. Even when a scholar gains access to some intelligence reports that figured in decisions, a formidable difficulty remains of determining how such reports were perceived. (Among the few exceptions is Vietnam policy, the development of which—particularly the intelligence ingredient—has seen unusual disclosure.) Still another fundamental obstacle to understanding is the use and abuse of the term "intelligence." As suggested earlier, this is a definitional or conceptual as well as an organizational problem.

Events of recent times, such as the war in Vietnam, unprecedented disclosures in the *Pentagon Papers*, Watergate, and related events have outrun our previous understanding of the intelligence system. New dimensions to the problems of use and abuse of secret intelligence agencies are being recognized. And new sources for fresh analysis have been uncovered. At the same time, a new watershed period in American foreign policy has been reached, affording a fresh perspective on policy performance and the intelligence role therein. The role of intelligence estimates or assumptions in the origins of the cold war, in

[11] *Ibid.*, 47.

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specific major cold-war events, and in the more recent moves in the damping of cold-war tensions have not been adequately analyzed.

What Wohlstetter has done in *Pearl Harbor* and Whaley in *Codeword Barbarossa* needs to be replicated for more recent events. I would state two competing and somewhat discouraging propositions as starting points:

1. Intelligence agencies tend to report what they think their leaders want to see or hear.
2. The decision-making leadership sees or hears what it wants, no matter what intelligence is reported.

Hypotheses along these lines need to be explored in pursuit of fuller knowledge about the impact of intelligence estimates on decisions. Testing them will no doubt be very difficult, given government secrecy. It is easy to be discouraged about this subject as a research frontier. Yet it is vitally important to an understanding of decision making to probe this dimly lit frontier. Otherwise we may never know how we are governed or how information bureaucracies can affect the future course of world politics.

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

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